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Three Essays on Credit Derivatives and Liquidity
Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical essays on pricing credit derivatives and the impact of liquidity
on the prices of credit derivatives. In essay one, I investigate empirically the pricing of Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDO) within the framework of copula models. In essay two I analyze the impact of
illiquidity on Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads on an individual level. In essay three I analyze the ef-
fect of market wide illiquidity on portfolio CDS spreads on an aggregate level. Overall, I contribute to the
existing literature by proving evidence on the importance of liquidity on CDS spreads on both individual
and aggregate level.
Esta tesis consiste de tres ensayos empíricos sobre la valoración de derivados de crédito y sobre el
efecto de la iliquidez sobre los precios de estos derivados. En el primer ensayo, se analiza empiricamente
la valoración de obligaciones de deuda colateralizada (CDO) utilizando funciones de cópulas. En el
segundo ensayo se analiza el impacto de la falta de liquidez sobre los Credit Default Swap (CDS) a nivel
individual. En el tercer ensayo, se analiza el impacto de iliquidez agregada sobre los spreads de carteras
de CDS agregadas. En general, esta tesis contribuye a la literatura existente, enfatizando la importancia
de la liquidez en los spreads de CDS, tanto a nivel individual como agregado.
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Introducción
El surgimiento de los mercados de derivados de crédito es relativamente un fenómeno nuevo. Dos décadas han
pasado desde la creación de los primeros derivados de crédito por parte de JP Morgan en 1995. Sin embargo,
en este corto período de tiempo los mercados de derivados de crédito han tenido un crecimiento sin prece-
dentes tanto en términos de su tamaño como en la variedad de instrumentos que se crearon. Para el segundo
semestre de 2011 el valor nominal de los contratos de derivados de crédito había superado los 32 millones
de dólares USA (informe de BIS (2011)). Inicialmente, los primeros derivados de crédito fueron contratos
de credit default swaps (CDS). Para satisfacer las necesidades crecientes de diversos grupos de inversores
se crearon complejos instrumentos de derivados de crédito tales como obligaciones de deuda colateralizada
(CDO), CDOs sintéticos, total return swaps (TRS), swaptions entre otros.
Sin embargo, ha habido costes altos asociados con el crecimiento de los mercados de derivados de crédito.
Por ejemplo, hay una creencia general entre los académicos y políticos de que los mercados de derivados de
crédito han provocado las recientes crisis financieras que se originaron en agosto de 2007 (véase, por ejemplo,
Brunnermeier (2009)). Más concretamente, los derivados de crédito se han utilizado como instrumentos para
negociar y transferir la deuda originada por las hipotecas subprime, por lo tanto, amplificando el efecto y
la magnitud de la actual crisis financiera. La otra desventaja de los derivados de crédito antes del inicio de
las crisis financieras es que esos instrumentos eran nuevos. Por lo tanto, también hubo una falta general de
comprensión de como estos instrumentos funcionaban y se valoraban.
Ha habido también crecientes preocupaciones relacionadas particularmente con la liquidez de los deriva-
dos de crédito después del inicio de las crisis financieras. Esto se debe a las fricciones en los mercados
de derivados de crédito, tales como las asimetrías de información (Acharya y Johnson (2007)) y los costes
de búsqueda ((Duffie et al., (2007)). Los contratos de CDS se han creado en la demanda de instrumentos
que puedan proporcionar información precisa sobre la solvencia de las compañías que estos contratos hacen
referencia y por la posibilidad de la negociación de manera oportuna sobre el riesgo de crédito de sus em-
presas subyacentes. Por lo tanto, la presencia de fricciones en el mercado de derivados de crédito pueden
"distorsionar" la verdadera medida de la solvencia de las empresas.
Estos factores enfatizan la importancia de comprender la manera en la que funcionan los derivados de
crédito, la forma en que se valoran o en que se deberían valorarse estos instrumentos, y los factores que
pueden influir a sus precios.
Esta tesis consiste de tres ensayos empíricos sobre la valoración de derivados de crédito y sobre el efecto
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de la iliquidez sobre los precios de estos derivados. En el primer ensayo, se analiza empiricamente la valo-
ración de obligaciones de deuda colateralizada (CDO) utilizando funciones de cópulas. En el segundo ensayo
se analiza el impacto de la falta de liquidez sobre los Credit Default Swap (CDS) a nivel individual. En el
tercer ensayo, se analiza el impacto de iliquidez agregada sobre los spreads de carteras de CDS agregadas. En
general, esta tesis contribuye a la literatura existente, enfatizando la importancia de la liquidez en los spreads
de CDS, tanto a nivel individual como agregado. A continuación se ofrece una descripción general de los tres
ensayos y las principales conclusions de ellos.
El primer ensayo se titula "Análisis VAR del modelo double t". En este ensayo se analiza empíricamente
la valoración de obligaciones de deuda colateralizada (CDO) utilizando modelos de cópulas estadisticas. La
relevancia de este estudio se justifica por el hecho de que la valoración de CDOs sigue siendo un campo
abierto de investigación tanto en la literatura del riesgo de crédito como en la práctica. Esto se puede explicar
en parte por la falta de éxito o "no-integridad" de los modelos utilizados para la valoración de tanto los CDOs
como de productos de riesgo estructurado de crédito en general.
Los modelos de cópula fueron el primer paradigma que fueron aplicados para la valoración de CDOs.
Dentro del enfoque de cópulas consideramos el modelo de double t cópula de Hull y White (2004) y la
cópula gaussiana, siendo este último el estándar en el mercado para la valoración de los CDOs. Además
de esto, llevamos a cabo un análisis dinámico (VAR) de los parámetros implicados del modelo de doble t
copula. El objetivo del análisis VAR es examinar mejor los factores que puedan explican la dinámica de los
parámetros del modelo double t copula. Por lo tanto, el análisis dinámico puede tener implicaciones para la
cobertura de riesgo de la cartera de crédito en virtud de modelos de cópula.
En resumen, en este estudio empírico analizamos el modelo double t cópula de Hull y White (2004).
Contribuimos a la literatura existente de dos maneras. En primer lugar, estimamos el modelo para los mer-
cados europeos de derivados de crédito mediante el uso de los datos del mercado de los tramos de índice
iTraxx Europe para el período de tiempo que va desde 27 de marzo de 2006 a 19 de septiembre de 2006.
Obtenemos los spreads de los tramos del indice iTraxx Europe de Markit, y los spreads de CDS de las em-
presas en el índice iTraxx Europe de Datastream. En segundo lugar, llevamos a cabo un análisis dinámico
de los parámetros del modelo de doble t cópula para examinar los factores que pueden explicar la dinámica
de estos parámetros. El modelo de double t cópula reduce significativamente los errores de valoración de los
tramos de CDOs en comparación con el modelo de Gaussian cópula, el estándar utilizado para la valoración
de los CDOs. También encontramos que los parámetros óptimos de los grados de libertad del model double
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t copula varían de un día a otro. Los resultados de análisis VAR de los parámetros del model double t copula
demuestran que el parámetro de la correlación implícita del modelo puede ser explicada por las principales
variables financieras, tales como el índice de volatilidad VIX, los spreads de term y default. La raíz del error
cuadrático medio (ECM), la medida de ajuste del modelo de double t copula a los spreads de tramos de CDOs,
se ve afectado por el índice de volatilidad VIX y term spread. Las predicciones de fuera de la muestra de los
parámetros del modelo con las variables exógenas empleadas se encuentran dentro del intervalo de confianza
estimado al 95%.
El segundo ensayo se titula "Sobre los efectos de la iliquidez en los spreads de los CDS". En este ensayo se
examina la "creencia generalizada" de los CDS, que establece que los spreads de CDS son una medida pura
de riesgo de crédito de las empresas que estos CDSs hacen referencia. Sin embargo, ha habido una creciente
evidencia empírica que sugiere que los spreads de los CDS no pueden ser completamente explicados por
factores de riesgo de crédito relacionados con la empresa subyacente (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Blanco
et al. (2005), Tang y Yan (2008), Berndt et al. (2008)).
En este ensayo se evalúa la importancia de la liqudiez en los spreads de CDS cuando los inversores están
negociando o cubriendo sus posiciones del riesgo de crédito bajo condiciones de altos riesgos financieros.
Nuestra hipótesis es que la liquidez es un elemento importante en el CDS, debido a las fricciones en el
mercado, tales como las asimetrías de información (Acharya y Johnson (2007)) y los costes de búsqueda
((Duffie et al., 2007)). Contamos con una serie de medidas para captar diferentes aspectos de la liquidez en
los spreads de los CDS. Más concretamente, medimos la liquidez de CDS con los bid-ask spreads, el número
de contribuyentes, la puntuación de liquidez de Fitch, medida de gamma iliquidez similar a la medida de la
iliquidez de bonos de Bao, Pan y Wang (2011), y con la medida de iliqudiez de rendimiento-volumen similar
a la medida de iliquidez de Amihud (2002) para las acciones.
Analizamos la relación entre la liquidez y CDS de dos maneras. En primer lugar, realizamos un análisis
de datos de panel para estudiar la relación transversal entre las medidas de liquidez y los spreads CDS. En
segundo lugar, hacemos el mismo análisis para cada uno de los componentes de CDS por separado, los
cuales son la prima de riesgo y el componente de riesgo de incumplimiento. Para descomponer los spreads
de CDS entre la prima de riesgo y componente de riesgo de incumplimiento aplicamos la metodología de Pan
y Singleton (2008) y Longstaff et al. (2008). Nuestro análisis empírico se basa en una muestra amplia de 284
contratos de CDS de Markit. El período de tiempo que consideramos en nuestro análisis va desde enero de
2004 hasta abril de 2011, que también engloba el período de las crisis financieras recientes.
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En resumen, nuestros resultados indican que los bid-ask spreads, gama medida de iliqudiez y la medida
de iliquidez rendimiento-volumen son factores importantes para explicar la liquidez tanto de los CDS como
de los constituyentes de los spreads de CDS, los cuales son la prima de riesgo y el componente de riesgo
de incumplimiento. Además, similar a los resultados de Pan y Singleton (2008) encontramos que para los
mercados corporativos de CDS una fracción importante de riesgo sistémico se valora a través de la prima
de riesgo de CDS. Por último, encontramos que la utilidad del número de contribuyentes y la puntuación de
liquidez de Fitch como medidas de liquidez es débil.
El tercer ensayo se titula "Liquidiez Agregada en los spreads de Credit Default Swaps". Como sugiere el
título, este estudio analiza el efecto de las medidas de iliquidez agregadas en los mercados de CDS. La
evidencia empírica sugiere claramente la presencia de un componente de liquidez en los CDS, independi-
entemente de la calidad crediticia, vencimiento y tipo de subyacente (ver Buhler y Trapp (2008), de Jarrow
(2010), y Bongaerts, Jong y Driessen (2011), entre otros). Sin embargo, la mayoría de los artículos analiza la
importancia de la liquidez a nivel individual.
Este trabajo contribuye a la literatura analizando el efecto agregado de liquidez en los mercados de CDS.
Estudiamos en profundidad el impacto de la iliquidez en los spreads de CDS a nivel agregado. En primer
lugar, mostramos que, para una calificación crediticia y vencimiento dado, hay un movimiento comun en
la liquidez de los contratos de CDS. A continuación, mostramos que la iliquidez agregada es un poderoso
determinante de los spreads de los CDS. Hay una relación positiva y consistentemente significativa entre los
spreads de CDS y los cambios de la iliqudiez agregada de mercado para todos los vencimientos y califica-
ciones crediticias. Por otra parte, esta relación es más fuerte durante los períodos de estrés. Por último, existe
una relación monótona entre la sensibilidad a cambios en la liqudiez agregada de mercado y calificaciones
crediticias, siendo esta sensibilidad más fuerte para los subyacentes de alto rendimiento. De hecho, el riesgo
de liquidez agregada parece ser un factor más importante que el riesgo de crédito en el mercado de CDS. Esta
conclusión es consistente con la importancia del fenómeno de flight-to-liquidity, dada la naturaleza variable
en el tiempo del riesgo de liquidez en los spreads de CDS. Esto es especialmente importante en los plazos
más cortos. Episodios de crisis a corto plazo reflejan flight-to-liquidity, pero no de flight-to-quality.
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Introduction
The emergence of credit derivatives markets is relatively a new phenomenon. Two decades have passed
since the creation of the first credit derivatives by JP Morgan in 1995. However, within this short period of
time credit derivatives markets have had an unprecedented growth both in terms of their size and variety of
instruments being traded. For the second half of 2011 the notional amount outstanding of credit derivative
contracts surpasses 32 billion U.S. dollars (BIS (2011)). Initially, the first credit derivatives were credit default
swap (CDS) contracts. To satisfy the increasing needs of various groups of investors, complex derivatives
instruments, such as Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO), Synthetic CDOs, Total Return Swaps (TRS),
Credit Default Swaptions and others, have been created.
However, there have been high costs associated with the growth of credit derivatives markets. For in-
stance, there is a general belief among academic scholars and policy makers that the credit derivatives mar-
kets have induced the recent financial crises that originated in August 2007 (see, for instance, Brunnermeier
(2009)). More specifically, credit derivatives have been used as instruments to trade and transfer the debt
originated by subprime mortgages, hence amplifying the effect and scale of the current financial crises. The
other downside of credit derivatives before the start of the financial crises is that those instruments were new.
Hence, there was also a general lack of understanding of the way these instruments work and were being
priced.
There have been also growing concerns associated particularly with the liquidity of credit derivatives after
the start of the financial crises. This is due to market frictions in credit derivatives markets, such as asym-
metries of information (Acharya and Johnson (2007)) and costs of search (Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen
(2007)). CDS contracts have been created in demand for instruments that can provide accurate informa-
tion about the creditworthiness of companies that they reference and for the possibility of timely trading on
the credit risk of their underlying companies. Hence, the presence of market frictions can "distort" the true
measure of creditworthiness of companies.
These factors underline the importance of understanding the way credit derivatives work, the way they
are/should be priced, and the factors that can influence their prices.
This thesis consists of three empirical essays on pricing credit derivatives and the impact of liquidity
on the prices of credit derivatives. In essay one, I investigate empirically the pricing of Collateralized Debt
Obligations (CDO) within the framework of copula models. In essay two I analyze the impact of illiquidity
on Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads on an individual level. In essay three I analyze the effect of market
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wide illiquidity on portfolio CDS spreads on an aggregate level. Overall, I contribute to the existing literature
by proving evidence on the importance of liquidity on CDS spreads on both individual and aggregate level.
Below I provide an overall description and the main findings of the three essays.
The first essay is titled "VAR Analysis of Double T Copula Model". In this essay I address the pricing of
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) within the framework of copula models. The relevance of this study
can be justified by the fact that CDO pricing still remains an open field of investigation both in the credit risk
literature and in practice. This can be partially explained by the lack of success or "non-completeness" of the
models used to price CDOs in particular or structured credit risk products in general. Copula models were
the first paradigm to be applied to CDO pricing. Within the copula approach we consider the double t copula
model of Hull and White (2004) and the Gaussian copula, the latter being the market standard for CDO
pricing. Furthermore, we carry out a dynamic (VAR) analysis of the parameters implied from the double t
copula model. The objective of the VAR analysis is to examine and have a closer look at the factors that drive
the dynamics of the double t copula model parameters. Hence, the dynamic analysis can have implications
for the portfolio credit risk hedging under copula models.
In short, in this study we empirically test the double t copula model of Hull and White (2004). We con-
tribute to the existing literature in two ways. First, we estimate the model for the European credit derivative
markets by using the market data on the iTraxx Europe index tranches for the time period ranging fromMarch
27, 2006 to September 19, 2006. We obtain the data on tranche spreads from Markit, and the CDS spreads
of the companies underlying the iTraxx Europe index from Datastream. Second, we carry out a dynamic
analysis of the double t copula model implied parameters to examine the factors driving their dynamics. We
find that the double t copula model significantly reduces the pricing errors compared to the Gaussian copula
model, the standard used for CDO pricing. We also find that the optimal degrees of freedom parameters of the
double t copula model change on a day-to-day basis. VAR analysis of the double t copula model parameters
reveal that the implied correlation parameter of the model can be explained by major financial variables, such
as the volatility index VIX, the term and default spreads. The root mean square error (rmse), the mispricing
measure of the double t copula model, is affected by the volatility index VIX and the term spread. The out-of-
sample predictions of the model parameters with the employed exogenous variables lie within the estimated
95% confidence interval.
The second essay is titled "On the effects of illiquidity in CDS spreads". In this essay I examine the "con-
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ventional wisdom" for CDSs, which states that CDS spreads are a pure price for credit risk of the companies
that they reference. However, there has been a growing empirical evidence that suggests that CDS spreads
may not be fully explained by credit risk factors related to the underlying company (Collin-Dufresne, Gold-
stein, and Martin (2001), Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Tang and Yan (2008), Berndt, Douglas, Duffie,
Ferguson, and Schranz (2008)).
In this essay we assesses the relevance of liquidity in default swap contracts when investors are hedg-
ing/trading under financially distressed conditions. We hypothesize that liquidity is an important element
in CDS spreads because of the market frictions, such as asymmetries of information (Acharya and Johnson
(2007) and search costs (Duffie et al. (2007)). We employ several measures to capture different aspects of
liquidity in CDS spreads. More specifically, we proxy CDS liquidity with CDS bid-ask spreads, number of
contributors, Fitch liquidity score, gamma measure of illiquidity similar to the bond illiquidity measure of
Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), and return-to-volume measure of illiquidity similar to the illiquidity measure of
Amihud (2002) for stocks. We characterize the relationship between liquidity and default swap spreads in two
ways. First, we perform a panel data analysis to study the cross-sectional relationship between our liquidity
proxies and plain CDS spreads. Second, we do the same analysis for each of the CDS constituents separately,
which are the distress risk premium and the default risk component. To decompose the CDS spreads into risk
premium and default risk components we apply the methodology of Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff,
Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2008).
Our empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive sample of 284 CDS contracts from Markit. The time
period that we consider in our analysis spans from January 2004 to April 2011, covering the period of the
recent financial crises. In short, our results indicate that the bid-ask spread, the asset’s gamma and the return-
to-volume measure are important factors in explaining liquidity of both CDS spreads and the constituents of
CDS spreads, i.e. the risk premium and the default risk component. Additionally, similar to Pan and Single-
ton (2008) we find that an important fraction of systematic risk is being priced via the distress premium in
corporate CDS markets. Finally, we find that the usefulness of the number of contributors and Fitch liquidity
score as measures of liquidity is weak.
The third essay is titled "Market-Wide Lliquidity in Credit Default Swap Spreads". As the title suggests,
this study analyzes market-wide liquidity in the CDS market. The empirical evidence clearly supports the
presence of a liquidity component of CDS spreads independently of credit quality, maturity and type of
underlying (see Buhler and Trapp (2009), Jarrow (2011), and Bongaerts, Jong, and Driessen (2011), among
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others). However, most papers analyze the importance of liquidity at the individual level.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing market-wide liquidity in the CDS market. We study
thoroughly the impact of illiquidity on CDS spreads on an aggregate level. We first show that, for a given
maturity and credit rating, there is a strong commonality in the liquidity of CDS contracts. Then, we show
that market-wide illiquidity is a powerful determinant of CDS spreads. There is a consistently positive and
significant relation between CDS spreads and market-wide illiquidity changes across all maturities and credit
qualities. Moreover, this relation is stronger during stress periods. Finally, there is a monotonic relationship
between sensitivity to market-wide changes of liquidity and credit ratings, being this sensitivity stronger for
high yield underlyings. Indeed, aggregate illiquidity risk seems to be a more important factor than credit risk
in the CDSmarket. This conclusion is also supported by a significant flight-to-liquidity given the time-varying
nature of liquidity risk embedded in CDS spreads. This is particularly important at the shortest maturities.
Crisis episodes reflect short-term flight-to-liquidity but not flight-to-credit quality.
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Chapter 1
VAR Analysis of Double T Copula Model
Abstract
In this paper we empirically test the double t copula model of Hull and White (2004). We contribute to
the existing literature in two ways. First, we estimate the model for the European credit derivative markets
by using the market data on the iTraxx Europe index tranches for the time period ranging from March
27, 2006 to September 19, 2006. Second, we carry out dynamic analysis of the double t copula model
implied parameters to examine the factors driving their dynamics. We find that the double t copula model
significantly reduces the pricing errors compared to the Gaussian copula model, the standard used for
CDO pricing. We also find that there is a change in the optimal degrees of freedom parameters of double
t copula model on a day-to-day basis. VAR analysis of the double t copula model parameters reveals
that the implied correlation parameter of the model can be explained by major financial variables, such as
the volatility index VIX, the term and default spreads. The root mean square error(rmse), the mispricing
measure of the double t copula model, is affected by the volatility index VIX and the term spreads. The
out-of-sample predictions of the model parameters with the employed exogenous variables lie within the
estimated 95% confidence interval.
1
1 Introduction
CDO pricing still remains an open field of investigation both in the credit risk literature and in practice. This
can be partially explained by the lack of success or “non-completeness" of the models used to price CDOs in
particular or structured credit risk products in general. By looking at the mispricing of different approaches
used to price CDOs we hope to help improve existing models, and hopefully improve credit risk management
and hedging.
In this paper we focus on the copula approach, which was the first paradigm to be applied to CDO pricing.
Within the copula approach we consider the double t copula model of Hull andWhite (2004) and the Gaussian
copula, the latter being the market standard for CDO pricing. We have chosen the double t copula model for
our analysis based on the empirical performance of this model relative to other copula approaches. For
instance, for August 4, 2004 Hull and White (2004) found that the double t copula model with even degrees
of freedom provides the best fit to the iTraxx Europe and CDX index tranche spreads. Burtschell et al. (2009)
find the same result based on the iTraxx European tranche data for February 8, 2005. Other papers using
the double t copula model and finding similar results are Kalemanova et al. (2007) and Mortensen (2005).
However, all these studies base their analysis on a cross sectional data for a single day (non-intra day).
Wang et al. (2009) estimate the double t copula by using market data for 248 days for the North American
credit derivatives market. One of the contributions of our paper is that we test the double t copula model
for the European credit derivatives market. In doing so we use a sample size of 114 days. Like Wang et al.
(2009), we consider a more general case where the two degrees of freedom parameters of the double t copula
model are allowed to be non-integer numbers as opposed to the conventional model specification, in which
the degrees of freedom parameters are restricted to be whole numbers.1 Note that in the double t copula
model the first degrees of freedom parameter represents the state of the common factor affecting all the
names in a credit portfolio, whereas the second degrees of freedom parameter characterizes the idiosyncratic
state of each name. The other contribution of our paper is that we carry out a dynamic (VAR) analysis of the
parameters implied from the double t copula model. The objective of the VAR analysis is to examine and
have a closer look at the factors that drive the dynamics of the double t copula model parameters. Hence, the
dynamic analysis can have implications for the portfolio credit risk hedging under copula models.
1By allowing the degrees of freedom parameters to be time varying, we aim to capture extra variation in the time series of the
degrees of freedom parameters, which can be critical for determining the factors driving their dynamics.
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To test the model, we consider the data on the iTraxx Europe credit index and its tranches ranging from
March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006. The index and tranche maturities are 5 years, which is the most
typical maturity for this type of products. We also compare the results with those obtained for the one factor
Gaussian copula that serves as benchmark. We find that on average the double t copula reduces pricing errors
by more than four times compared to the one factor Gaussian copula model. As for the degrees of freedom
parameters of the double t copula model, we find that two degrees of freedom parameters of the double t
copula model estimates from market data vary on a day-to-day basis and are different one from the other.
This is in contrast to the methodology and results of Wang et al. (2009) where they estimate the double t
copula model with one time varying degrees of freedom parameter equal for both factors.
In the literature of CDO pricing, some authors (see, for instance, Hull and White (2004), Burtschell et al.
(2009)) have considered the double t copula model with both degrees of freedom parameters equal to 4. We
test for the time invariance in the parameters using mean tests for the degrees of freedom parameters of the
double t copula model. First, the hypothesis that the means of two degrees of freedom parameters are the
same is rejected at the 5 percent level against the alternative that they are different. Second, we fail to reject
the hypothesis that the first degrees of freedom parameter is equal to four, but we reject the hypothesis that
the second degrees of freedom parameter is four.
Finally, we study the time series behaviour of the implied model parameters and the pricing errors of
the double t copula model. To do this, we conduct a VAR analysis of the implied correlation of the double
t copula model, two degrees of freedom parameters of the model as well as the root mean square error
(RMSE). We also control for a number of variables representing major volatility, treasury and corporate bond
markets. Those are the volatility index VIX, treasury term spread defined as the difference between the 10
year constant maturity treasury bond yields and 1 year constant maturity treasury bill yields, and the default
spread of Moody’s, defined as the difference between Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields.
The time series of the implied default correlation parameter of the double t copula model can be explained
by all the considered exogenous variables.2 The relationship between the implied correlation of the double
t coupla model and the VIX index is positive and statistically significant. An increase in the VIX index
2Note, that in what follows the interpretation of the VAR results hold for the risk neutral parameters that are implied from the
double t copula model. In particular, as we do not have historical measures of default time correlation, we cannot separate “objective"
correlation under P measure from the “priced" correlation under Q measure. Hence, the interpretations are relevant for the market
price or premium inherent in default time correlation.
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might be interpreted as an increase in overall market uncertainty, which can also contribute to the increase
in the default correlation among various companies. The negative sign of the term spread may indicate that
increasing term spreads may reduce the riskiness of many companies as measures by the CDS spreads, hence
may also decrease the default correlation among them. In corporate bond markets, the Moody’s default
spread is has a positive and a significant effect on the correlation. The intuition behind the positive sign is
that growing default spreads can signal concerns about the creditworthiness of the companies, hence induce
increases in the default correlation among them.
We find that model mispricing, measured by the root mean square error, can be explained by such macro
factors as the volatility index VIX and the term spreads. The sign of the coefficient for the VIX is negative and
statistically significant, whereas the sign of the coefficient of the term spread is positive and also statistically
significant. The positive sign of the coefficient of the the VIX index indicates that the double t copula model
captures better the tranche spreads of the iTraxx Europe index when there are volatile conditions expected
over future time horizons. On the other side, the positive sign of the coefficient of the term spread suggests
that the model captures worse the tranche spreads when good economic conditions are expected. Overall,
these results seem to suggest that the double t copula model captures better the tranches of the iTraxx Europe
index for expected bad times than for good times.
The explanatory power of the degrees of freedom parameters is at most at the 10 percent level, and the
coefficients of the variables of those equations are difficult to interpret. The out-of-sample predictions for the
model parameters show acceptable forecasting power.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a literature review of the work that has been
done in credit derivatives pricing. Section 3 describes the general approach to synthetic CDO tranche pricing.
Section 4 present the theory of portfolio loss distribution function modelling and building within the factor
copula framework. It also reviews one factor Gaussian and double t copula models, respectively. Section 5
describes the data. Section 6 reports the results from empirical analysis. Section 7 summarizes the results
and concludes.
4
2 Literature Review
Due to its simplicity and tractability, the one factor Gaussian copula, introduced by Vasicek (1987), Vasicek
(1991) and later formalized by Li (2000), has become the market standard for CDO pricing. However, the
theoretical foundations of the model have been questioned. It performs poorly when one tries to replicate
market prices for tranches of a CDO with a constant correlation parameter. Furthermore, the empirical cor-
relation numbers, implied by the market tranche spreads of the same CDO assuming a Gaussian copula, are
not constant and form a smile shape. The weaknesses of the model have been found to be the one factor
correlation structure and the lack of tail dependence in the Gaussian copula.
To overcome some of the problems of the one factor Gaussian copula, a number of authors have proposed
alternative parametrizations of the one factor copula. Hull and White (2004) extend the model by changing
the distributional assumptions in factor copulas from normal to Student t. This gives rise to the so called
double t copula model. Kalemanova et al. (2007) introduce another factor copula by considering the normal
inverse Gaussian distribution for portfolio loss default modelling. Andersen and Sidenius (2005) extend the
model by randomizing recovery rates and factor loadings. Another paper introducing a stochastic correlation
structure in the portfolio loss default modelling is Burtschell et al. (2007). Other copulas have been proposed:
Student t (Marshall and Naldi (2002), O’Kane and Schloegl (2002), Demarta and McNeil (2005), Clayton
(Schonbutcher (2001), Rogge and Schonbutcher (2003), Marshall-Olkin (Marshall and Olkin (1976), Duffie
and Singleton (1998)).3 However, their performances have been marginally satisfactory. A good introduction
and comparisons of the Gaussian, stochastic correlation Gaussian, Student t, double t, Clayton and Marshal-
Olkin copula models can be found in Burtschell et al. (2009). Brunlid (2006) describes the generalized
hyperbolic copulas, that are skewed, and include the normal inverse Gaussian, the variance gamma and the
skewed Student t copulas.
Another line of research has looked into increasing the number of factors in the model. This approach
has been considered, among others, by Hull and White (2004), Lucas et al. (2001), and Moreno et al. (2008).
For a theoretical treatment of the pricing issues of the multi-factor copulas when the factors are Gaussian, see
3Note, that the double t and student t copulas are similar in that they both employ student t distribution. However, these are two
different models as the double t copula model assumes that both the common and idiosyncratic factors of the model follow a student
t distribution, whereas the Student t copula assumes that the weighted sum of the common and idiosyncratic factors is student t. As
the sum of two student t random variables is not a student t random variable, those two specifications give rise to two different copula
models.
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Glasserman and Suchintabandid (2006), Iscoe and Kreinin (2007).
An important aspect of the factor copula models is the assumption of conditional independence. This
assumption allows to significantly reduce the computational dimension of the problem, and to derive semi-
analytical formulas for CDO portfolio loss distribution functions. Andersen and Sidenius (2003) use recursive
methods to build up the portfolio loss function, while Hull and White (2004) apply a similar technique by
considering the probability bucketing procedure in case recovery rates and credit principals in the underlying
portfolio are different. Andersen and Sidenius (2005) also propose a technique for portfolio loss distribution
evaluation when the notional amounts and the recovery rates of underlying portfolio names are pairwise
different. Laurent and Gregory (2003) employ another technique which first evaluates the characteristic
function of portfolio loss and then inverts it numerically to back out the portfolio loss function. A comparison
of different methods to build up the portfolio loss distribution is done by Jackson et al. (2004).
In all empirical studies of copula models outlined above the time period is only one day. Wang et al.
(2009) extend these results by considering a sample size of 248 days for North American credit derivatives
market. They fit a one factor heavy tailed copula model to the data. More specifically, they test the double
t copula model where the degrees of freedom parameters of the model are fractional. They also test another
copula model where they consider the mixture distribution of t and Gaussian copula models. In our paper we
also test the double t copula model with varying degrees of freedom parameters for a sizeable sample of days.
By contrast, we test the model for European credit derivatives market. Then we go a step further, and do a
dynamic (VAR) analysis of the double t copula model implied parameters.
Other approaches to CDO valuation have been proposed. The paper by Duffie and Garleanu (2001) is one
of the first in the credit derivatives literature that applies the default intensity approach to CDO pricing. They
model the default intensities of credit names in portfolio as affine jump processes, and derive closed form
solutions for correlated default probabilities of portfolio names. This approach has been further extended and
examined, among others, by Mortensen (2005), Feldhutter (2008) and Eckner (2009).
An alternative way to model CDO credit portfolios is to follow the top-down approach. Rather than
modelling individual defaults, the distribution function of portfolio loss is modelled directly. Then, so called
thinning techniques can be applied to derive individual credit dynamics. Papers following this approach are
Longstaff and Rajan (2008), Giesecke and Goldberg (2009), Halperin and Tomecek (2009), Schonbutcher
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(2006), Bielecki et al. (2008), to name a few.
3 Synthetic CDO Tranche Pricing Equation
In this section we cover the pricing of a synthetic CDO which is tailored by a pool of single name Credit
Default Swap (CDS) contracts as opposed to a cash CDO where the underlying portfolio contains more
traditional fixed-income securities. For a comprehensive description and understanding of CDS contracts and
their market, see Merrill Lynch (2006a).
CDOs are used to reallocate the credit risk of a portfolio by parts. To this end, they are divided into
several classes, called tranches. Each tranche is a bilateral contract with predefined maturity where the CDO
tranche issuer (protection seller) agrees to pay to the CDO tranche buyer (protection buyer) all the losses
that happen in the portfolio associated with that tranche until maturity. On the other side, the tranche holder
compensates the tranche issuer for protection by making periodic payments proportional to the outstanding
tranche notional up to tranche maturity.4 The portfolio losses that the tranche covers in case of default is
defined by the attachment / detachment points. For a general description of CDO structures, their types and
applications see the handbook by Merrill Lynch (2006b).
In general terms, let’s consider a CDO tranche with maturity T that provides protection against portfolio
losses in the range of La and Ld (0 ≤ La < Ld ≤ 1), where La and Ld define attachment/detachment points,
respectively. The tranche spread made by the protection buyer to the protection seller per annum is denoted
by S[La,Ld ]. Additionally, let t1 < .. . < tJ = T denote the tranche spread payment dates, and t0 < t1 the tranche
valuation date.5
As we will see later, the protection and default payments require the evaluation of the expected tranche
loss function, which we consider next. As tranche [La,Ld ] provides credit protection against portfolio losses
L(t) in pre-specified range of La and Ld , the tranche loss can be written as:
L[La,Lb] (t,L(t)) =
1
Ld−La
￿
(L(t)−La)+− (L(t)−Ld)+
￿
(1)
4The outstanding notional of a tranche is the amount that is left from the initial tranche notional after having paid all the expected
losses associated with the given tranche. The notional amount of a financial instrument is the nominal value that is being used to
calculate payments made on that instrument.
5For many structured credit derivatives, traded in the OTC markets, the spread payment frequency is usually quarterly, i.e.
t j− t j−1 ≈ 1/4.
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For ease of exposition, let’s assume the portfolio loss distribution function FL(t)(l) of the loss process L(t)
is continuous both in time and in loss amount. Then, the expected cumulative tranche loss over the (0, t) time
interval under risk neutral probability measure Q will be:
E[La,Lb](t)
.
= EQ
￿
L[La,Lb] (t,L(t))
￿
=
1
Ld−La
￿￿ 1
0
￿
(l−La)+− (l−Ld)+
￿
dFL(t)(l)
￿
=
1
Ld−La
￿￿ 1
La
(l−La)dFL(t)(l)−
￿ 1
Lb
(l−Lb)dFL(t)(l)
￿
(2)
However, as it will become clear later in practice, the portfolio loss distribution function FL(t)(l) is discrete in
loss amounts. Hence, for the expected tranche loss calculation it will suffice to calculate Prob[L(t) = l], where
l denotes the discrete value that the portfolio loss can take on. These values are a non-trivial function of the
number of names in the portfolio, the nominal amounts and the recovery rates associated with all the names
in the portfolio. Though it might not be immediately obvious, the expected tranche loss is a deterministic
function of time.
To determine the breakeven spread of a single tranche CDO, the payments (also called legs) made by both
protection buyer and protection seller should be defined. But first let D(t) be the discount factor defined as
D(t) = exp
￿−￿ tt0 r(s)ds￿, where r(t) is the risk free interest rate. For simplicity, we will assume r(t) to be
independent of portfolio loss process L(t).
Then, the value of the Premium Leg is equal to an upfront payment plus the present value of all the spread
payments made by the protection buyer to the protection seller.6
PL = U[La,Ld ] +EQ
￿
J
∑
j=1
∆t jS[La,Ld ]D(t j)
￿
1−L[La,Lb] (t j,L(t j))
￿￿
(3)
= U[La,Ld ] +S[La,Ld ]×
J
∑
j=1
∆t jD(t j)
￿
1−E[La,Lb](t j)
￿
(4)
where U[La,Ld ] is the upfront payment made by the protection buyer to the protection seller at t = t0. This
upfront payment is mostly required for the so called equity tranche, that is, the one with zero attachment
6The Premium Leg also includes accrued payments at default. It means that if there has been a default at time τ− proceed by
a new default at time τ between two consecutive tranche spread payment dates t j−1 and t j, i.e. (τ ∈ (t j−1, t j)), then an accrued
payment in the amount of (τ− t−)S[La,Ld ]×
￿
L[La,Lb] (τ,L(τ))−L[La,Lb]
￿
t−,L(t−)
￿￿
should be made at default time τ , where t− .=
max(τ−, t j−1). For notational simplicity, we don’t include them in the pricing formula, but take them into account in the numerical
analysis.
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point. For the equity tranche the spread payment S[0,Ld ] is usually fixed. ∆t j = t j− t j−1 is the time period
between two spread payment dates, measured in fractions of a year. As the spread payments are made for
consecutive time periods, then ∆t jS[La,Ld ] will be the effective spread adjusted for the time period t j− t j−1.
Also note that 1−E[La,Lb] is the tranche outstanding notional, where the initial tranche principal is normalized
to one.
The value of the Default Leg (Protection Leg) is equal to the expected value of the discounted random
loss payments dL[La,Lb] made by protection seller to the protection buyer at default. Hence,
DL = EQ
￿￿ T
t0
D(t)dL[La,Lb] (t,L(t))
￿
(5)
where dL[La,Lb] (t,L(t)) is a shorthand for
￿
∂L[La,Lb] (t,L(t))/∂ t
￿
dt
If we assume that default happens on the spread payment dates, then the Default Leg can be approximated
by:
DL ≈ E
￿
J
∑
j=1
D(t j)
￿
L[La,Lb] (t j,L(t j))−L[La,Lb] (t j−1,L(t j−1))
￿￿
(6)
=
J
∑
j=1
D(t j)
￿
E[La,Lb](t j)−E[La,Lb](t j−1)
￿
(7)
The break-even spread S[La,Ld ] for tranche [La,Ld ] is calculated by equating the value of the Default Leg
to that of the Premium Leg.
S[La,Ld ] ≈
J
∑
j=1
D(t j)
￿
E[La,Lb](t j)−E[La,Lb](t j−1)
￿
J
∑
j=1
∆t jD(t j)
￿
1−E[La,Lb](t j)
￿ (8)
As mentioned previously, an upfront payment is mostly required for the equity tranche, while its running
spread S[0,Ld ] is fixed. For the iTraxx Europe index, which we will describe later, the running spread of the
equity tranches is fixed at the level of 500 basis points (bp). Hence, when there are upfront payments, i.e.
when S[La,Ld ] is fixed, equation DL= PL should instead be solved for the optimal value ofU[La,Ld ].
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4 Portfolio Default Modelling
Given the loss distribution function of a credit portfolio over any time horizon, the spread calculation of a
tranche is straightforward. However, the evaluation of the portfolio loss distribution is per se challenging.
One of the principal difficulties arises from the fact that default by one credit name in the portfolio may
trigger default(s) of others. In other words, default processes of the credit names in the portfolio can be
correlated. Introducing an appropriate correlation structure among portfolio credit default times constitutes
one of the major challenges for CDO pricing. This section addresses the issues related to the correlated
default modelling and portfolio loss distribution building within the so called copula approach.
Let the CDO portfolio be composed of n names with associated random default times τ1,τ2, . . . ,τn defined
on the probability space (Ω,F ,Q). Additionally, let Ni denote the notional amount of name i, and Ri(t) ∈
[0,1] the non-stochastic recovery rate associated with portfolio name i. We will assume that the individual
risk neutral default probabilities pi(t) = Q(τi ≤ t),∀i = 1, . . . ,n of all names are known or otherwise can
be bootstrapped from the market CDS quotes. More specifically, in our numerical analysis we will use the
following approximation of the individual risk neutral default probabilities of any name i:
pi(t) = 1− exp
￿−Scdsi (T )/(1−Ri) · t￿ ,∀t ≤ T
where Scdsi (T ) is the CDS spread of name i with T years of maturity, and Ri is the expected recovery rate of
name i in default.
The pro-rata loss amount generated by credit name i in default is: li(t) = δi(1− Ri(t)), where δi =
Ni/∑ni=1Ni is the weight of name i in the total CDO notional. Hence, the aggregate portfolio loss L(t) at time
t will be given by:
L(t) =
n
∑
i=1
δi(1−Ri(t))1τi≤t (9)
where 1τi≤t is the default indicator function of name i. It is equal to one if credit name i defaults by time t,
and zero otherwise.
To calculate the portfolio loss density function Prob(L(t) = l) one should be able to account for the
correlation among the default indicator processes 1τi≤t for any name i.
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4.1 The Copula Approach
Copula functions are widely used to account for correlation among credit defaults. If we define Fi(t)
.
=
Q(τi ≤ t) to be the continuous marginal distribution function of random variable τi, and F(t1, . . . , tn) .=
Q(τ1 ≤ t1, . . . ,τn ≤ tn) the joint distribution function of τi’s, then by Sklar’s theorem Sklar (1973) there
exists a copula functionC : [0,1]n→ [0,1] such that F(t1, . . . , tn) =C(F1(t1), . . . ,Fn(tn)). In other words, cop-
ula functions serve to combine the marginal distributions into a multivariate one. An example of a copula
that is widely used in the modelling of correlated defaults is the Gaussian one: C(G)(F1(t1), . . . ,Fn(tn)) =
ΦΣ
￿
Φ−1(F1(t1)), . . . ,Φ−1(Fn(tn))
￿
, where ΦΣ is the multivariate normal distribution function with correla-
tion matrix Σ. For a detailed presentation of copula functions and their applications, see Cherubini et al.
(2004), Galiani (2003), Embrechts et al. (2001), Schmidt (2006).
It should be noted that the conventional copula approach for CDO pricing is based on correlated default
time simulations. One of the main reasons is that the evaluation of the joint distribution function F at a
given set of data points (t1, . . . , tn) involves an n-dimensional integration, which can be quite complicated
if not impossible. A Monte-Carlo algorithm to simulate correlated default times within the Gaussian copula
framework is described by Li (2000). Briefly, if we generate a series of random variablesVi =Φ−1(Fi(τi)), i=
1,2, . . . ,n from the n-dimensional normal distribution by using the Cholesky decomposition of the correlation
matrix Σ, the correlated default times can be obtained by τi = F−1i (Φ(Vi)). Once the correlated default times
are simulated, then it becomes straightforward to calculate the contingent tranche payments, hence the optimal
tranche spreads of the CDO.
This approach is quite general and easily implemented. However, for an accurate estimation of the tranche
spreads of a CDO a large number of simulations is needed, as the Monte-Carlo simulations are slow to
converge.
4.2 The One Factor Copula Approach
The one factor copula is another approach that is being used to define the co-dependence structure of times to
default. Unlike the conventional copula approach, it allows to get semi-analytical expressions for the portfolio
loss density function, and thus, also for the CDO tranche spreads.
Within the factor copula approach, one assumes that the credit name i’s time to default τi is related
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to another random variable Vi(t), such that i-th issuer defaults whenever Vi(t) goes below a non-stochastic
threshold level Bi(t):
1τi≤t ≡ 1Vi(t)≤Bi(t), for i= 1, . . . ,n (10)
In some papers, Vi(t) is conveniently interpreted as company i’s asset return process, and Bi(t) the com-
pany’s liquidation value. In this general framework, we will simply treat Vi(t)’s as random latent variables.
Let the distribution function FVi(t)(v) of random variable Vi(t) be continuous and invertible. Then the
equality Q(τi ≤ t) = Q(Vi(t) ≤ Bi(t)) will follow if Bi(t) = F−1Vi(t)(pi(t)). Recall, that pi(t)’s are the boot-
strapped default probabilities of the underlying portfolio names, which we calculate using the following
approximation:
pi(t) = 1− exp
￿−Scdsi (T )/(1−Ri) · t￿ ,∀t ≤ T, i= 1, . . . ,n (11)
To generate the one factor correlation structure among the underlying portfolio default times, the latent
variable Vi(t) is further decomposed as:
Vi(t) = ρiX(t)+
￿
1−ρ2i Ei(t), for i= 1, . . . ,n (12)
where the random variables X(t) and Ei(t)’s are mutually independent and are assumed to have zero mean
and unit variance.7 X(t) is referred to as the common factor affecting all credit names in the portfolio, and
Ei(t) is the idiosyncratic component specific to credit name i.
One of the most important features of the factor copula approach, outlined in equations (10) and (12),
is that the default times of the underlying portfolio names become independent conditional on the common
factor X :
F(t1, . . . , tn | X(t)) .= Q(τ1 ≤ t1, . . . ,τn ≤ tn | X(t)) =
n
∏
i=1
Q(τ1 ≤ t1 | X(t))
The conditional independence result considerably facilitates the calculation of the portfolio loss distribu-
tion function. To see this, let pi(t|x) .= Q(τi ≤ t|X(t) = x). Then, the conditional default probability of name
7Even if we assume that X(t) and Ei(t) are not zero mean and unit variance random variables, the results that follow will not
change. Note also, that with the given assumptions for X and Ei’s, random variable Vi will also have a zero mean and unit variance.
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i can be calculated as:
pi(t|x) .= Q(τi ≤ t|X(t) = x) = Q(Vi(t)≤ Bi(t)|X(t) = x) (13)
= Q(ρiX(t)+
￿
1−ρ2i Ei(t)≤ Bi(t)|X(t) = x) = FEi(t)
Bi(t)−ρix￿
1−ρ2i

where FEi(t) is the distribution function of the idiosyncratic factor Ei(t), and Bi(t) = F
−1
Vi(t)
(pi(t)).
For simplicity, let’s suppose the underlying CDO portfolio is homogeneous, i.e. the initial notional amounts,
recovery rates, risk neutral default probabilities and factor loadings are the same for all portfolio names.
Then,
pi(t|x) = p(t|x) = FE (t)
￿
B(t)−ρ x￿
1−ρ2
￿
,∀i= 1, . . . ,n
and the portfolio loss takes on L(t) = k(1−R)/n,k = 0,1, . . . ,n values. Because of the homogeneity of the
CDO portfolio, L(t) will follow a binomial distribution conditional on X:
Q
￿
L(t) =
k
n
(1−R) | X = x
￿
=
n!
k!(n− k)! p(t|x)
k(1− p(t|x))n−k, k = 0,1, . . . ,n (14)
The unconditional portfolio loss density function can be recovered by integrating equation (14) over all
possible values of the common factor:
Q
￿
L(t) =
k
n
(1−R)
￿
=
￿ ∞
−∞
n!
k!(n− k)! p(t|x)
k(1− p(t|x))n−k dFX(t)(x), k = 0,1, . . . ,n (15)
where FX(t)(x) is the distribution function of the common factor X(t).
For the case when the CDO portfolio is non-homogeneous, one can use semi-analytical techniques to
construct the portfolio loss distribution function. In Appendix A, we briefly describe a popular method
proposed by Andersen and Sidenius (2003), that calculates the portfolio loss distribution function recursively.
Note, that this approach assumes that the recovery rates are the same for all underlying portfolio names. An
alternative approach is described by Laurent and Gregory (2003), which uses the characteristic function and
Fast Fourier Transform techniques to build the portfolio loss density function. For the case when the initial
notionals and the recovery rates of the underlying portfolio names are different see Hull and White (2004)
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and Andersen and Sidenius (2005).
In the next two sections, we describe the one factor Gaussian and double t copula models. The Gaussian
copula will serve as benchmark for the empirical studies, where our principal interest will be to test the double
t copula model.
4.2.1 The One Factor Gaussian Copula Model
Different distributional specifications for the common and idiosyncratic factors Xi and Ei from Equation (12)
give rise to different factor copula models. The one factor Gaussian copula admits the following specification:
Vi = ρiX+
￿
1−ρ2i Ei (16)
where X and Ei’s are independent and follow the standard normal distribution. Note that we have dropped
the time dependence from equation (16), as the standard normal distribution is fully characterized by its
mean and variance, which are zero and one, respectively. |ρi| ≤ 1 is generally assumed to be constant, i.e.
ρi = ρ,∀i= 1, . . . ,n. Hence, the default correlation between two credit names i ￿= j will be equal to ρ2.
As the normal distribution is closed under convolution, the distribution function of any Vi will also be
normal. Hence, the default threshold Bi(t) of name i, i.e. the level of the random variable Vi below which
the name i defaults, is given by Bi(t) =Φ−1(pi(t)). Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal random variable, whereas pi(t) is given by (11).
The probability that credit name i defaults conditional on a realization of common factor X = x is:
pi(t|x) .= Q(τi ≤ t|x) =Φ
￿
Φ−1(pi(t))−ρ x￿
1−ρ2
￿
(17)
ρ = 0 corresponds to the case when default times are independent, while ρ = 1 is associated with the perfect
dependence case, meaning that the portfolio behaves like a single credit asset.
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4.2.2 The Double T Copula Model
The double t copula model was introduced by Hull and White (2004), and it is a simple extension of the
Gaussian copula:
Vi = ρ
￿
n1−2
n1
X+
￿
1−ρ2
￿
n2−2
n2
Ei (18)
X and Ei’s are pairwise independent student random variables with n1 and n2 degrees of freedom, respectively.
They are scaled so that each Vi has zero mean and unit variance.
The choice of the student distribution for both common and idiosyncratic factors has certain advantages
over the Gaussian one. First, the student distribution has fatter tails, a valuable feature commonly desired in
risk management. Second, it exhibits non-zero tail dependence. For any two random variables X and Y with
distribution functions FX and FY , the (lower) tail dependence is defined as
λL = lim
u→0Q(X ≤ F
−1
X (u)|Y ≤ F−1Y (u)) = limu→0
C(u,u)
u
whereC is the copula associated with (X ,Y ).
When X and Y are Student t random variable with equal degrees of freedom, i.e. n1 = n2 = n, then,
λL = 2tn
￿√
n+1
√
1−ρ√
1+ρ
￿
(19)
where tn is the density function of the Student t random variable with n degrees of freedom (Embrechts et al.
(2001)). One can easily show, that this measure is increasing in ρ , and decreasing in n.
Finally, the Gaussian copula is nested within the double t copula model, and can be recovered by letting
the degrees of freedom parameters n1 and n2 go to infinity. Note, that the lower tail dependence for the
Gaussian copula will be zero, i.e. limn→∞λL = 0.
The conditional default probability pi(t|x) of name i in the double t copula model, i.e. the probability that
name i will default conditional on a realization of the common factor X = x, is:
pi(t|x) .= Q(τi ≤ t|x) = FEi
￿
Bi(t)−ρ
￿
(n1−2)/n1 x￿
1−ρ2￿(n2−2)/n2
￿
(20)
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where the default barrier is given by
Bi(t) = F−1Vi (pi(t)) (21)
and FEi is the cumulative distribution function of a standard student random variable with n2 degrees of
freedom.
The double t copula model is numerically intensive. To calibrate default barriers Bi(t) = F−1Vi (pi(t)),
the distribution function of Vi from equation (18) should be calculated and then inverted. As the student
distribution is not closed under convolution, meaning that sum of two independent student random variables
is not a student random variables, FVi should be computed numerically. For instance, Vrnis (2009) describe
a numerical method for performing such a task. In case both degrees of freedom parameters are odd, the
convolution of two student t random variables can be calculated in closed form. See Walter and Saw (1987)
and Berg and Vignat (2008).
5 Data Description
The data that we use for our numerical analysis is based on the iTraxx Europe CDS index and its tranches.
The iTraxx European index is managed byMarkit, and consists of 125 European CDS contracts, each contract
referencing a high grade corporate bond. The underlying index names are equally weighted, which means
that the notional amount of each CDS contract is 0.8% of the total portfolio principal. Note, that the index
trades like a single CDS contract with a fixed coupon rate and quarterly payments.
The index constituents are updated every six months, a process commonly known as rolling. In the rolling
process, the downgraded, illiquid or defaulted CDS contracts are dropped from the index, and are substituted
with new liquid CDS names. Hence, the rolling creates a new series which becomes on-the-run until the next
rolling date. Earlier created series continue to be traded, but the liquidity is concentrated on the newly created
series. Note, that the rolling dates are fixed, and are March 20 and September 20 of each year.
We have the daily data for the mid spreads (average of bid and ask spreads) of the 5-year maturity iTraxx
Europe index. This data is provided by Markit. The time period in our sample spans from March 27, 2006 to
September 19, 2006, and corresponds to on-the-run Series 5 of the iTraxx Europe index. The overall sample
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size is 114 days.
We also have the data for standardized tranches of the iTraxx Europe index for Series 5. More specifically,
we have the mid daily closing spreads for the (0-3)%, (3-6)%, (6-9)%, (9-12)% and (12-22)% tranches of the
index with 5 year maturity. These are commonly known as equity, junior mezzanine, senior mezzanine, senior
and super senior tranches. The (0-3)% tranche is quoted differently from the rest of the tranches. It involves an
upfront payment made by the protection buyer to the protection seller at the initiation of the tranche contract
plus a running spread of 500 basis points (bp) paid quarterly until tranche maturity. Mezzanine and senior
tranches have no upfront payments. They are quoted in running spreads (bp) that are also paid quarterly until
tranche maturity date. Note, that like the rolling dates, the maturity dates of the iTraxx Europe index or any
of its tranches are standardized. For any 5 year contract of Series 5 of the iTraxx European index and its
tranches, the fixed maturity date will be June 20, 2011. It means that the actual time to maturity changes a bit
for the on-the-run period as we enter into a long/short tranche position from one day to the other in the time
period between March 20, 2006 and September 20, 2006.8
The data for CDS spreads is taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream. It consists of 5 year CDS spreads
for all 125 index constituents and 114 days in our sample. Finally, we have the closing data on EURIBOR
rates for all standard maturities plus 2-year, 3-year, 4-year and 5-year swap rates for the European market.
This data is taken from Reuters 3000Xtra, and serves to calculate the discount factors.
Table 1 gives the summary statistics for the time series for Series 5 of the iTraxx Europe index and its
tranches. The average upfront payment of the equity tranche is 20%, which translates roughly into 900 bp of
running spread per annum, as a rule of thumb. With this conversion in mind, we can observe that the tranche
spreads decrease monotonically with the tranche attachment/detachment points. The decreasing pattern in
the tranche spreads implies that the equity tranche is the riskiest followed by the other tranches in succession.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 depicts the time series for Series 5 of iTraxx Europe index and its tranches. It reveals a gener-
ally similar pattern in the times series of the individual tranches. The principal component analysis (PCA)
8If one enters into a long/short position in iTraxx or any of its tranches on March 20, 2006, the maturity will be 5.25 years based
on the conventional 360 day count (5.25 is the yearly fraction between March 20, 2006 and June 20, 2011). If one goes long/short
index or tranche on the last day of the on-the-run period, i.e. September 19, 2006, then the remaining maturity will be 4.75 years.
Hence any position entered between March 20, 2006 and September 19, 2006 will have a maturity window between 4.75 and 5.25
years. To keep the things simple, for our numerical analysis we will be using a constant 5 year rolling window for all the tranche
maturities and for all days in our sample.
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confirms this fact, by showing that the first factor alone account for 83% of the variability in the tranche time
series.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Average 5 year CDS spread across all 125 names underlying iTraxx Europe index and 114 days in our
sample is 32.2 bp, while the time average standard deviation for the 125 names is 21.3 bp. The averaged
interval for 125 names across 114 days is from 6 to 145 bp.
6 Empirical Analysis
The double t copula model was first tested by Hull and White (2004). For August 4, 2004 they use the iTraxx
Europe and CDX index tranche spreads data, and conclude that the double t distribution copula fits the index
tranche spreads reasonably well. Burtschell et al. (2009) find a similar result based on the iTraxx Europe
tranche data for February 8, 2005 when comparing several copula approaches. Kalemanova et al. (2007)
introduce the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) copula approach and compare the results of their model with
those for the double t copula model. For April 12, 2006 they find that the NIG and double t copula models give
quantitatively (in terms of the magnitude of the pricing error) and qualitatively (low pricing errors) similar
results for the tranche spreads of the iTraxx Europe index. Mortensen (2005) compares the results of the
affine jump diffusion (AJD) model of Duffie and Garleanu (2001) with those of the double t copula model,
and find that the latter fits best to the market tranche data of DJ CDX index for August 23, 2004.
All these studies base their analysis on single day (non-intra day) data. Wang et al. (2009) provide more
extensive empirical analysis using market data on CDX NA index from September 1, 2004 to August 31,
2005. We also do the empirical analysis for a broad time period of 114 days that spans from March 27, 2006
to September 19, 2006. In contrast, we estimate the model for the European credit derivatives market, i.e. for
iTraxx Europe index.
In this section we empirically estimate the Gaussian and double t copula models. More specifically, we
calibrate the parameters of the models so that the measure of fit (defined below) to the market quotes of the
iTraxx Europe tranches is minimized. Note, that the Gaussian copula has only one endogenous parameter, the
constant correlation coefficient ρ , while the double t copula model has three such parameters, which are the
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correlation coefficient ρ and the degrees of freedoms n1 and n2 for the factors. Note also, that the exogenous
inputs of the models are the CDS spreads of all 125 names underlying the iTraxx Europe index, which are
used for the default threshold calibration.
The model calibration process consists of solving for the correlation number ρ and degrees of freedom
parameters n1 and n2 such that the measure of Relative RMSE is minimized:
min
ρ,n1,n2
￿￿￿￿1
5
5
∑
k=1
￿
Smarketk −Smodelk (ρ,n1,n2)
Smarketk
￿2
(22)
Smarketk is the market spread for iTraxx Europe tranche k = {[0,3], [3,6], [6,9], [9,12], [12,22]}, and
Smodelj (ρ,n1,n2) is the model implied spread for given values of correlation and degrees of freedom parame-
ters:9
Smodel[La,Ld ](ρ,n1,n2) ≈
J
∑
j=1
D(t j)
￿
E[La,Lb](t j)−E[La,Lb](t j−1)
￿
J
∑
j=1
∆t jD(t j)
￿
1−E[La,Lb](t j)
￿
E[La,Lb](t) = ∑
l
L[La,Lb] (t, l) ·Prob[L(t) = l]
L[La,Lb] (t,L(t)) =
1
Ld−La
￿
(L(t)−La)+− (L(t)−Ld)+
￿
Prob[L(t) = l] = ￿f (ρ,n1,n2; input data)
L(t) = ￿g(input data)
Though previous studies have considered the case in which the degrees of freedom parameters of the double
t copula model are whole numbers, we relax this assumption by calibrating each of n1 and n2 to any non-
integer number greater than three.10 In this respect, our analysis can be seen as an extension of Wang et al.
(2009), who study the double t copula model with non-integer degrees of freedom parameters, or what they
call, double t copula with fractional degrees of freedom. However, there are some differences between their
9Note, that all the three parameters ρ , n1 and n2 of the double t copula model, implied from the RMSE minimization, are forward
looking. For instance, RMSE correlation parameter of 12%, implied from 5 year maturity iTraxx tranche spreads on a particular day,
means that the default correlation over 5 year horizon from that day on will be 12%.
10We have also done the optimization with the lower bound set to equal 2.01 for both degrees of freedom parameters. However,
they hardly give any gain in terms of the reduction of the RMSE measure. Furthermore, the numerical stability of the code, and the
computational time for the optimization worsen.
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model methodology and estimation and ours. First, they don’t use the CDS data on the underlying 125 names
of the CDX North American index to calculate the risk neutral default intensities. Instead, they consider the
homogeneous portfolio specification, and input the same and constant default intensity of all 125 names as
an endogenous variable to the model to be estimated together with the correlation and the degrees of freedom
parameters. They also apply the restriction that n1 = n2, observing that the difference in fit measure between
the case when n1 = n2 and n1 ￿= n2 is negligible. As a fit measure, they consider the total absolute pricing
error, which is defined as the sum of the absolute differences between the market spreads and model spreads.
By relaxing the assumption that the degrees of freedom parameters are whole numbers, we are able to
capture extra variability in the time series of the implied degrees of freedom parameters, which would other-
wise be lost when using only integer degrees of freedom parameters. We also do the calibration separately
for the Gaussian copula model (the restrictive case of the double t copula model with n1 = n2 = ∞ degrees of
freedom).
The calibration is done on a daily basis. This is to say, we do the same minimization problem for all 114
days in our sample (from March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006).
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the minimized RMSE and the calibrated parameters. The
pricing errors for the double t copula model are 14% on average. The minimum and maximum pricing errors
are in the range of 6 to 22 percent approximately. The Gaussian copula produces rather high pricing errors of
around 68% for the whole sample. Compared to the latter case, the double t copula model on average reduces
the pricing errors by 4.9 times.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the differenced rmse, corr and degrees of freedom parameter
series. It reveals relatively high correlation levels between the calibrated series. These results suggest that
their is a high inter-dependence among the calibrated parameters of the double t copula model, which should
be taken into account in further regression analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 plots the time series of the optimized parameters for the double t copula model. We can observe
that the time series of the correlation and n1 parameters follow nearly the same dynamics, whereas the time
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series of n2 evolves inversely with that of n1.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
As we have already mentioned before, the literature has considered the double t copula model with integer
degrees of freedom parameters. More specifically, many authors have restricted themselves to the case where
the degrees of freedom parameters are both equal to 4. To check the validity of this assumption, we carry
out a mean test for the degrees of freedom parameters. The hypothesis that the population means of the two
degrees of freedom parameters are equal, i.e. H0 : E(n1) = E(n2), is rejected at the 5% error level against
the alternative hypothesis Ha : n1 ￿= n2. We also tested the hypotheses that each of the degrees of freedom
separately is 4. In the first case, i.e. when H0 : E(n1) = 4, we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 95%
confidence level, whereas we reject the hypothesis that H0 : E(n2) = 4.
As a next step, we perform a time series analysis of the optimized parameters from Figure 2. For this
reason we consider several financial variables that represent major volatility, treasury and corporate bond
markets. As a measure of volatility, we use changes in the VIX index. To capture the changes in corporate
bond markets, we use the changes in the default spread, where the default spread is defined as the difference
between Moody’s Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields. Finally, to capture the changes in treasury bond
markets we use changes in the term spread, where the term spreads is defines as the difference between
one and ten year treasury yields. For the sake of brevity, we will refer (wherever appropriate) to the first
differences in VIX volatility index, Moody’s default spread, and the Treasury term spread as VIX , DEF , and
TERM, respectively. Table 4 presents the correlation matrix of our exogenous macro variables. As one would
expect, the correlation between changes in the VIX index and term spread is negative, whereas the correlation
between default and term spreads is positive. However, the correlation among the employed macro variables
are relatively low for the time period that we consider in our analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
As we also want to capture the evolution and the interdependencies between the four calibrated series,
our methodology would be to fit a VAR model to the calibrated parameters with the exogenous variables
described above.
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The following VAR model is fitted to the data:
Yt = α+
I
∑
i=1
βiYt−i+
J
∑
j=0
γ jXt− j+ εt (23)
Yt is the dependent variable vector consisting of the first differences of the correlation, two degrees of freedom
parameters, and the rmse. Xt is the exogenous variable vector comprisingVIX , TERM andDEF . One-day lag
structure (I = 1) for the endogenous variables, coupled with the contemporaneous and one-day lagged values
of the exogenous variables (J = 1) is suggested by the data, which is consistent with the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC).
We use roughly the first 100 observations for the model estimation (in-sample), whereas the last 14
observations are used for the out-of-sample analysis. Table 5 summarizes the VAR estimation results. The
VAR results show that the equations for the implied correlation, the first degrees of freedom parameter of the
double t copula model and the rmse have significant explanatory power as indicated by the F-tests. However,
the significance of the equation for the first degrees of freedom is only at the 10 percent level. The average
R2 statistics for the three significant equations is approximately 33%.
Turning first to the results for the correlation parameter, we observe that the lagged values of VIX are
positively related to the correlation parameter corr. An increases in the VIX index is often associated with an
increase in the volatility of the markets. Hence the positive sign of VIX on correlation seems intuitive, since
the volatile markets can contribute to increased number of defaults or default correlation in an economy.
A decrease in the term spread may imply a weakening economy. According to this argument, an increase
in the term spread may decrease the CDS spreads of the underlying names of the iTraxx Europe index.
Decreasing CDS spread can decrease the default correlation between the companies of the iTraxx Europe
index. Hence, the negative and significant coefficient sign of TERM in the equation of corr seems reasonable.
Turning next to corporate bond markets, we see that default spread DEF has a significant and positive
relationship with correlation. This can be intuitive as higher default spreads can induce higher default corre-
lation.
Changes in model mispricing, measured by the RMSE can be explained by the lag of changes in the VIX
index, changes in the term spread TERM, and lagged changes in the second degrees of freedom of the double
t copula model n2. The negative coefficient of the VIX index might imply that the double t copula model
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captures better the tranche spreads of the iTraxx Europe index when the investors anticipates volatile market
conditions over future time horizons. On the other hand, the positive sign of the TERM variable indicates that
the pricing power of the model is worse during expected good economic conditions. The positive coefficient
sign of the second degrees of freedom parameter of the double t copula model n2 seem to confirm this result.
The second degrees of freedom parameter of the double t copula model n2 represents the idiosyncratic factor
specific to each company underlying the iTraxx Europe index. The higher n2, the lower the volatility of each
idiosyncratic factor. Hence, the positive sign of the coefficient of n2 in the rmse equation indicates that as the
volatility of the idiosyncratic factor specific to each company decreases, the double t copula model captures
worse the tranche spreads of the iTraxx Europe index.
Some of the coefficients of the macro variables are statistically significant in the equations for the degrees
of freedom parameters. However, those coefficients are difficult to interpret. Additionally, as noted above,
the equation for the second degrees of freedom parameter does not have any explanatory power, whereas the
significance of the explanatory power of the equation for first degrees of freedom is only at 10 percent level.
In short, higher market volatility, default spreads and lower term spreads can lead to higher default cor-
relation among the companies underlying iTraxx Europe index. On the other hand, the results on the rsme
suggest that the double t copula captures better the tranches of iTraxx Europe index for expected bad times
than for good times.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 plots the out-of-sample forecast for the calibrated parameters along with their observed values
from the time period between September 1, 2006 and September 19, 2006. The predictive power of the
proposed VAR model seems to be satisfactory.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the ability of the double t copula model of Hull and White (2004) to replicate
the market spreads of iTraxx Europe index tranches based on the data from March 27, 2006 to Septeber 19,
2006. Compared to the one factor Gaussian copula, this model reduces pricing errors on average by more
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than four times. We also obtain that the degrees of freedom parameters implied from the double t copula
model, are time varying and different one from the other.
VAR analysis of the double t copula model parameters reveal that the correlation and the degrees of
freedom parameters can be explained by major financial variables, such as the volatility index VIX, the default
and the treasury term spreads. Particularly, the results of the equation of the implied correlation parameter
suggest that an increase in the VIX index and the default spread can lead to higher default correlations among
the companies underlying the iTraxx Europe index, whereas an increase in the term spread can lead to lower
default correlation among those companies. The RMSE, which is the mispricing measure of the double t
copula model, can be explained by such macro variables as the volatility index VIX and the term spread. In
particular, the results of the rmse seem to suggest that the model can capture better the tranches of the iTraxx
Europe index during bad than good times. The out-of-sample analysis of the calibrated parameters of the
double t copula model show reasonable forecasting power of the above mentioned exogenous variables for
the correlation, the two degrees of freedom and rmse parameters.
A logical extension of this paper will be to broaden our sample period. Another way to go would be to do
the same exercise for the North American CDS market CDX, and compare the results with those presented
in this paper.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of iTraxx Europe Index and its Tranches
Panel A: Summary Statistics
mean sd skew kurt min med max N
iTraxx EU index 30.54 2.31 0.09 2.01 26.53 30.53 35.62 114
(0-3)% Tranche 20.46 2.94 -0.01 2.06 14.80 20.30 26.80 114
(3-6)% Tranche 65.28 11.91 0.04 1.79 43.52 66.33 90.99 114
(6-9)% Tranche 18.48 3.24 0.02 1.89 12.12 18.78 24.86 114
(9-12)% Tranche 8.55 1.62 0.04 2.30 4.90 8.24 11.59 114
(12-22)% Tranche 3.66 0.48 -0.07 1.86 2.68 3.77 4.74 114
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
index (0-3)% (3-6)% (6-9)% (9-12)% (12-22)%
index 1
(0-3)% 0.978 1
(3-6)% 0.864 0.766 1
(6-9)% 0.828 0.728 0.972 1
(9-12)% 0.663 0.555 0.833 0.888 1
(12-22)% 0.864 0.834 0.756 0.767 0.746 1
This table reports summary statistics for Series 5 of iTraxx Europe index and its tranches with 5 years of maturity for
the time period from March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006. Equity tranche is quoted up-front (%), while the index
and the rest of tranches in running spreads (bp).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Parameters of Gaussian and Double T Copula Models
Panel A: Gaussian Copula Model
mean sd skewness kurtosis min med max N
RMSE 0.6815 0.0424 -0.1884 1.9115 0.5972 0.6819 0.7529 114
ρG 0.1088 0.0133 -0.1393 2.2349 0.0730 0.1088 0.1332 114
Panel B: Double T copula Model
mean sd skewness kurtosis min med max N
RMSE 0.1395 0.0457 -0.0175 1.7320 0.0551 0.1390 0.2200 114
ρT 0.1220 0.0105 0.1589 2.6050 0.0991 0.1206 0.1447 114
n1 3.8837 0.5861 0.6486 2.3380 3.0000 3.6307 5.2559 114
n2 4.1512 1.3138 1.6582 6.0225 3.0004 3.6796 9.3409 114
Descriptive statistics for the calibrated parameters of the Gaussian and Double t copula models. The upper panel
corresponds to the Gaussian copula model, while the lower panel is for the double t copula. The time period goes from
March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006.
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix of Parameters of Double t Copula Model
∆ rmse ∆ corr ∆ df1 ∆ df2
∆ rmse 1
∆ corr -0.535 1
∆ df1 -0.345 0.902 1
∆ df2 0.236 -0.857 -0.833 1
This table displays the correlation matrix of the differenced series of rmse, cor-
relation, and degrees of freedom parameters implied from the double t copula
model. The period is from March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006.
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Macro Variables
∆ VIX ∆ TERM ∆ DEF
∆ VIX 1.0000
∆ TERM -0.0075 1.0000
∆ DEF 0.0704 0.0747 1.0000
This table displays the correlation matrix of the differenced series of the VIX
index, the slope of the term structure of interest rates, and the Mooody’s default
spread. The period is from March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006.
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Table 5: VAR Results of Parameters of Double T Copula Model
∆t corr ∆t df1 ∆t df2 ∆t rmse
∆t−1 corr -1.50 0.21 -0.12 1.62
∆t−1 df1 0.49 -0.30 -0.16 -0.02
∆t−1 df2 -1.14 0.32 -1.00 2.46∗∗
∆t−1 rmse 0.23 0.63 -0.22 -0.31
∆t VIX -0.64 -1.93∗ 0.63 -0.05
∆t−1 VIX 2.90∗∗∗ 2.48∗∗ -1.72∗ -3.83∗∗∗
∆t TERM -1.68∗ -0.92 0.88 1.96∗∗
∆t−1 TERM -0.40 -1.20 0.26 -1.09
∆t DEF 2.04∗∗ 2.62∗∗∗ -1.99∗∗ 0.19
∆t−1 DEF -1.32 -0.87 1.40 0.91
R2 0.3259 0.2481 0.1780 0.3939
P > F 0.0060 0.0783 0.3544 0.0003
This table reports the VAR results of the double t copula model parameters calibrated for the time period from March
27, 2006 to September 19, 2006. ∆t denotes the first difference, while ∆t−1 denotes the first lag of the differenced
variable (∆t x
.
= xt − xt−1, ∆t−1 x .= xt−1 − xt−2). A first order VAR structure is suggested by the data, where the
exogenous variables are taken with their contemporaneous and one lag values (i.e., I = 1 and J = 1). The superscript
denotes the significance level. ∗∗∗ denotes significance at the 1% level; ∗∗ denotes significance at 5% level; ∗ denotes
significance at 10% level. P > F is the p-value of the F test of the hypothesis that the coefficients of all the variables
are jointly zero.
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Figure 1: Time Series of iTraxx Europe index and its Tranches
27MAR06 10MAY06 14JUN06 17JUL06 17AUG06 19SEP06
25
30
35
40
iTraxx EU Index
27MAR06 10MAY06 14JUN06 17JUL06 17AUG06 19SEP06
10
15
20
25
30
[0−3]% Tranche
27MAR06 10MAY06 14JUN06 17JUL06 17AUG06 19SEP06
40
60
80
100
[3−6]% Tranche
This figure graphs the time series for Series 5 of iTraxx Europe index and its tranches from March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006.
Equity tranche is quoted up-front (%), while the index and the rest of tranches in running spreads (bp).
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Figure 1: Continued
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Figure 2: Time Series of Parameters of Double T Copula Model
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This figure graphs the optimized parameter space for the double t copula model. More specifically, the upper panel plots the optimal
RMSEs across for the double t copula model. The middle and the lower two bottom panels depict the corresponding correlation
coefficient and the optimal number of the degrees of freedom parameter graphs that produce the optimized RMSEs of the upper panel.
The sample ranges from March 27, 2006 to September 19, 2006.
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Figure 3: Out-of-Sample Graph
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This figure graphs the out-of-sample forecasts for the calibrated parameters of the double t copula model. The out-of-sample ranges
from September 1, 2006 to September 19, 2006.
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A Computation of CDO Portfolio Loss Distribution
This section describes briefly the method of Andersen and Sidenius (2003) that uses a recursive algorithm to
build up the CDO portfolio loss distribution function. Let p1(x), p2(x), . . . pn(x) be default probabilities of
n obligors conditional on a realization of the common factor X = x. Let’s additionally denote by Pkn (x) the
conditional probability of having k defaults in an n credit portfolio. Finally, the recovery rate R is assumed to
be constant across all credit names in the portfolio.
If the portfolio consists of one credit, let’s say credit 1 with conditional default probability p1(x), then the
probability of having no default in portfolio is P01 (x) = 1− p1(x), while the probability of observing 1 default
is P11 (x) = p1(x). If we add one more credit to the portfolio, then three scenarios are possible. First, no name
in portfolio defaults with probability P02 (x) = P
0
1 (x) ·(1− p2(x)). Second, there is only one default in portfolio
with probability P12 (x) = P
1
1 (x) · (1− p2(x))+P01 (x) · p2(x). Finally, all two names in portfolio default, where
the probability of this event is P22 (x) = P
1
1 (x) · p2(x).
By induction method it can be shown that when one more credit is added to a current n credit portfolio, then
Pkn+1(x) =

Pkn (x) · pn(x) if k = 0
Pkn (x) · (1− pn+1(x))+Pk−1n (x) · pn+1(x) if k = 1,2 . . . ,n
Pkn (x) · pn+1(x) if k = n+1
The unconditional default probability of having k defaults in an n credit portfolio can be calculated by aver-
aging the above expression over all possible values of X :
Pkn = E(P
k
n (X)) =
￿
X
Pkn (x) fX(x)dx; ∀k = 0,1,2, . . . ,n
Because we assumed a constant recovery rate R, the portfolio Loss Given Default (LGD) in percentage terms
would be L= k/n · (1−R), k = 0,1, . . . ,n
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Chapter 2
On the effects of illiquidity in CDS spreads
Abstract
This article explores the impact of liquidity supply on Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. Our sample
comprises a CDS panel with more than 280 US firms during the period of 2004-2011. We proxy the CDS
liquidity with several measures such as bid-ask spreads, gamma measure and liquidity scores, among
others. We characterize the relationship between liquidity and default swap spreads in two ways: first,
we perform a panel data analysis to study the cross-sectional dynamics between our liquidity proxies and
plain CDS spreads. Second, we examine whether liquidity is priced by CDS investors by examining the
interactions between our liquidity proxies and the risk premium and default components embedded in CDS
spreads. Our results indicate that bid-ask spread, gamma and return-to-volume measures are important
factors in explaining illiquidity of both CDS spreads and risk premium. The usefulness of the number of
contributors and Fitch liquidity score as measures of liquidity is weak.
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1 Introduction
Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts allow to trade on and transfer the credit risk of a company. Traditionally,
CDS spreads represent the fair insurance price for the credit risk of a company. Because of their contractual
nature, CDS contracts are less influenced by convenience or liquidity factors than bond assets (Longstaff
et al., 2005). However, recent empirical evidence suggests that CDS spreads may not be fully explained by
credit risk factors related to the underlying company (Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Blanco et al. (2005),
Tang and Yan (2008) or Fulop and Lescourret (2007), among others). Additionally, the soaring CDS spreads
during the financial crisis of 2007-2011 raise the question of whether CDS prices are affected by factors other
than default risk. Given the central role of CDS markets nowadays in assessing the creditworthiness of firms
and institutions and their ability to lead other markets (see Blanco et al., 2005; Forte and Peña, 2009), this
question is of paramount importance.
This article assesses the relevance of liquidity in default swap contracts when investors are hedging/trading
under financially distressed conditions. We hypothesize that liquidity is an important element in CDS spreads
for several reasons: first, liquidity can be a significant factor in default swap contracts due to the over-the-
counter (OTC) nature of CDS markets. There is no central organized place or exchange where trading orders
are matched. Instead, a CDS market operates through a decentralized and opaque dealer network1. As a
consequence, costs of search and other frictions can be comparatively high relative to other markets, resulting
in lower liquidity in OTC derivative markets (Duffie et al., 2007).
Other factors such as information asymmetries suggest that liquidity plays an important role in CDS
markets. For instance, Acharya and Johnson (2007) find evidence of insider trading in credit derivatives
markets. They argue that many banks and financial institutions trade CDS of companies for whom they
provide financing. Therefore, CDS contracts allow those banks to exploit private information about their
clients which is not available to the public. As a result, the asymmetry of information can lead to reduced
liquidity (see, for instance, Easley et al. (1996) or Brockman and Chung, 2003). As pointed out by Acharya
and Johnson (2007), credit derivative markets may be especially vulnerable to asymmetric information and
insider trading problems because most of the players in CDS markets are insiders.
1The trades are usually initiated either by a phone call between the counter-parties or they are conducted through interdealer
brokers (IDB). Dealers can place the quotes with the IDB house, where the interdealer brokers match the dealers and then execute
the trade.
38
Last but not least, the CDS market is an opaque market controlled by a small number of financial institu-
tions.2 This fact has implications for liquidity as small markets are likely to be less competitive, and hence
less liquid. The reason for the small number of market players may be the high cost of entry into CDS mar-
kets. During the second half of 2010, the CDS market constituted approximately 5% of the OTC derivatives
market in terms of the notional amount outstanding. In nominal terms, the total amount outstanding of CDS
market was 29.9 trillion US dollars as opposed to 601.1 trillion US dollars of the overall OTC derivatives
market (see BIS(2011) May report).
We analyze empirically the relationship between CDS spreads and liquidity. We proxy liquidity using a
number of measures such as absolute bid-ask spread and the number of contributors (NOC) providing quotes
to Markit. Additionally, we also introduce three new illiquidity proxies such as i) the CDS gamma measure,
inspired by the bond illiquidity measure of Bao et al. (2011), ii) the return-to-volume illiquidity measure, a
version of Amihud (2002) stock illiquidity variable and iii) the Fitch liquidity score, a synthetic indicator of
liquidity provided by Fitch. Our analysis is based on a comprehensive panel of CDS spreads for 283 US
firms taken from Markit. Our dataset consists of a diversified sample of CDS names across different rating
categories and sectors for a time period that spans from January 2004 to April 2011, covering the recent
financial crisis period. Moreover, we have an access to an extensive data on bid-ask spreads and default
probabilities from CMA Datastream and Moody’s, respectively.
Our study is developed in two parts. First, we conduct a panel data analysis in order to study the cross-
sectional relationship between changes in our liquidity proxies and plain CDS spreads, respectively. Second,
we examine whether liquidity is a risk factor priced by CDS investors. For this reason, we analyze the
relationship between our liquidity proxies and the default and risk premium components of default swap
spreads. The risk premium denotes the compensation demanded by protection sellers that is associated with
the unpredictable changes in the default risk environment. This premium is also known as distress risk
premium as opposed to default event premium, which embodies the reward for changes in the bond price
in the event of default (see Driessen (2005) or Berndt et al., 2008). An in-depth discussion about the risk
premium within the intensity framework of Duffie and Singleton (1999) can be found in Jarrow et al. (2005)
and Yu (2002). Using the methodology developed by Pan and Singleton (2008) and also applied by Longstaff
et al. (2011), we are able to disentangle how much of the CDS spreads are due to compensation via distress
2See "EU hits banks with credit default swap probe", Reuters, April 29, 2011
39
risk premium or pure effects of default.
Our results show a strong and significant relationship between changes in illiquidity proxies and changes
in default swap spreads. On the one hand, we find that changes in liquidity measures such as absolute bid-ask
spread, return-to-volume and gamma measure of illiquidity of CDS names are significant determinants for
changes in CDS spreads during the period of 2004-2007. Moreover, illiquidity measured by bid-ask spreads
intensifies as the credit crisis worsens. On the other hand, changes in number of contributors and Fitch
liquidity score exhibit a significant statistical relationship with changes in CDS spreads. However, we find
an inverse relationship between the latter variables that still puzzles us. Additionally, our results on the two
components of CDS spreads, risk premium and default risk, also show a significant interaction between CDS
constituents and our liquidity proxies.
We document a consistent deviation in the parameters governing the dynamics of the instantaneous, risk-
neutral arrival rate of a credit event (λQ) under risk neutral (Q) and physical (P) measures in the corporate
CDS market. We impose an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) mean-reverting structure for the logarithm of the
risk-neutral default intensity λQ. The Maximum Likelihood (ML) model estimates reveal a strong high (low)
mean-reversion rate under P (Q) measures. To put these findings into perspective, investors anticipate a wors-
ening credit-risk environment through time. Pan and Singleton (2008) also interpret this fact as evidence that
an important fraction of systematic risk is being priced via the distress premium in the context of sovereign
CDS markets. According to our results, the risk premium (on average) ranges from 22.24 bps for AA-rated
companies to 254.09 bps for B-rated companies. In terms of their relative contribution, the risk premium
represents around 28% (42%) of the total AA(B)-rated firm CDS spread. Surprisingly enough, the relative
contribution of risk premia to overall CDS spreads (on average) is around 40% when firms are grouped by
sectors, with the sole exception of 10% for Financials. How much of this gain in risk premium is due to
liquidity factors is a matter of interest in our study.
Our results on the effect of liquidity contribute to a research area that is very active nowadays.3. From a
theoretical perspective, the problem of frictions in OTC markets has been studied by Lagos et al. (2011) and
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). Empirically, Ericsson and Renault (2006), Bao et al. (2011) and Lin et al.
(2011) have analyzed liquidity concerns in corporate bond markets. The studies of Tang and Yan (2008) and
3The literature about liquidity in equity derivatives markets has received an active attention in the past. However, those articles
analyzing the liquidity in default swap markets are yet scarce. Paradoxically, the CDS outstanding has been two times bigger than
the equity derivatives in 2004. This difference has widened to four times in 2010 (ISDA, survey results 01/1987-06/2010).
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Bongaerts et al. (2011) focus on the CDS market. This article mainly continues and extends Tang and Yan
(2008), who also explore the interaction between liquidity and CDS spreads. Our paper differs from Tang and
Yan (2008) by providing a model that quantifies the risk premium inherent in CDS spreads. Additionally, we
employ a more recent sample period which includes the recent financial crisis. Having obtained a measure
of risk premia, we examine how it relates to liquidity factors. Some standard references on analyzing the
risk premium in the corporate bond markets are the works of Duffee (1999) and Driessen (2005). Berndt
et al. (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2005) employ corporate CDS spreads in order to extract information about
risk premia. Our approach is mainly inspired by Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2011), who
extract the risk premia from sovereign CDS spreads. By contrast, the empirical studies about the link between
default risk and liquidity remains scarce. To the best of our knowledge, this article is pioneering in assessing
the relationship between CDS spread constituents and liquidity.
To summarize, this article analyzes the impact of CDS liquidity supply on both plain CDS spreads and
the risk premia embedded in them. The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 overviews
the default swap market and presents our dataset. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the liquidity variables and their
relationship with CDS spreads, respectively. Sections 5 introduces the decomposition technique of Pan and
Singleton (2008), providing some results about the CDS constituents. The effects of liquidity on risk premium
and default components are studied in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The CDS Market
This section describes the structure of CDS markets, and characterizes the general features of a CDS contract.
We also summarize the main characteristics of our data sample.
2.1 The structure of the CDS market
The CDS market has been one of the fastest growing OTC derivative markets before the start of the financial
crisis in August 2007. Figure 1 shows the size of the CDS market in terms of its notional amount outstanding
(upper graph) and gross market value (lower graph), respectively. The notional amount is similar to bond
principal amount. However, unlike bonds, there is no exchange of notional during the life of the contract.
The notional amount serves a reference on which contractual payments for a CDS contract are based. Figure
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1 (b) offers a different perspective on CDS markets. It displays the gross market value of CDS contracts, that
is, the absolute sum of all open CDS contracts evaluated at market prices on the reporting date. Gross market
value provides a measure of the potential market risk in CDS transactions. Both graphs are constructed based
on the data from the BIS semi-annual reports on OTC derivatives market.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 shows that the size of the CDS market in terms of the notional amount outstanding (upper graph)
was USD 6.4 trillion by December 2004. It peaked to USD 58.2 trillion by December 2007, constituting
around 10% of the overall OTC market size in terms of notional outstanding. After the second half of 2007,
the CDS market gradually declined up to USD 32.4 trillion during June 2011 (BIS, 2012). On average,
the CDS market has constituted around 5% of the overall notional OTC derivatives market over this period.
In terms of gross value (lower graph), the default swap market has increased considerably after June 2007,
rising from USD 2.2 trillion up to USD 5.1 trillion during the second half of 2008. Since December 2009,
the average value of all CDS marked-to-market positions remains stable around USD 1.54 trillion.
Credit derivative (CD) contracts can also be classified into single- and multi-name contracts. During the
first half of 2011, multi-name CD contracts, such as basket default swaps, CDS indexes, tranche index prod-
ucts and collateral debt obligations accounted for 45% of CD market share (on average). On the other hand,
single name CDS contracts accounted for 55% of the overall CD market, where corporate (non-sovereign)
CDS contracts represented the 85% of the total –about USD 18.1 trillion in nominal amount. In terms of
maturity, single name default swaps with maturities ranging from 1 to 5 years accounted for the 70% of the
single name CDS market share. In terms of rating, investment grade single name CDS contracts (AAA-BBB)
constituted approximately 70% of the single name CDS market.
With regard to the composition of market participants, reporting dealers (commercial and investment
banks, securities houses) accounted for 60% of the single name CDS market involvement for the first half
of 2011. Other financial and non-financial institutions (insurance firms, hedge funds, etc.) represented the
remaining 39% and 1% of trading in CDS markets, respectively. The overall picture is similar for earlier time
periods. Thus, the CDS market seems to be mainly dominated by investors that operate in the financial sector.
42
2.2 CDS definition
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a derivative contract that hedges the credit risk of an underlying company
that it references (also known as reference entity). It is an agreement between two parties, where one party
(protection buyer) agrees to make periodic payments to the other party (protection seller) until the contract
maturity or some predefined credit events, whichever occurs first. CDS spreads are quoted in basis points per
annum of the total notional amount. The frequency of payments for corporate CDS names is mostly quarterly.
In case the credit event occurs before CDS maturity, and assuming physical settlement, the protection buyer
delivers the defaulted bonds to the protection seller and receives the face value of the contract principal.
In case of cash settlement, the protection seller compensates the protection buyer by paying the difference
between the notional amount of the CDS contract and the market value of the distressed bonds for the same
notional amount. Physical delivery is the dominant type of settlement in the CDS market.
The credit events that trigger payments are specified in the CDS contract. The International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) defines several types of credit events, which generally include bankruptcy,
failure to pay and restructuring.4 Currently, there are four types of restructuring defined by ISDA: full re-
structuring (FR - any restructuring constitutes a credit event, and any bond of maturity up to 30 years is
deliverable), modified restructuring (MR - restructuring counts as a credit event, and any bond of maturity 30
months or less is deliverable after the termination date of the CDS contract), modified-modified restructuring
(MM - any bond of maturity shorter than 60 months for restructured obligations and 30 months for all other
obligations is deliverable), and no restructuring (NR - no restructuring events constitute a credit event). The
MR clause is most common in US market, whereas in Europe the most common one is the MM clause. The
most frequently quoted and traded CDS contracts are the ones with 1-, 3-, 5- , 7- and 10-year maturities. The
typical notional amount of a CDS contract is USD 5-10 million for investment grade firms, and USD 2-5
millions for high yield names.
To price a CDS, let us consider a CDS contract with maturity M and annualized premium payment
CDS(M). Additionally, assume the premium payments are made quarterly. Then, the CDS spread at time t
4The restructuring has been a major source of controversy among the CDS market participants. The reason is that restructuring
of debt may not constitute a loss for the protection buyers. See O’Kane et al. (2003).
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with M year maturity will be computed as
CDSQt (M) =
4LQ
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where rt denotes the risk-free rate, λQt is the intensity of the Poisson process governing default, and LQt is the
loss given default of the referenced bond under the Q measure. The dynamics of λQt process are discussed in
Section 5.
The numerator in equation (1) represents the expected payments to the protection buyer in case of default.
The denominator reflects the discounted value of a constant, risky annuity of USD 1 paid quarterly until
maturity or default, whichever comes first. At the moment of inception, the premium on this risky annuity
(the CDS spread) paid by the protection buyer must equal the expected discounted payments faced by the
protection seller. Without loss of generality, the notional amount of the CDS contract is normalized to one.
This implies a loss given default equal to 1−R, where R is the recovery rate of the underlying bond in case of
default. Expression (1) is similar to those employed in Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2011).
Throughout the paper we assume that the risk-free rate and the default intensity processes are independent
from each other. Additionally, we use a constant recovery rate, and assume it is the same under both actual P
and risk-neutral Q measures. Both are standard assumptions in the credit risk literature.
2.3 CDS Data
We obtain the data on CDS spreads form Markit Group Ltd., a data provider which collects quotes from more
than 30 major participants5. Our dataset comprises daily quotes (composite average of bid-ask quotes) of
CDS spreads with 1-, 3-, 5-, 7-, and 10-year maturities. We consider North American CDS names that are
or have been constituents of the CDX index. Additionally, we only consider contracts that are denominated
in USD with the modified restructuring (MR) clause. We conduct our empirical analysis based on monthly
CDS spreads. To this end, we take the last non-missing CDS spread of a given month. Our final sample is
comprised of a panel of 283 CDS names across six different rating groups (from AA to CCC) and ten sectors
(basic materials, consumer goods, consumer services, financial, health care, industrial, oil&gas, technology,
5Mayordomo et al. (2011) provide a detailed description of Markit. They also refer to some academic articles employing this
database.
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telecommunications and utilities). The time period spans from January 2004 to April 2011 and it comprises
more than 100,500 daily observations.
Table 1 describes the distribution of CDS names by sector and rating. Around 52% of our sample are
investment grade companies with AA (2%), A (17%) and BBB (33%) ratings, respectively. The Consumer
Services sector accounts for almost 26% of the firms, followed by Financials (15%), Consumer Goods (14%)
and Industrials (11%).
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of CDS spreads by rating and maturity. On average, CDS spreads
increase both across ratings and maturities for the overall sample. Similar results apply to their median values.
Standard deviations of CDS spreads rise as the credit ratings of the underlying CDS names deteriorate. Inter-
estingly, CDS contracts with short-term maturity exhibit more volatility in CDS spreads than CDS contract
with long-term maturity. Maximum values of CDS spreads are unrealistically high, which suggests presence
of outliers in CDS spreads.
Table 2 also suggests that CDS term structure can be inverted. More specifically, we observe that CDS
spreads with lower maturities can be higher that CDS spreads with longer maturities. For instance, Schneider
et al. (2009) argues that since investment funds primarily use 1-year CDS to express views on the creditworthi-
ness of a CDS name, the economic driver behind the unique pattern in 1-year spreads is a supply-and-demand
premium induced by such large trades.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 depicts the monthly time series of CDS spreads by rating group. The time series of each rating
group is calculated by taking the cross sectional average of CDS spreads for each month and rating group.
Before the aggregation we drop the CDS spreads that fall outside the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution
of pooled CDS spreads. The vertical shadowed lines mark two key events of the financial crisis: i) August
2007, when BNP Paribas frozen three funds because of the subprime assets6 and ii) the Lehman Brothers
collapse in September 2008 7. On average, Figure 2 shows that the CDS spreads for investment grade compa-
nies are much lower and less volatile than the CDS spreads for high-yield companies. Additionally, spreads
6See “BNP Paribas suspends funds because of subprime problems”, NYT, August 7, 2007.
7See “Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill Is Sold”, NYT, September 14, 2008.
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exhibit a high commonality across ratings. There is a noticeable break in the dynamics of the CDS spreads
before and after August 2007. The time period before August 2007 can be characterized as a period with
stable and low volatility CDS spread dynamics, with the exception of spreads for CDSs of high-yield names.
In contrast, after the start of the financial crisis of August 2007, CDS spreads exhibit an uneven pattern .
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
3 The Liquidity of CDS spreads
3.1 Liquidity Proxies
When trying to assess the liquidity of CDSs, our objective is to capture the ease with which one can initi-
ate or unwind a CDS position. Each CDS trade has certain costs associated with it, such as search costs,
broker/dealer commissions and asymmetry of information costs (Acharya and Johnson, 2007). The higher
these costs, the higher the illiquidity of the corresponding CDS contract. Bongaerts et al. (2011) provides a
theoretical approach to model the interaction between hedging demand and liquidity premium.
Since liquidity is an economic variable not directly observed in the markets, we construct several mea-
sures in order to capture certain aspects of CDS liquidity. More specifically, we proxy liquidity using the i)
absolute CDS bid-ask spread, ii) the number of contributors that provide quotes to Markit for 5 year CDS
spreads, iii) the gamma measure of CDS illiquidity similar to the gamma measure of bond illiquidity of Bao
et al. (2011), iv) the return-to-volume measure of CDS illiquidity similar to the illiquidity measure of Amihud
(2002) for stocks and v) the Fitch liquidity score.
Bid-ask spread is one of the most widely used measures of liquidity in finance. This variable provides
a measure of the tightness of the CDS market. According to the literature, bid-ask spread reflects order
processing, inventory holding and information asymmetry costs (see Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), Stoll
(1989) or Krinsky and Lee (1996), among others). We construct the absolute bid-ask measure of illiquidity
for a CDS on a monthly basis. More specifically, we proceed by taking the last non-missing bid-ask spread for
each month. We consider absolute or quoted rather than relative bid-ask spread. Pires et al. (2010) and Coro
et al. (2012) argue that absolute bid-ask spread is already a proportional measure, hence there is no need to
scale it by the average of CDS ask and bid quotes. As liquidity dries up, the size of bid-ask spread increases.
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Hence, we expect a positive relationship between changes in CDS spreads and changes in the bid-ask spread.
Our sample of bid-ask spreads is composed of daily spreads for 5-year maturity CDS names and its taken
from CMA Datastream. The data is available from January 1, 2004.
We consider the number of contributors (NOC) that submit to Markit the 5-year CDS quotes as another
proxy for CDS illiquidity. Those contributors are usually big commercial and investment banks actively
trading in CDS contracts. Hence their concentration could reflect the degree of competitiveness in CDS
markets. Less competitive markets can lead to reduced liquidity provisions. With the NOC measure we try
to capture the aspect of CDS liquidity that is associated with the size and competitiveness of CDS markets.
A positive change in NOC might be interpreted as a sign of growing interest by market participants in buying
or selling credit protection for a particular CDS. Consequently, positive changes in NOC can be attributed
to increased liquidity in CDS markets for a given CDS name, which should be associated with a drop in the
price for credit protection. In this context, we expect to find a negative relationship between changes in NOC
and changes in CDS spreads. We take the last non-missing number of contributors for each CDS name and
month to construct the individual NOC series. Data on NOC has also been obtained from Markit.
The market depth measures the impact of a trade on the security price. An asset is considered to be liquid
if a large amount of the security can be traded without affecting its price. Since CDS contracts are not traded
in an organized markets and the data on the CDS trading volumes is not available to us, we construct an
illiquidity proxy similar to the stock illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) to account for the depth of the
CDS market,
ILRTV it =
1
Nt,d
Nt,d
∑
d=1
|rcds5yt,d |
NOC5yt,d
where Nt,d is the number of days in month t for which data is available for CDS name i, r
cds5y
t,d is the daily
return on a CDS contract with 5-year maturity for day d in month t, and NOC5yt,d is the number of market
contributors providing quotes to Markit for a 5-year CDS spread at day d in month t. To construct the CDS
returns we closely follow the methodology of Berndt and Obreja (2010).
One might argue the fact that we approximate the trading volume of CDS contracts by the number of
market contributors. Although this may not be true, the OTC nature of CDS markets leads us to introduce
additional assumptions. We believe that NOC could proxy quite closely the amount of trading activity of a
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CDS contract because it might indicate that, at least, NOC number of trades could have been executed for a
CDS name for a given day.
Our fourth proxy is the gamma measure of CDS illiquidity similar to the gamma measure of bond illiq-
uidity of Bao et al. (2011),
ILCDSCOV = Cov(rcdst ,r
cds
t+1)
where rt stands for the CDS return. This formulation of gamma illiquidity slightly modifies the one employed
by Bao et al. (2011), which is defined as the negative covariance between consecutive bond price changes.
The reason for the negative sign is due to the fact that bond price returns exhibit negative serial correlation
(see Roll, 1984). However, CDS returns approximate by construction the yield changes of the underlying
bond (see, for instance, Berndt and Obreja (2010)). The reason is that CDS spreads are approximately equal
to the bond yield minus the risk free rate (e.g., see Blanco et al. (2005), Hull et al., 2004). As it is known,
bond yield changes and bond returns are inversely related.
Finally, we consider a synthetic CDS illiquidity measure provided by Fitch. It is known as Fitch liquidity
score. This variable is a composite measure which incorporates several aspects of CDS liquidity such as the
bid-ask spread levels, the dispersion of mid-quotes across brokers, and the number of market participants.
The documentation provided by Fitch suggests that this measure should be interpreted as a pure measure of
liquidity because it controls for the default risk of the underlying CDS name. According to the documentation
on the liquidity score, the lower the score, the higher the liquidity of the corresponding CDS name.
Figure 3 displays the time series of our liquidity proxies by rating group. The time series of each measure
is constructed by taking the cross-sectional averages of the corresponding measures for each month and rating
group. Liquidity variables are bid-ask spreads (upper left graph), number of contributors (upper right), return
to volume (medium left), gamma measure (medium right) and Fitch liquidity scores (bottom). In general, the
variables exhibit the expected behavior: bid-ask spreads widen and the NOC decreases during the period of
the crisis. The return to volume and gamma measures also increase substantially after August 2007. The only
exception in this respect is the Fitch liquidity score, which suggests that illiquidity decreases after August
2007.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
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An interesting feature of Figure 3 is the rating effect in the liquidity variables. Bid-ask spreads, return
to volume and gamma measures clearly connect lower ratings with higher illiquidity. These results seem to
be consistent as rating improves. On the contrary, we do not observe such a direct interpretation for NOC or
Fitch liquidity scores.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for 5-year CDS liquidity measures. We observe that the average
bid-ask spread is around 20 basis points (bps), exhibiting a high standard deviation (67.78 bps) for the entire
sample. The average number of contributors is 10. This variable shows a low fluctuation (4.20), with a max-
imum of 16 contributors in the 95% of the sample. Gamma and volume measures present higher deviations,
where extreme values are common. Lastly, the Fitch score seems to be a very stable measure: it has a mean
score of 8.26, displaying a low variation (1.03 standard deviation) in an interval that ranges from 6.85 to
10.02 in the 10th to 90th percentile range.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 provides the correlation matrix between liquidity variables. The correlation among the liquidity
proxies is generally small with the exception of return-to-volume measure. This variable has a relatively high
correlation (0.58) with bid-ask spread, and -0.23 and -0.35 with number of contributor and gamma illiquidity,
respectively. The low correlation levels among other variables might suggest that the dependence between
those variables is not linear.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Determinants of CDS liquidity
To understand why some CDS contracts are more liquid than the others, we run a panel data regression of
our liquidity measures on company specific variables. For this reason we consider the following company
specific control variables i) the 1-year expected default frequency (EDF1y), an estimate of the actual default
probability of the firm, ii) the realized volatility (RVOL) of the stock returns of the underlying CDS company,
iii) the market capitalization (ME) in logs and iv) the composite monthly rating (RATING) constructed by
averaging credit ratings of S&P, Fitch and Moody’s.
Table 5 provides the results of panel regressions of liquidity proxies on firm specific variables and monthly
dummies. We observe that higher default probabilities and realized stock return volatility are associated with
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higher bid-ask spreads, return-to-volume and Fitch score measures, respectively. In other words, when the
companies become riskier, the liquidity associated with their corresponding CDS spreads increases. When
the market capitalization of the underlying CDS names increases, the liquidity of CDS spreads (as measured
by bid-ask spread, gamma illiquidity, return-to-volume) improves. As for the ratings, when the credit quality
of the underlying CDS names deteriorates or increases (1 corresponds to AAA, 2 to AA+, 21 to D), bid-ask
spread and return-to-volume increases. This is consistent with the results on default probabilities and realized
stock return volatility described above. Finally, the results are counter-intuitive for the number of contributors
and Fitch liquidity score.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
4 Liquidity and CDS spreads
This section analyzes the relationship between our liquidity proxies and default swap spreads using panel
data regressions. We also control for a set of variables previously employed in the literature.
4.1 Control Variables
In addition to the liquidity proxies, we control for several factors associated with the creditworthiness of the
underlying CDS names. We partially follow Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) when choosing a set of control
variables associated with credit risk of the CDS names. The variables that we choose are as follows:
1. The expected default frequency (EDF) is a measure of the actual probability of default for a given firm
over a specified period of time. We use EDF with 1 year maturity in our regression analysis. EDF data
has been previously analyzed in Bharath and Shumway (2008). It has been also employed for backing
out the default event risk premium embedded in excess bond yields or CDS spreads (see Berndt et al.,
2008).
2. As we do not have access to implied volatilities, instead we use the realized volatilities of stock returns.
We calculate the realized volatilities of stock returns by taking the standard deviation of stock returns
using a 30-day window.
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3. Return on market capitalization. In structural default models, default happens when the leverage ratio
gets close to one. Similarly, CDS spreads should be a decreasing function of the firm’s return on equity
all else being equal. Hence, instead of changes in the leverage ratio, we employ equity returns of a
CDS reference entity. We use the data on monthly equity returns downloaded from CRSP.
4. Volatility. We use the changes in the VIX index as a global indicator of market volatility. It has been
employed in other studies such as Pan and Singleton (2008).
5. Changes in the slope of the yield curve. The spot interest rate is the only interest rate that is relevant
for the determination of the firm value process in structural models. However, the spot rate can itself
depend on other factors, such as the slope of its term structure. The slope of the term structure (of
interest rates) is constructed by taking the difference between 10 year and 3 month bond yields (end of
month) of US Treasury bonds and yields, respectively. The data in downloaded from Datastream.
6. Changes in Moody’s bond yield index spread, where the spread is defined as the difference between
Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yield index levels.
Table 6 provides the summary statistics of our liquidity proxies and control variables employed in this
article. We also report some previous references (if available) that have employed these variables.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 The effect of liquidity on CDS spreads
To assess the relationship between our liquidity proxies and CDS spreads, we estimate the following panel
data model using fixed effects,
∆CDSi,t = α+β1∆ILBAS5yi,t +β2∆NOC5yi,t +β3∆ILCOV5yi,t +β4∆ILRTV5yi,t
+ β5∆LSCOREi,t + γ∆Controli,t + εi,t (2)
whereCDSi,t is the 5-year CDS spread of name i for month t, ILBAS5y is the quoted bid-ask spread, NOC5y is
the number of contributors, ILCOV5y is the gamma measure of illiquidity of 5-year CDS contract, ILRTV5y
is the return-to-volume measure, and LSCORE is the Fitch’s liquidity score. Controli,t is the vector of control
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variables, which includes Moody’s EDF measure of default probabilities, realized stock return volatility,
return on equity of the underlying CDS name, the VIX index, the slope of the term structure of interest rates,
and the spread of Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yield indices.
Table 7 reports the regression results of model (12). To stress the effects of financial crisis, we repeat
the estimations for our data before and after August 2007. Robust standard errors are adjusted for issuer-
clustering. Since we employ macroeconomic variables in our panel data analysis, model (12) does not include
time dummies. Results in Table 7 are strong: illiquidity is a significant determinant in explaining CDS
spreads. This result seem to be consistent across different measures of liquidity. More specifically, panel
estimates reveal that the bid-ask spread is a significant determinant of 5-year CDS spreads. The sign of the
bid-ask spread variable is positive and its magnitude increases after August 2007.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
With regard to the gamma and return-to-volume measures, Table 7 shows that their beta coefficients are
positive and statistically significant (as illiquidity increases CDS spreads go up). Even though the magnitude
of the coefficients of those variables falls during the crisis, they still remain statistically significant.
The regression results of number of contributors (NOC) and Fitch liquidity score seem to be counter-
intuitive. For example, changes in NOC is a significant factor for explaining changes in CDS spreads. Con-
trary to our conjecture, the sign of NOC is positive. Fitch liquidity score also suggests similar results: liquidity
improves as credit environment deteriorates. These results still puzzle us.
Finally, the control variables included in our analysis are significant factors for explaining CDS spreads.
As expected, an increase in company specific variables such as EDF and realized volatility lead to high CDS
spreads; and a decrease in equity returns also results in higher CDS spreads. Global variables such as the
VIX index, the slope of the term structure (of interest rates) and Moody’s Aaa-Baa spread are also significant
factors for CDS spreads with the expected sign for both time periods.
5 The constituents of CDS spreads
We analyze whether liquidity is priced by default swap investors. We decompose CDS spreads into their risk
premium and default risk components. This section introduces the methodology of Pan and Singleton (2008),
and it also presents our estimation results.
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5.1 The model
The intensity modeling framework has it roots in Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Lando (1998). Within this
methodology, the default event is specified as the first jump of a Poisson process, where the intensity of the
process evolves stochastically in time. The survival probability p of a firm is given by
p(t,T ) = E
￿
e−
￿ T
t λsds
￿
, (3)
where λ is the stochastic intensity of the Poisson process. This formulation permits us to compute the
expectations in equation (1) using the same machinery used for models of the term structure of interest rates
(Duffie et al., 2000).
Since default and liquidity are not easily discernible events, we hypothesize that the intensity process ac-
counts for both default and liquidity factors as in Longstaff (2011). Thus, the dynamics of the default/liquidity
process λQt under the physical measure P is given as a Black and Karasinski (1991) process, where the loga-
rithm of the state variable follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (logOU) process,
d lnλQt = κP(θP− lnλQt )dt+σdWPt , (4)
and κP and θP are the actual mean-reversion speed and long-run mean, respectively, and σ accounts for the
volatility of the process. The logOU process allows for mean reversion and it ensures the positiveness of the
default intensity. This specification has been previously employed by Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff
et al. (2011).
To price a CDS, we need to specify the process (4) under the risk neutral measure Q. The change of
measure from P to Q implies that
d lnλQt = κQ
￿
θQ− lnλQt
￿
dt+σdWQt , (5)
where κQ= κP+δ1σ and κQθQ= κPθP−δ0σ . Additionally, parameters δ0 and δ1 are governing the market
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price of risk η , where
dWQ = ηdt+dWP
=
￿
δ0+δ1 lnλQ
￿
dt+dWP.
The market price of risk allows the mean reversion rate of lnλQ to be different under the P and Q mea-
sures. Moreover, the dynamics of the default intensity can differ under both measures. Finally, note that we
specify the risk neutral default intensity process λQ under two different measures. The default intensity under
the historical measure λP does not play any role in our analysis.
5.2 Risk premium
Jarrow et al. (2005) describe the two types of risk premia in underlying CDS bonds. The first type of risk
premia designates the compensation associated with the unpredictable variation in the arrival rate of a credit
event of the bond issuer. This type of risk premia is also known as distress premium, and it has been estimated
by Pan and Singleton (2008) or Longstaff et al., 2011 for sovereign CDS spreads. The other type type of risk
premia, also known as jump-at-event premium, denominates the compensation associated with the default
event itself. Jump-at-event risk premium has been analyzed by Pan and Singleton (2006) and Berndt et al.
(2008), among others.
We focus on the distress risk premium in corporate default swaps, similarly to Pan and Singleton (2008)
and Longstaff et al. (2011) for sovereign CDS markets. To quantify the risk premium embedded in CDS
spreads, we first compute CDS spreads using the risk neutral parameter values of λQ by means of equation
(1) and (5). By restricting the parameter of the market price of risk to be zero (δ0 = δ1 = 0), we are able to
calculate a pseudo CDS spread under the physical measure,
CDSPt (M) =
4LQ
￿ t+M
t E
P
t
￿
λQu e−
￿ u
t (rs+λ
Q
s )ds
￿
du
∑4Mi=1EPt
￿
e−
￿ t+.25i
t (rs+λ
Q
s )ds
￿ , (6)
where the default intensity is given by (4).
Note that if the market price of risk ηt is zero, then the risk neutral and objective intensity of λQ will be
the same. This then implies thatCDSQ =CDSP. However, if ηt is not zero, the parameters of the λQ process
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under both measures will differ. Hence, CDS spreads calculated under P and Q measures will be different.
By subtractingCDSP fromCDSQ we obtain an estimate of the distress default premium, which we denote by
RP.
5.3 Econometric Framework
We closely follow Pan and Singleton (2008) and Longstaff et al. (2011) to estimate the parameters of the
process via Maximum Likelihood (ML). This technique has been also employed by Duffie and Singleton
(1997) and Duffie et al. (2003) with CIR-type models. For ease of notation, we denote λQ as λ . To identify
the λ process and its parameters, we employ the full CDS spread term structure available to us. It comprises
default swap spreads with 1-, 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-year maturities. We bootstrap the daily term structure of risk-
free interest rates from USD Libor and IRS swap rates. More specifically, we use the 3-, 6-, 9- and 12-month
USD Libor rates that are published by the British Bankers’ Association, and the 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year USD
interest rate swaps from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15.
To explain our estimation procedure, we first assume that 5-year CDS contracts are priced without error.
Then, we extract the λt time series inverting the pricing function (1):
λt = f−1(CDSt(5);κQ,θQ,σ). (7)
Second, we denote CDSt(M) as the remaining observed default swap spreads with maturities M = 1,3,7
and 10 years, respectively. Those contracts are assumed to be measured with normally distributed errors
εt(M), with zero means and standard deviations σε(M). For simplicity, those errors are uncorrelated across
maturities and not autocorrelated individually,
εt(M) = CDSt(M)−CDSQt (M)∼ N
￿
0,σ2ε (M)
￿
, M = 1,3,7,10 (8)
withCDSQt (M) the theoretical spread using equation (1) and the implied λt values from the first step.
Third, the probability function of the intensity process also plays a role in the estimation procedure of the
log normal model. Since the logarithm of λ follows a log-OU process, its density f P(lnλ |κP,θP,σ) is the
likelihood function of a Gaussian AR(1) process with parameters κP, θP and σ under the objective measure.
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Finally, the last step consists of maximizing the joint likelihood function,
f P(Θ,λ ) = f P(ε|σ(M))× f P(lnλ |κP,θP,σ)× ￿￿∂CDSQ(λ |κQ,θQ,σ)/∂λ ￿￿−1 (9)
where ε denotes the vector of misspricing errors,
￿￿∂CDSQ(·)/∂λ ￿￿ the corresponding Jacobian of the transfor-
mation and the parameter vector is Θ = (κQ,κQθQ,κP,σ ,σε(1),σε(3),σε(7),σε(10)). Finally, ∆t is fixed,
and it is equal to 1/12 because of the monthly frequency of our data.
5.4 Estimation results
Table 8 summarizes the results of the ML estimation8. We find significant differences between the parameters
estimated under P and Q measures. On median, the mean-reversion rate under risk-neutral measure (κQ) is
lower than the objective measure (κP), implying that the risk-neutral environment worsens as time goes by.
Additionally, the default arrival rate is much higher under Q than P measure as inferred from κQθQ > κPθP.
Those two observations suggest that a systematic risk premium is priced in the CDS market that is associated
with the unpredictable variation in the arrival rate of a credit event (Pan and Singleton, 2008).
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The magnitude of CDS spread misspricing for maturities other than 5 years can be judged by the σε(M)
parameters forM = 1,3,7,10. The results show that misspricing is highest for shorter maturities, particularly
1-year maturity. On average, σε(1) is 89.22 basis points, and 27.33 in median. This pattern seems to be
consistent when comparing with the distribution of misspricing volatilities to other maturities (e.g. percentile
95%).
To further assess the scale of misspricing of the log normal model, Figure 4 plots the cross-sectional,
averaged time series of relative misspricing of logOU model by maturity. Relative misspricing is defined as
(CDS(M)−CDSQ(M))/CDSQ(M), whereCDS(M) is the market observed CDS spread withM year maturity,
and CDSQ(M) is the model implied CDS spread. Figure 4 clearly shows the high level of misspricing of 1-
year maturity CDS spreads, especially when it is compared with other maturities. In terms of numbers, the
8The detailed list of the ML estimates for the firms under study is provided in the Appendix A.
56
average (median) misspricing for 1-year CDS is -14.46%(-4.67%), against -5.84%(-5.03%), -2.71% (-2.05%)
and -1.99%(0.31%) for 3, 7 and 10-year maturities, respectively.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Table 9 provides the summary statistics for the 5-year distress risk premium when grouping the firms by
Rating (Panel A) and Sector (Panel B), respectively. The absolute risk premium is defined as the difference
between CDS model implied spreads using expressions (1) and (4). We also report the relative distress risk
premium (DRP) measure:
DRP(M) = (CDSQ(M)−CDSP(M))/CDSQ(M). (10)
This measure quantifies the percentage of risk premium embedded in CDS spreads, similarly to Longstaff
et al. (2011).
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE]
According to Panel A in Table 9, the market demands higher risk premia (on average) from lower-rated
firms. Risk premium ranges from 22.24 bps for AA-rated companies to 254.09 bps for B-rated companies.
The standard deviation of the premium also increases as the credit quality worsens. Additionally, the distress
compensation does not seem to follow a linear pattern. An investor moving from BB to B rating category
(non-investment grade) demands 118.46 bps additionally for selling protection, versus 8.94 bps when going
from AA to A. In terms of their relative contribution, risk premium represents around 28% (42%) of the total
AA(B)-rated firm CDS spread9.
When grouping the risk premium by sectors, Panel B in Table 9 shows that lower risk premia is observed
for Telecommunications and Industrial sectors with 81.96 and 85.65 bps, respectively. On the other hand,
maximum risk premia (on average) is demanded for Technology (141.82 bps) and Consumer Services (136.91
bps). Surprisingly enough, the relative contribution of risk premium by sectors is (on average) around 40%,
with the sole exception of 11% for Financials.
Lastly, Figure 5 depicts the averaged cross-sectional time series of relative risk premium by maturity.
Taking the 5-year maturity as a base, we can observe that risk premium increases substantially from around
9The conflicting result in rating CCC might be due to the scarcity of these firms, which represent a 6.3% of our total sample.
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30% before the crisis to almost 60% after August 2007. According to these results, the financial crisis has
resulted in a generalized increase in the level of risk premia.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
6 The effects of liquidity on CDS constituents
This section examines the relationship between CDS components and the liquidity proxies of our study. More
specifically, we analyze the influence of liquidity on risk premium and default risk constituents of default swap
spreads.
To explore these questions, we first project the individual CDS risk premium on a set of variables,
∆RPi,t = α+β1∆ILBAS5yi,t +β2∆NOC5yi,t +β3∆ILCOV5yi,t +β4∆ILRTV5yi,t
+ β5∆LSCOREi,t + γ∆Controli,t + εi,t (11)
where RPi,t is the 5-year risk premium of name i for month t, ILBAS5y the bid-ask spread, NOC5y is number of
contributors, ILCOV5y the gamma measure of 5-year CDS contract, ILRTV5y the return-to-volume measure
and LSCORE the Fitch’s liquidity score. Finally,Controli,t is the vector of variables previously introduced in
subsection 4.1.
Table 10 provides the results for the CDS risk premia. We observe that our liquidity measures are signif-
icant determinants of CDS risk premia. These results are robust for different subsamples. When considering
the liquidity variables individually, we find that higher bid-ask spreads, gamma and return-to-volume proxies
lead to higher risk premium. In other words, as liquidity dries up, protection sellers ask for higher compensa-
tion for providing credit protection. As in case of CDS spreads, the number of contributors (NOC) and Fitch
liquidity scores produce results that are contrary to our expectations. More specifically, we find that higher
number of contributors and Fitch liquidity score are associated with higher and lower risk premia, respec-
tively. At this point it is worth mentioning that low Fitch liquidity score corresponds to higher liquidity of
the corresponding CDS name. Hence, these results are counter-intuitive and raise some concerns of whether
NOC (or functions of NOC) is a true proxy for liquidity.
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE]
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Table 11 estimates the panel regressions of CDS default risk component according to the following model,
∆CDSPi,t = α+β1∆ILBAS5yi,t +β2∆NOC5yi,t +β3∆ILCOV5yi,t +β4∆ILRTV5yi,t
+ β5∆LSCOREi,t + γ∆Controli,t + εi,t (12)
where CDSPi,t is the 5-year default risk component of name i for month t. According to Table 11, liquidity
variables have a significant effect on CDS default risk component. Interestingly, only bid-ask spreads, gamma
and return-to volume measures are significant factors for explaining the default part of CDS (NOC is also
significant at 10% level). The positive sign of the coefficients of bid-ask spreads, gamma and return-to-
volume measures indicate that higher illiquidity leads to higher default component of CDS spreads. Since
the point estimates of the number of contributors and Fitch liquidity score variable are not significant when
considering different subsamples, it suggests that the presence/absence of contributors does not affects the
default component of CDS spreads. Changes in control variables have a significant effect with the expected
coefficient signs on the CDS default component.
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE]
In conclusion, previous results suggest that illiquidity is an important determinant that can explain the
risk premium of default swap spreads. Additionally, illiquidity also matters for the default risk component of
CDS spreads. Finally, number-of-contributors and Fitch liquidity score measures exhibit unexpected results.
Since the usefulness of number of contributors and Fitch liquidity score variables on capturing illiquidity is
not well studied in the literature, these results should be interpreted with caution.
7 Conclusions
Default swap markets nowadays play a leading role in assessing the default risk of firms and institutions.
However, the interaction between liquidity supply and CDS markets can distort the information content of
default swaps spreads. This article analyzes the relationship between illiquidity and CDS spreads.
To explore this question, we approximate liquidity by the CDS bid-ask spreads and the number of contrib-
utors. We also introduce additional measures for liquidity such as the gamma measure of Bao et al. (2011),
the return-to-volume ratio of Amihud (Amihud, 2002) and the Fitch liquidity score. Then, we conduct our
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analysis in two steps. First, we run panel data regressions to study the relationship between our liquidity
measures and plain CDS spreads. Second, we separate CDS spreads into risk premium and default risk com-
ponent using the decomposition technique of Pan and Singleton (2008). Finally, we analyze the relationship
of CDS spread constituents with the proposed liquidity proxies.
Our findings reveal that changes in bid-ask spreads, gamma and return-to-volume measures have a sig-
nificant effect on changes in CDS spreads during the period of 2004-2011. Moreover, illiquidity proxied by
bid-ask spreads intensifies as the credit crisis worsens. Changes in the number of contributors and the Fitch
liquidity score have a significant effect on changes in CDS spreads. However the sign of the coefficients of
those variables are counter-intuitive, which are still puzzling us.
In our analysis of the risk premium, our estimation results show considerable differences in the estimated
parameters for credit event arrival rates under P and Q measures. Our results suggest that an important
fraction of CDS spreads associated with uncertainty over the future credit risk environment is systematically
being priced via the distress risk premium. According to our results, risk premium ranges from 22.24 bps
for AA-rated companies to 254.09 bps for B-rated companies. In terms of their relative contribution, risk
premium represents around 28% (42%) of the total CDS spreads of AA(B)-rated firms. When controlling
by sectors, we document a relative contribution of risk premium (on average) around 40%, with the sole
exception of 10% for Financials.
Our panel data regressions on risk premium and default risk CDS components show a significant interac-
tion between CDS constituent and our liquidity proxies. Again, the results for the number of contributors and
Fitch score are still puzzling us.
In conclusion, our results suggest that illiquidity constitutes an important factor for explaining the CDS
spreads. These results hold for risk premium and default risk components of CDS spreads. Finally, the
number of contributors and Fitch liquidity score exhibit opposite effects.
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Table 1: Distribution of CDS names by Sector and Rating
AA A BBB BB B CCC Total
Basic Materials 1 7 6 2 16
Consumer Goods 1 13 12 1 5 41
Consumer Services 1 6 29 14 2 2 72
Financials 3 11 9 8 4 8 43
Health Care 1 6 2 3 2 14
Industrials 1 5 16 6 4 32
Oil & Gas 4 6 8 1 19
Technology 6 5 3 4 18
Telecommunications 7 2 4 1 14
Utilities 1 5 3 3 2 14
Total 6 48 94 67 5 18 283
This table shows the sample distribution of CDS names by rating and ICB In-
dustry category. Ratings correspond to the averaged Moody’s and S&P grades
adjusted by instrument seniority.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of CDS spreads
mean sd min 5% med 95% max N
AA
1y 42.63 101.62 1.06 1.66 11.38 157.61 950.53 455
3y 51.37 95.20 1.54 3.33 21.29 186.54 811.87 455
5y 59.64 90.75 2.94 5.32 30.53 195.57 737.96 455
7y 61.91 83.84 4.68 8.02 34.38 198.35 680.53 455
10y 65.57 79.42 5.05 10.81 39.12 199.26 652.67 455
A
1y 40.32 163.78 1.36 2.98 13.82 126.20 6524.64 3839
3y 51.14 133.74 3.89 6.88 24.70 153.83 4391.16 3845
5y 62.69 119.67 6.93 12.04 36.97 175.59 3606.86 3846
7y 67.80 107.83 10.08 17.35 44.25 179.60 3132.83 3845
10y 74.08 98.44 12.87 22.98 52.62 184.24 2714.45 3845
BBB
1y 74.81 283.47 1.78 4.78 22.36 249.70 10594.97 7425
3y 90.34 229.03 4.51 12.45 41.08 277.24 7820.38 7428
5y 107.22 206.55 8.59 21.86 60.39 290.75 7053.63 7432
7y 113.35 186.03 12.80 29.78 70.85 287.21 6069.29 7407
10y 120.97 169.08 17.20 37.86 82.33 291.55 5416.57 7396
BB
1y 181.62 415.94 1.29 10.42 75.72 629.74 10376.70 4385
3y 239.34 380.37 8.76 25.66 141.28 699.85 7330.14 4389
5y 281.67 354.45 14.96 41.61 191.24 718.24 6347.23 4419
7y 289.55 328.14 19.96 49.90 208.20 693.10 5780.23 4385
10y 296.81 304.71 22.95 58.81 225.28 678.40 5283.29 4377
B
1y 415.22 883.27 4.36 14.60 168.65 1491.53 12686.53 3873
3y 514.30 760.37 7.42 31.73 308.73 1562.04 11246.86 3893
5y 573.08 689.49 14.06 52.12 409.10 1516.38 11762.57 3914
7y 573.01 631.28 17.96 65.46 437.77 1414.15 11397.80 3873
10y 567.13 569.05 26.36 77.35 459.40 1303.85 9235.43 3862
CCC
1y 1310.41 3155.83 5.14 14.66 397.38 5621.31 35045.89 1154
3y 1263.96 2471.88 12.51 27.96 570.55 4807.91 36934.43 1157
5y 1221.95 2115.54 20.26 42.51 647.73 4248.77 27913.98 1162
7y 1166.30 1933.11 24.78 49.90 664.92 4072.41 24371.56 1153
10y 1099.39 1735.99 31.47 59.45 667.61 3632.74 22493.20 1156
Total
1y 219.89 917.50 1.06 4.54 40.93 776.84 35045.89 21131
3y 255.40 760.19 1.54 11.02 72.45 924.98 36934.43 21167
5y 281.36 678.77 2.94 18.89 102.00 972.67 27913.98 21228
7y 282.32 625.54 4.68 25.75 113.24 933.71 24371.56 21118
10y 283.04 570.14 5.05 32.93 124.13 888.41 22493.20 21091
Summary statistics of pooled CDS spreads by rating group and maturity. Spreads are in basis points
(bps). The sample frequency is monthly and it spans from January 2004 to April 2011.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of CDS Liquidity Measures
ILBAS5y NOC5y ILCOV5y ILRTV5y LSCORE
mean 19.97 8.57 0.47 4.76 8.26
sd 67.78 4.20 159.22 12.04 1.03
min 0.00 2.00 -7167.53 0.01 5.09
p5 3.00 3.00 -2.73 0.10 6.85
p50 9.46 8.00 0.10 1.68 8.14
p95 58.00 16.00 25.20 17.61 10.02
max 2724.00 27.00 3722.25 393.20 17.69
Summary statistics of our liquidity proxies computed for 5-year CDS spreads.
ILBASS stands for the bid-ask spreads. NOC is the number of contributors.
ILCOV represents the gamma measure of illiquidity. ILRTV and LSCORE are
the return-to-volume and Fitch liquidity score variables, respectively.
Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Liquidity Measures
Panel A: In Levels:
ILBAS5y NOC5y ILCOV5y ILRTV5y LSCORE
ILBAS5y 1
NOC5y -0.114 1
ILCOV5y -0.0593 0.0224 1
ILRTV5y 0.576 -0.234 -0.357 1
LSCORE 0.0335 0.0296 -0.0794 -0.0210 1
Panel A: In Differences:
∆ILBAS5y ∆NOC5y ∆ILCOV5y ∆ILRTV5y ∆LSCORE
∆ILBAS5y 1
∆NOC5y -0.0129 1
∆ILCOV5y -0.0204 0.00791 1
∆ILRTV5y 0.121 -0.0118 -0.577 1
∆LSCORE 0.0437 -0.165 -0.0856 0.0870 1
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Table 5: CDS Liquidity Determinants
ILBAS5y NOC5y ILCOV5y ILRTV5y LSCORE
EDF1y 0.97∗∗∗ (6.76) 0.23∗∗∗ (3.11) 0.16∗∗ (2.61) 0.21∗∗∗ (2.95) 0.07∗∗∗ (2.67)
RVOL 1.02∗∗∗ (7.12) 0.19∗ (1.87) 0.50∗∗∗ (9.46) 0.52∗∗∗ (9.95) -0.04∗∗ (-2.15)
ME -1.46∗∗∗ (-3.36) -0.53 (-1.13) -0.87∗∗∗ (-5.53) -0.63∗∗∗ (-3.33) 0.32∗∗∗ (2.89)
RATING 0.30∗ (1.84) -0.26 (-1.36) 0.03 (0.69) 0.22∗∗∗ (3.12) -0.02 (-0.48)
Cons 27.49∗∗∗ (3.76) 20.48∗∗ (2.53) 13.01∗∗∗ (4.79) 8.76∗∗ (2.57) 4.45∗∗ (2.17)
monthly dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7723 9224 8818 8562 5534
adj. R2 0.388 0.494 0.261 0.480 0.489
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
This table reports the results of panel regressions of liquidity proxies on firm control variables and monthly dummies. EDF1y is the
expected default frequency of the underlying CDS name over 1 year horizon. RVOL is the realized volatility of the stock returns of
the underlying CDS name. ME is the log of market capitalization of the underlying CDS name. Finally, RATING is the composite
monthly rating of a CDS name constructed by averaging credit ratings of S&P, Fitch and Moody’s.
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Table 6: Variable definitions
Name Definition References
Panel A.- Liquidity Variables
ILBAS5y The quoted bis-ask spread of a 5 year CDS contract
(end of month value).
Tang and Yan (2010), Venkatesh and
Chiang (1986), Stoll (1989), Krinsky
and Lee (1996)
ILCOV5y The gamma measure of iliquidity of a 5 year CDS
contract.
Bao et al. (2011)
ILRTV5y The return-to-volume measure of iliquidity of a 5
year CDS contract.
Amihud (2002)
rcdst (M) Return on a CDS contract withM year maturity. Berndt and Obreja (2010), Bongaerts
et al. (2011)
Panel B.- Company Specific Control Variables
EDF1y Expected Default Frequency of the underlying CDS
company over 1 year horizon.
?
ME Market capitalization of underlying CDS name (end
of month level).
RETEQ Return on equity of underlying CDS name: ((MEt−
MEt−1)/MEt−1).
RVOL The realized volatility of the stock returns of under-
lying CDS name (calculated over daily observations
within each month and company).
Panel C.- Macroeconomic Variables
VIX The VIX index (end of month value). Pan and Singleton (2008)
SLOPE The difference between 10-year Treasury bond and
3-month Treasury bill yields (end of month value).
DEF The difference between the Moody’s Aaa and Baa
bond yield index levels (end of month value).
Longstaff et al. (2008)
Summary of liquidity and control variables. Displayed references provide a detailed description of the variable or use a
similar measure in their empirical research. Data sources are Markit, Datastream, Thomson Reuters and Yahoo Finance.
69
Ta
bl
e
7:
Pa
ne
lD
at
a
A
na
ly
si
s
fo
rC
D
S
sp
re
ad
s
Th
is
ta
bl
e
re
po
rts
th
e
re
su
lts
fo
rt
he
pa
ne
ld
at
a
re
gr
es
si
on
,
∆C
D
S i
,t
=
α
+
β 1
∆I
LB
AS
5y
i,t
+
β 2
∆N
O
C
5y
i,t
+
β 3
∆I
LC
OV
5y
i,t
+
β 4
∆I
LR
T
V
5y
i,t
+
β 5
∆L
SC
O
RE
i,t
+
γ∆
C
on
tr
ol
i,t
+
ε i,
t
w
he
re
C
D
S i
,t
is
th
e
5-
ye
ar
C
D
S
sp
re
ad
of
na
m
e
if
or
m
on
th
t,
IL
BA
S5
y
th
ei
rq
uo
te
d
bi
d-
as
k
sp
re
ad
,N
O
C
5y
is
nu
m
be
ro
fc
on
tri
bu
to
rs
,I
LC
OV
5y
th
e
ga
m
m
a
m
ea
su
re
of
5-
ye
ar
C
D
S
co
nt
ra
ct
,I
LR
T
V
5y
th
e
re
tu
rn
-to
-
vo
lu
m
e
m
ea
su
re
an
d
LS
C
O
RE
th
e
Fi
tc
h’
sl
iq
ui
di
ty
sc
or
e.
Fi
na
lly
,v
ar
ia
bl
eC
on
tr
ol
i,t
is
th
e
ve
ct
or
of
co
nt
ro
lv
ar
ia
bl
es
w
hi
ch
in
cl
ud
es
fir
m
sp
ec
ifi
c
an
d
gl
ob
al
va
ria
bl
es
.F
irm
sp
ec
ifi
c
va
ria
bl
es
ar
e
th
e
ex
pe
ct
ed
de
fa
ul
t
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
(E
D
F
1y
),
th
e
re
al
iz
ed
vo
la
til
ity
of
th
e
st
oc
k
re
tu
rn
s
(R
V
O
L)
,t
he
re
tu
rn
on
eq
ui
ty
(E
Q
RE
T
)a
nd
th
e
lo
g
of
m
ar
ke
tc
ap
ita
liz
at
io
n
(M
E
)o
ft
he
un
de
rly
in
g
C
D
S
na
m
es
,r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
Th
e
gl
ob
al
va
ria
bl
es
co
ns
id
er
ed
ar
e
th
e
V
IX
in
de
x
(V
IX
),
th
e
sl
op
e
of
th
e
in
te
re
st
ra
te
cu
rv
e
(S
LO
PE
)m
ea
su
re
d
as
th
e
di
ff
er
en
ce
be
tw
ee
n
10
-y
ea
rT
re
as
ur
y
bo
nd
an
d
3-
m
on
th
tre
as
ur
y
bi
ll
yi
el
ds
an
d
th
e
di
ff
er
en
ce
be
tw
ee
n
M
oo
dy
’s
A
aa
an
d
B
aa
bo
nd
yi
el
d
in
de
xe
s
(D
E
F
).
Th
e
m
od
el
is
es
tim
at
ed
w
ith
is
su
er
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
.R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
ad
ju
st
ed
fo
ri
ss
ue
r-
cl
us
te
rin
g.
01
/2
00
4
to
04
/2
01
1
01
/2
00
4
to
06
/2
00
7
06
/2
00
7
to
04
/2
01
1
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0)
(1
1)
(1
2)
(1
3)
(1
4)
(1
5)
∆
IL
BA
S5
y
2.
18
∗∗
∗
1.
74
∗∗
∗
2.
76
∗∗
∗
(1
1.
90
)
(9
.5
2)
(7
.3
3)
∆
N
O
C
5y
0.
39
∗∗
∗
0.
19
∗∗
0.
75
∗∗
∗
(4
.1
4)
(2
.1
1)
(3
.5
4)
∆
IL
C
O
V
5y
2.
38
∗∗
∗
4.
07
∗∗
∗
1.
56
∗∗
∗
(6
.7
3)
(5
.0
7)
(4
.5
5)
∆
IL
RT
V
5y
4.
33
∗∗
∗
6.
55
∗∗
∗
2.
19
∗∗
(6
.1
6)
(6
.7
8)
(2
.2
3)
∆
LS
C
O
R
E
−8
.3
9∗
∗∗
−5
.3
3∗
−7
.6
3∗
∗∗
(−
5.
03
)
(−
1.
71
)
(−
4.
91
)
∆
ED
F1
y
14
.7
6∗
∗∗
15
.2
5∗
∗∗
16
.8
3∗
∗∗
15
.8
2∗
∗∗
6.
79
∗∗
∗
28
.7
1∗
∗∗
28
.6
1∗
∗∗
24
.8
1∗
∗∗
24
.2
3∗
∗∗
19
.0
0
6.
16
∗
5.
42
∗∗
8.
89
∗∗
9.
75
∗∗
∗
5.
29
∗∗
(3
.4
2)
(4
.1
3)
(4
.8
4)
(3
.8
0)
(2
.9
0)
(3
.5
0)
(3
.7
4)
(3
.5
0)
(2
.9
6)
(1
.0
9)
(1
.9
6)
(2
.0
2)
(2
.2
7)
(3
.1
1)
(1
.9
9)
∆
RV
O
L
1.
83
∗∗
∗
2.
07
∗∗
∗
1.
04
∗
1.
24
∗∗
2.
75
∗∗
∗
0.
91
1.
26
0.
02
0.
22
1.
22
3.
76
∗∗
∗
4.
30
∗∗
∗
3.
26
∗∗
∗
3.
52
∗∗
∗
3.
98
∗∗
∗
(2
.7
5)
(3
.3
1)
(1
.8
4)
(2
.0
2)
(3
.2
8)
(1
.1
0)
(1
.6
0)
(0
.0
3)
(0
.2
5)
(0
.8
1)
(3
.4
0)
(4
.0
8)
(3
.0
2)
(3
.2
4)
(3
.7
1)
R
ET
EQ
−0
.8
0∗
∗∗
−0
.8
0∗
∗∗
−0
.7
2∗
∗∗
−0
.8
1∗
∗∗
−0
.9
4∗
∗∗
−0
.6
3∗
∗∗
−0
.5
7∗
∗∗
−0
.4
8∗
∗∗
−0
.5
9∗
∗∗
−0
.7
7∗
∗∗
−0
.8
7∗
∗∗
−0
.9
3∗
∗∗
−0
.8
9∗
∗∗
−0
.9
0∗
∗∗
−0
.9
2∗
∗∗
(−
7.
94
)
(−
8.
71
)
(−
10
.3
5)
(−
9.
28
)
(−
9.
52
)
(−
4.
38
)
(−
4.
81
)
(−
4.
93
)
(−
5.
04
)
(−
3.
60
)
(−
8.
96
)
(−
9.
19
)
(−
9.
83
)
(−
8.
83
)
(−
9.
11
)
∆
V
IX
0.
81
∗∗
∗
0.
95
∗∗
∗
0.
79
∗∗
∗
0.
87
∗∗
∗
0.
95
∗∗
∗
1.
98
∗∗
∗
2.
20
∗∗
∗
1.
85
∗∗
∗
2.
05
∗∗
∗
4.
00
∗∗
∗
0.
88
∗∗
∗
0.
88
∗∗
∗
0.
76
∗∗
∗
0.
89
∗∗
∗
0.
74
∗∗
∗
(6
.5
3)
(7
.8
8)
(7
.2
6)
(7
.5
0)
(6
.8
5)
(5
.6
5)
(7
.9
1)
(7
.5
4)
(8
.0
3)
(6
.7
9)
(7
.1
6)
(7
.4
2)
(7
.1
9)
(7
.5
1)
(5
.9
8)
∆
SL
O
PE
−1
6.
89
∗∗
∗
−1
6.
95
∗∗
∗
−1
5.
18
∗∗
∗
−1
8.
19
∗∗
∗
−2
6.
60
∗∗
∗
−2
.2
1
−2
.9
9∗
∗
−1
.4
3
−2
.4
7∗
5.
03
∗
−2
3.
25
∗∗
∗
−2
2.
82
∗∗
∗
−2
1.
75
∗∗
∗
−2
3.
70
∗∗
∗
−2
5.
28
∗∗
∗
(−
10
.9
8)
(−
11
.2
5)
(−
10
.6
0)
(−
12
.2
9)
(−
13
.2
8)
(−
1.
37
)
(−
2.
30
)
(−
1.
16
)
(−
1.
69
)
(1
.9
5)
(−
12
.0
7)
(−
12
.8
3)
(−
12
.4
9)
(−
12
.5
9)
(−
13
.9
8)
∆
D
EF
25
.3
8∗
∗∗
30
.5
8∗
∗∗
31
.2
4∗
∗∗
29
.8
4∗
∗∗
26
.4
3∗
∗∗
12
8.
86
∗∗
∗
13
1.
18
∗∗
∗
11
3.
82
∗∗
∗
12
6.
67
∗∗
∗
19
2.
94
∗∗
∗
15
.2
7∗
∗∗
20
.5
6∗
∗∗
22
.9
5∗
∗∗
21
.4
2∗
∗∗
22
.3
9∗
∗∗
(8
.2
3)
(9
.9
1)
(1
0.
10
)
(9
.5
2)
(8
.6
5)
(9
.8
4)
(1
0.
54
)
(1
0.
65
)
(1
0.
90
)
(9
.0
6)
(4
.9
8)
(6
.4
5)
(7
.9
4)
(7
.1
9)
(6
.9
8)
C
on
s
2.
42
∗∗
∗
1.
85
∗∗
∗
1.
52
∗∗
∗
2.
29
∗∗
∗
4.
23
∗∗
∗
1.
98
∗∗
∗
1.
23
∗∗
∗
0.
77
∗∗
∗
1.
43
∗∗
∗
2.
14
∗∗
∗
4.
82
∗∗
∗
4.
35
∗∗
∗
4.
02
∗∗
∗
4.
56
∗∗
∗
4.
26
∗∗
∗
(2
6.
01
)
(2
4.
50
)
(2
5.
31
)
(2
7.
90
)
(1
9.
04
)
(1
3.
28
)
(1
0.
21
)
(6
.7
9)
(1
2.
13
)
(5
.0
2)
(1
6.
32
)
(1
6.
48
)
(1
5.
76
)
(1
5.
33
)
(1
6.
88
)
N
64
94
79
84
75
48
73
49
47
03
33
84
46
23
43
99
40
45
13
57
31
10
33
61
31
49
33
04
33
46
ad
j.
R2
0.
21
4
0.
14
7
0.
19
4
0.
18
5
0.
16
9
0.
27
5
0.
20
9
0.
27
7
0.
27
8
0.
29
5
0.
21
1
0.
15
0
0.
19
2
0.
17
0
0.
15
4
ts
ta
tis
tic
s
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s
∗
p
<
0.
1,
∗∗
p
<
0.
05
,∗
∗∗
p
<
0.
01
70
Table 8: Summary of model ML estimates
mean sd min 5% med 95% max N
κQ 0.16 0.17 -0.35 -0.15 0.17 0.47 0.50 253
κQθQ -0.83 0.75 -2.57 -2.00 -0.88 0.57 1.34 253
σQ 1.45 0.40 0.52 0.97 1.33 2.23 2.74 253
κP 0.86 0.47 0.13 0.22 0.77 1.74 2.49 253
κPθP -4.58 2.42 -9.00 -8.72 -4.12 -1.02 -0.56 253
σ(1) 89.22 141.18 3.42 4.72 27.33 499.98 500.00 253
σ(3) 51.81 102.25 2.00 3.48 14.50 270.84 500.00 253
σ(7) 35.51 75.53 2.17 3.10 10.33 155.69 492.33 253
σ(10) 60.67 115.33 4.30 6.05 17.29 404.67 500.00 253
LLK 1891.52 628.79 163.67 627.53 2034.05 2686.96 2831.49 253
P 81.49 13.12 37.00 48.00 88.00 88.00 88.00 253
This table provides a summary statistics for ML estimates of the LogOUmodel. κQ and κP denote the
mean-reversion rates under the risk-neutral and objective probability measures, respectively. θQ (θP)
is the long-run mean of default intensity processes λQ under Q (P) measure. σQ is the instantaneous
volatility of λQ process. Finally, σε (M) represents the volatility of the CDS misspricing, with M =
1, 3, 7, and 10-year maturities. LLK denotes the maximized value of the ML objective function.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics of Distress Risk Premium by Rating and Sector
Absolute DRP (bp) Relative DRP (%)
mean sd med mean sd med
Panel B.- By rating
AA 22.24 32.86 7.45 27.52 24.66 30.27
A 31.18 50.68 19.45 44.73 31.24 54.49
BBB 49.89 109.52 31.11 43.76 29.23 51.30
BB 135.63 192.95 87.57 44.41 30.45 52.81
B 254.09 413.26 189.11 41.87 37.51 48.38
CCC 290.31 839.95 106.19 -2.67 115.58 22.51
Total 111.26 283.82 43.14 41.50 39.73 50.16
Panel B.- By sector
Basic Materials 117.73 203.64 49.94 51.56 31.44 58.53
Consumer Goods 111.27 277.02 46.21 35.10 28.56 40.14
Consumer Services 136.91 376.26 53.33 49.45 23.15 54.65
Financials 103.05 369.02 21.64 10.86 73.44 25.05
Health Care 94.07 146.33 30.98 48.15 26.63 54.71
Industrials 85.65 117.23 39.03 50.53 26.30 57.57
Oil & Gas 95.71 123.44 47.42 48.09 22.97 53.24
Technology 141.82 325.89 56.45 48.91 24.07 52.68
Telecommunications 81.96 120.90 37.01 49.45 29.57 60.55
Utilities 104.65 134.61 53.84 46.67 29.95 56.83
Total 111.61 283.71 43.26 41.53 39.71 50.20
This table reports the summary statistics for the pooled time series of 5-year Distress Risk Pre-
mium (DRP) by rating (Panel A) and sector (Panel B). Absolute and relative DRPs are defined as
(CDSQ−CDSP) and (CDSQ−CDSP)/CDSQ, respectively. The frequency of DRP is monthly.
The sample spans from January 2004 until April 2011.
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Figure 1: CDS Market Size
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CDS market size in terms of notional amount (upper graph) and gross value (lower graph). Notional amount is the
reference base for computing contractual CDS payments. Gross market value represents the mark-to-market value of
open CDS contracts. Data is taken from semi-annual OTC derivatives market reports of BIS.
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Figure 2: Time series of 5-year CDS spreads
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This figure graphs the averaged cross-sectional 5-year CDS spreads by rating group. The sample frequency is monthly
and it spans from January 2004 to April, 2011. Vertical shadow lines indicate the suspension of three BNP Paribas
funds in August, 2007, and the failure of Lehmann Brothers in September 2008, respectively.
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Figure 3: Time series of Liquidity Measures
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Time series of averaged cross-sectional liquidity measures by rating. Liquidity values outside the 5th and 95th per-
centiles have been removed.
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Figure 4: Time series of Model Misspricing
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This figure graphs the cross-sectional, averaged relative misspricing for the logOU model. Relative misspricing is
defined asMSP(M) = (CDS(M)−CDSQ(M))/CDSQ(M), whereCDS(M) is the market observed CDS spread withM
year maturity, and CDSQ(M) is the model implied CDS spread under the risk neutral measure. The sample frequency
is monthly and it spans from January 2004 to April, 2011.
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Figure 5: Time series of Distress Risk Premium
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Time series of relative distress risk premia (DRP) by maturity. Series are obtained by averaging the cross-sectional
DRP within each month. The sample frequency is monthly and it spans from January 2004 to April, 2011.
A Log OU Model Estimates
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Table 12: Parameters
Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
Alcoa Inc. 0.0625 -0.3803 1.2540 0.5254 -3.2313 0.0047 0.0022 0.0010 0.0018 2075.94
(0.0151) (0.0615) (0.0161) (0.3339) (1.8216) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Barrick Gold Corp 0.0314 -0.3380 1.1767 0.3499 -2.0989 0.0012 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 2462.27
(0.0093) (0.0348) (0.0293) (0.4905) (2.7112) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Amern Elec Pwr Co Inc 0.3219 -1.8322 1.3759 1.1601 -7.0926 0.0010 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 2587.04
(0.0208) (0.1089) (0.0299) (0.4774) (3.1587) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
The AES Corp 0.0015 0.0129 1.4076 0.9730 -3.9564 0.0096 0.0050 0.0018 0.0036 1731.22
(0.0060) (0.0326) (0.0755) (1.1584) (4.8464) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Aetna Inc. 0.1009 -0.7840 1.3439 1.1892 -7.2334 0.0009 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 2577.52
(0.0143) (0.0740) (0.0373) (0.6093) (3.6079) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Amern Intl Gp Inc 0.0787 -0.4665 1.3109 0.2637 -1.5764 0.0461 0.0162 0.0099 0.0226 1223.83
(0.0329) (0.1217) (0.0148) (0.2237) (1.1405) (0.0060) (0.0080) (0.0013) (0.0105)
Intl Lease Fin Corp 0.0957 -0.6866 1.1769 0.1953 -0.8753 0.0243 0.0059 0.0042 0.0065 1567.99
(0.0265) (0.1132) (0.0223) (0.3125) (1.3969) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0023) (0.0033)
AK Stl Corp 0.2918 -1.3399 2.2028 0.8160 -3.0063 0.0112 0.0057 0.0025 0.0031 1646.54
(0.0676) (0.3243) (0.0781) (0.8166) (4.0711) (0.0021) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Allstate Corp 0.2111 -1.2641 1.2484 0.3865 -2.2828 0.0021 0.0009 0.0005 0.0009 2383.86
(0.0122) (0.0538) (0.0185) (0.3111) (1.8170) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Advanced Micro Devices Inc 0.5000 -1.3002 2.3401 0.5004 -3.1119 0.0209 0.0088 0.0129 0.0246 1088.75
(0.0121) (0.0619) (0.0509) (0.5045) (2.6562) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Amgen Inc. 0.1142 -0.8425 1.2902 0.6254 -3.9584 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 2634.00
(0.0201) (0.1041) (0.0345) (0.5455) (3.5757) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Amkor Tech Inc 0.4987 -2.0002 2.7214 1.3307 -5.9422 0.0133 0.0046 0.0040 0.0059 1543.91
(0.0959) (0.4492) (0.1047) (1.2361) (5.5080) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0004)
AMR Corp 0.4916 -1.1141 2.1060 0.6272 -1.6053 0.0244 0.0122 0.0173 0.0303 1063.61
(0.0075) (0.0139) (0.0374) (0.3578) (1.1924) (0.0017) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0042)
Anadarko Pete Corp 0.0147 -0.2468 1.1175 0.6969 -3.8140 0.0044 0.0013 0.0006 0.0013 2197.15
(0.0076) (0.0324) (0.0176) (0.4091) (2.0381) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
ARAMARK Corp 0.0649 -0.1321 1.9090 2.0931 -8.7605 0.0074 0.0052 0.0015 0.0024 998.44
(0.0370) (0.1651) (0.1272) (1.9325) (8.5347) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0006)
ArvinMeritor Inc 0.4946 -1.6707 1.6235 0.4946 -2.1562 0.0500 0.0281 0.0110 0.0277 995.65
(0.0101) (0.0414) (0.0266) (0.3387) (1.6281) (0.0107) (0.0361) (0.0042) (0.0334)
Arrow Electrs Inc 0.1236 -0.7336 1.3638 1.4567 -8.1097 0.0019 0.0013 0.0009 0.0016 2224.87
(0.0210) (0.1048) (0.0510) (0.8928) (5.2544) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
AT&T Inc 0.2552 -1.3809 1.3109 0.6062 -3.7536 0.0010 0.0006 0.0006 0.0012 1810.04
(0.0159) (0.0774) (0.0252) (0.3779) (2.3405) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
AT&T Mobility LLC 0.0394 -0.4951 1.3376 1.1265 -7.5196 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 1583.16
(0.0379) (0.2048) (0.0514) (1.1039) (7.0539) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Avis Budget Group Inc 0.3741 -0.9837 1.0837 0.3741 -1.8763 0.0500 0.0499 0.0134 0.0384 409.31
(0.0106) (0.0366) (0.0526) (0.1865) (0.8486) (0.0034) (0.0447) (0.0053) (0.0312)
Avnet, Inc. 0.2339 -1.3042 1.6025 1.4415 -7.8239 0.0019 0.0013 0.0009 0.0017 2197.92
(0.0237) (0.1135) (0.0399) (0.5885) (3.4181) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Amern Express Co 0.3170 -1.8557 1.4057 0.3929 -2.3845 0.0017 0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 2381.56
(0.0134) (0.0552) (0.0172) (0.2634) (1.4592) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Autozone Inc 0.3061 -1.7715 1.6017 1.0518 -6.3495 0.0013 0.0010 0.0009 0.0015 2316.67
(0.0332) (0.1813) (0.0542) (0.7630) (4.7857) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Boeing Cap Corp 0.0920 -0.6946 1.2685 0.5743 -3.5326 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0006 2615.39
(0.0093) (0.0454) (0.0288) (0.4389) (2.7609) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Bk of America Corp 0.0447 -0.4536 1.0659 0.1746 -0.9250 0.0043 0.0015 0.0007 0.0010 1599.95
(0.0225) (0.0919) (0.0290) (0.3657) (1.7914) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Baxter Intl Inc 0.2136 -1.2716 1.2101 1.1063 -7.3231 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 2809.56
(0.0184) (0.0996) (0.0347) (0.6959) (4.8639) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Brunswick Corp 0.1329 -0.5517 1.1805 0.2598 -1.4403 0.0200 0.0049 0.0066 0.0074 1553.87
(0.0389) (0.1259) (0.0190) (0.2511) (1.1591) (0.0055) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0016)
Black& Decker Corp 0.2873 -1.6436 1.4608 0.3570 -2.3985 0.0010 0.0008 0.0008 0.0013 2400.31
(0.0171) (0.0870) (0.0314) (0.5166) (2.9467) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Belo Corp. 0.3160 -1.3824 1.3155 2.0363 -6.2308 0.0296 0.0078 0.0041 0.0061 627.53
(0.1677) (0.6407) (0.0844) (1.4153) (4.5091) (0.0242) (0.0040) (0.0034) (0.0064)
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Table 13: Parameters
Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
BellSouth Corp 0.2330 -1.2430 1.1334 1.2499 -8.3599 0.0004 0.0003 0.0005 0.0010 2657.07
(0.0093) (0.0510) (0.0219) (0.4472) (3.0117) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Bristol Myers Squibb Co 0.2752 -1.5873 1.2337 1.1050 -7.4720 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 2831.49
(0.0181) (0.0965) (0.0256) (0.4651) (3.2994) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Bombardier Inc 0.1640 -0.8328 1.7658 1.7079 -7.9361 0.0043 0.0020 0.0015 0.0024 1928.27
(0.0225) (0.1111) (0.0520) (0.8260) (3.8816) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Bombardier Cap Inc -0.1299 0.4275 0.7089 0.3871 -1.7647 0.0034 0.0014 0.0007 0.0010 2219.77
(0.0102) (0.0373) (0.0166) (0.3621) (1.5079) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Boston Pptys Ltd Partnership -0.0015 -0.2538 1.2105 0.5891 -3.0027 0.0029 0.0013 0.0007 0.0014 1816.30
(0.0029) (0.0147) (0.0347) (0.6976) (3.2352) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Berkshire Hathaway Inc 0.0676 -0.3604 0.7815 0.1902 -1.0734 0.0025 0.0012 0.0004 0.0007 2410.07
(0.0067) (0.0230) (0.0118) (0.1722) (0.9112) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Boston Scientific Corp 0.0555 -0.4147 1.1502 0.4870 -2.7073 0.0027 0.0015 0.0009 0.0017 2171.80
(0.0146) (0.0612) (0.0201) (0.4928) (2.6721) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Boyd Gaming Corp 0.2762 -0.7019 1.8164 0.3484 -1.8484 0.0191 0.0151 0.0116 0.0168 1154.04
(0.0478) (0.2028) (0.0379) (0.4128) (2.2650) (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0045) (0.0066)
ConAgra Foods Inc -0.0552 0.0561 1.2583 0.4028 -2.3006 0.0009 0.0006 0.0007 0.0012 2449.39
(0.0101) (0.0366) (0.0848) (1.1754) (7.2795) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Cardinal Health Inc 0.0416 -0.4329 1.2955 1.3577 -8.2242 0.0009 0.0005 0.0006 0.0011 2481.17
(0.0171) (0.0907) (0.0580) (1.1935) (7.1397) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
CA, Inc. 0.0212 -0.1725 1.3425 1.6319 -8.8535 0.0024 0.0018 0.0015 0.0030 1449.07
(0.0143) (0.0631) (0.0567) (1.1759) (6.2492) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Caterpillar Inc 0.1114 -0.7008 1.1190 0.6672 -4.1233 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0006 2614.72
(0.0067) (0.0328) (0.0162) (0.3709) (2.1148) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Chubb Corp 0.0520 -0.5302 1.2047 0.8851 -5.2761 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 2686.96
(0.0164) (0.0873) (0.0304) (0.5980) (3.4640) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CBS Corp 0.3232 -1.6915 1.6402 0.4193 -2.5690 0.0018 0.0009 0.0011 0.0017 1589.12
(0.0185) (0.0912) (0.0354) (0.4920) (2.6909) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Carnival Corp 0.0964 -0.7062 1.4155 0.7491 -4.3992 0.0011 0.0008 0.0012 0.0014 2335.58
(0.0154) (0.0692) (0.0362) (0.5359) (3.1224) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Clear Channel Comms Inc 0.2131 -0.7516 1.1776 0.2131 -0.8922 0.0500 0.0500 0.0372 0.0491 367.49
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2543) (1.1386) (0.0023) (0.0058) (0.0046) (0.0038)
AVIS BUDGET CAR Rent LLC 0.2552 -0.4813 1.7326 0.3296 -1.8898 0.0500 0.0145 0.0492 0.0500 512.91
(0.0127) (0.0087) (0.0441) (0.3133) (1.6908) (0.0101) (0.0034) (0.0662) (0.0346)
Constellation Engy Gp Inc 0.1392 -0.8302 1.2898 0.5156 -2.8384 0.0043 0.0020 0.0006 0.0013 2159.98
(0.0231) (0.0935) (0.0215) (0.3349) (1.9017) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Chesapeake Engy Corp 0.0034 -0.0599 1.6489 1.4748 -7.5095 0.0066 0.0043 0.0017 0.0025 1831.40
(0.0069) (0.0401) (0.0527) (0.7393) (3.7179) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Cigna Corp 0.1271 -0.8367 1.2981 1.3136 -7.4444 0.0008 0.0006 0.0004 0.0007 2545.88
(0.0094) (0.0477) (0.0264) (0.4605) (2.6040) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
CIT Gp Inc 0.3841 -1.0825 2.5702 0.3841 -2.2011 0.0500 0.0167 0.0397 0.0500 589.75
(0.0099) (0.0378) (0.0411) (0.5508) (2.3279) (0.0095) (0.0037) (0.0168) (0.0287)
Celestica Inc -0.2725 1.1172 0.9452 1.7369 -7.2214 0.0064 0.0036 0.0022 0.0031 1794.68
(0.0297) (0.1168) (0.0351) (0.9624) (3.9432) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Comcast Corp 0.1723 -1.0007 1.3743 0.8843 -5.2007 0.0011 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 2450.71
(0.0106) (0.0526) (0.0257) (0.3907) (2.4167) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Comcast Cable Comms LLC 0.1544 -0.9451 1.3307 1.3878 -8.8781 0.0009 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 2476.49
(0.0185) (0.0954) (0.0334) (0.5772) (3.7163) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
CMS Engy Corp 0.3601 -1.9275 1.8581 1.6097 -7.7539 0.0023 0.0015 0.0009 0.0013 2168.17
(0.0358) (0.1874) (0.0564) (0.7982) (4.5492) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
New Cingular Wireless Services Inc 0.1848 -1.0860 1.2437 1.1707 -8.1733 0.0003 0.0002 0.0004 0.0009 2454.33
(0.0297) (0.1549) (0.0331) (0.5765) (4.1828) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cdn Nat Res Ltd 0.0467 -0.2968 0.9442 0.3383 -1.8176 0.0015 0.0007 0.0007 0.0013 2373.55
(0.0076) (0.0260) (0.0237) (0.4729) (2.3752) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cap One Finl Corp 0.2775 -1.3874 1.0305 0.3860 -1.7242 0.0027 0.0013 0.0008 0.0013 2160.66
(0.0103) (0.0437) (0.0114) (0.1804) (0.9598) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Cap One Bk USA Natl Assn 0.1614 -1.0120 1.0368 0.7645 -3.0793 0.0027 0.0014 0.0008 0.0013 911.17
(0.0299) (0.1226) (0.0483) (0.8438) (3.2480) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Cooper Tire& Rubr Co 0.2992 -1.3842 2.0815 0.6029 -3.3937 0.0086 0.0046 0.0047 0.0073 1584.20
(0.0611) (0.2405) (0.0378) (0.5310) (2.7834) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008)
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Table 14: Parameters
Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
ConocoPhillips 0.2232 -1.3463 1.2370 0.6564 -4.2100 0.0005 0.0004 0.0002 0.0005 2759.83
(0.0117) (0.0674) (0.0298) (0.4797) (3.0519) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Cox Comms Inc 0.2588 -1.4550 1.4826 1.3347 -8.1593 0.0015 0.0009 0.0006 0.0011 2358.95
(0.0160) (0.0814) (0.0283) (0.4267) (2.6582) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Campbell Soup Co 0.0046 -0.2751 1.2644 1.3648 -8.8973 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 2642.32
(0.0045) (0.0458) (0.0677) (1.1911) (8.0304) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Computer Sciences Corp -0.1603 0.6837 1.2584 1.1149 -6.7208 0.0013 0.0013 0.0009 0.0016 2267.32
(0.0242) (0.1160) (0.0633) (1.1575) (7.1089) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Cisco Sys Inc 0.1725 -1.0986 1.3183 0.5825 -3.9116 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0008 2288.17
(0.0205) (0.1011) (0.0304) (0.7055) (4.5723) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
CSX Corp 0.1320 -0.8404 1.2795 1.0350 -6.1825 0.0010 0.0005 0.0005 0.0010 2489.75
(0.0124) (0.0646) (0.0341) (0.5878) (3.3953) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Centex Corp 0.4029 -2.2276 1.7107 0.4782 -2.5314 0.0039 0.0021 0.0012 0.0022 2017.59
(0.0251) (0.1166) (0.0314) (0.3834) (2.1573) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
CVS Caremark Corp 0.2986 -1.8149 1.4980 0.9008 -5.3929 0.0010 0.0007 0.0007 0.0011 1311.57
(0.0337) (0.1717) (0.0591) (1.1344) (6.7489) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Cmnty Health Sys Inc 0.4883 -2.0225 2.7305 1.9671 -8.9998 0.0061 0.0053 0.0023 0.0035 903.69
(0.1942) (0.8924) (0.2192) (2.7238) (12.8093) (0.0010) (0.0014) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Dominion Res Inc 0.3680 -2.0247 1.3698 1.3691 -8.7390 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 2646.82
(0.0181) (0.0918) (0.0242) (0.3843) (2.5765) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
E I du Pont de Nemours& Co 0.1539 -0.9834 1.2864 0.7627 -5.0651 0.0007 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 2630.13
(0.0109) (0.0626) (0.0365) (0.7045) (4.5069) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dillards Inc 0.0915 -0.3033 2.0420 0.8639 -4.3677 0.0105 0.0045 0.0040 0.0062 1600.64
(0.0486) (0.2119) (0.0772) (0.8324) (3.8618) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0015)
Deere& Co 0.1021 -0.7816 1.3032 1.2362 -7.8069 0.0010 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 2610.51
(0.0086) (0.0497) (0.0328) (0.6288) (3.7371) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Dell Inc 0.0430 -0.3713 1.1194 0.4362 -2.6057 0.0012 0.0007 0.0005 0.0009 2496.26
(0.0103) (0.0482) (0.0286) (0.5663) (3.2930) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Quest Diagnostics Inc -0.1141 0.3454 1.1104 1.4150 -7.7591 0.0016 0.0011 0.0007 0.0013 2242.41
(0.0230) (0.1047) (0.0543) (1.1858) (6.2989) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Walt Disney Co 0.2858 -1.5342 1.2423 0.6825 -4.5463 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0008 2668.48
(0.0126) (0.0648) (0.0214) (0.3712) (2.5700) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Dean Hldg Co -0.2711 1.0882 0.9679 0.6047 -2.4204 0.0064 0.0039 0.0020 0.0035 1622.54
(0.0346) (0.1434) (0.0414) (0.9799) (4.0269) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Dean Foods Co -0.3453 1.3357 0.8722 2.4475 -8.8622 0.0076 0.0046 0.0021 0.0030 975.99
(0.0632) (0.2418) (0.0577) (1.9170) (7.2270) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0013)
R R Donnelley& Sons Co 0.2333 -1.2715 1.7480 0.4636 -2.7793 0.0030 0.0019 0.0012 0.0019 1818.83
(0.0258) (0.1206) (0.0365) (0.4943) (3.0065) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Domtar Corp 0.2371 -1.3318 2.0517 1.6852 -7.4213 0.0055 0.0028 0.0014 0.0016 857.52
(0.0763) (0.3897) (0.1828) (1.8329) (7.8789) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Dow Chem Co 0.1827 -1.0140 1.2893 0.4478 -2.6745 0.0021 0.0014 0.0007 0.0014 2261.83
(0.0101) (0.0411) (0.0221) (0.3270) (1.9555) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Darden Restaurants Inc 0.1460 -0.8358 1.2378 0.4728 -2.6889 0.0020 0.0011 0.0011 0.0018 2227.49
(0.0162) (0.0703) (0.0328) (0.5949) (3.3705) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006)
DIRECTV Hldgs LLC -0.0153 0.0294 1.5190 1.6792 -9.0000 0.0024 0.0017 0.0018 0.0029 1903.34
(0.0100) (0.0463) (0.0567) (0.9138) (4.7118) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Duke Energy Carolinas LLC 0.0943 -0.6960 1.1892 1.0617 -6.5459 0.0007 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005 1646.36
(0.0211) (0.1043) (0.0366) (0.6863) (4.2776) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Devon Engy Corp 0.2944 -1.6488 1.3034 1.1031 -6.9446 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 2654.52
(0.0148) (0.0800) (0.0271) (0.4412) (2.8356) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Dynegy Hldgs Inc -0.0694 0.3342 1.6499 1.1403 -3.9568 0.0254 0.0122 0.0030 0.0049 1445.60
(0.0537) (0.2369) (0.0707) (0.9621) (3.5544) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Energy Future Hldgs Corp -0.1464 0.6090 1.2232 0.7369 -1.5602 0.0500 0.0238 0.0083 0.0148 514.79
(0.1117) (0.2964) (0.0479) (1.0598) (2.1446) (0.0121) (0.0083) (0.0025) (0.0046)
Eastman Kodak Co -0.1973 1.1075 1.6536 0.7425 -3.3240 0.0173 0.0072 0.0048 0.0086 1462.22
(0.0541) (0.2096) (0.0392) (0.6264) (2.8347) (0.0015) (0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0021)
Embarq Corp -0.0493 0.1333 1.3101 1.4992 -8.1891 0.0018 0.0017 0.0013 0.0026 1393.73
(0.0193) (0.0839) (0.0576) (1.0311) (5.3603) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0008)
Eastman Chem Co 0.2747 -1.5216 1.4180 1.1403 -6.8149 0.0010 0.0008 0.0007 0.0012 2402.50
(0.0212) (0.1165) (0.0462) (0.7225) (4.4331) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
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Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
EOP Oper Ltd Pship 0.1446 -0.9755 1.4544 1.2546 -7.3412 0.0016 0.0012 0.0008 0.0017 2278.75
(0.0369) (0.1898) (0.0691) (1.0960) (6.6246) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
El Paso Corp 0.2578 -1.2758 1.9207 1.3542 -6.2045 0.0059 0.0039 0.0013 0.0019 1877.58
(0.0397) (0.1833) (0.0518) (0.7301) (3.6416) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ERP Oper Ltd Pship 0.0627 -0.6846 1.4886 0.5222 -2.9534 0.0031 0.0010 0.0007 0.0013 2240.74
(0.0210) (0.0788) (0.0429) (0.7041) (3.6174) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
EXPEDIA INC 0.2568 -1.3446 1.6970 1.4087 -7.1536 0.0042 0.0024 0.0020 0.0033 1203.69
(0.0300) (0.1438) (0.0688) (0.9911) (5.0214) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0016)
Ford Mtr Co 0.3460 -1.1781 1.4164 0.3622 -1.4289 0.0500 0.0500 0.0281 0.0493 442.07
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4303) (1.0951) (0.0159) (0.0460) (0.0082) (0.0113)
Hertz Corp 0.3113 -1.3447 2.1638 0.9745 -5.2494 0.0106 0.0057 0.0045 0.0076 1553.13
(0.0980) (0.4045) (0.0476) (0.6918) (3.3264) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0026)
FORD Mtr Cr Co LLC 0.5000 -2.0171 2.5224 0.7688 -4.2365 0.0490 0.0176 0.0098 0.0221 586.08
(0.1557) (0.7755) (0.0949) (0.9261) (4.5618) (0.0197) (0.0156) (0.0044) (0.0228)
Freeport McMoran Copper& Gold Inc -0.0334 0.0608 1.2343 1.2386 -5.7344 0.0043 0.0025 0.0030 0.0034 1616.55
(0.0128) (0.0498) (0.0402) (0.7059) (3.1994) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
1st Data Corp -0.1287 0.5416 1.3173 0.1997 -1.0144 0.0249 0.0088 0.0041 0.0067 1459.92
(0.0454) (0.1814) (0.0273) (0.3468) (1.7083) (0.0029) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0012)
FirstEnergy Corp -0.0417 0.0537 1.0551 0.6984 -3.5325 0.0022 0.0012 0.0006 0.0011 2298.70
(0.0082) (0.0314) (0.0351) (0.7071) (3.7482) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Fairfax Finl Hldgs Ltd -0.3108 1.1136 0.6902 0.7261 -2.6160 0.0055 0.0034 0.0020 0.0025 1807.47
(0.0260) (0.0975) (0.0212) (0.6087) (2.1249) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Fortune Brands Inc 0.2019 -1.1953 1.4979 0.5928 -3.7140 0.0021 0.0012 0.0010 0.0016 2216.02
(0.0215) (0.0996) (0.0262) (0.3826) (2.3024) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Freescale Semiconductor Inc 0.1275 -0.2774 1.6695 0.1341 -0.6818 0.0490 0.0241 0.0470 0.0500 674.78
(0.0220) (0.0344) (0.0307) (0.2610) (1.2757) (0.0169) (0.0128) (0.0404) (0.0181)
Fst Oil Corp 0.0063 -0.0740 1.7350 1.2321 -5.9704 0.0058 0.0042 0.0017 0.0027 1834.46
(0.0107) (0.0519) (0.0775) (1.0190) (4.8815) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Gannett Co Inc DE 0.1923 -0.9319 1.2247 0.2192 -1.2211 0.0123 0.0049 0.0025 0.0038 1761.98
(0.0350) (0.1260) (0.0270) (0.2756) (1.5774) (0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0016)
Gen Elec Cap Corp 0.1525 -0.9589 1.2289 0.3142 -1.7823 0.0033 0.0010 0.0007 0.0011 2261.45
(0.0102) (0.0413) (0.0179) (0.3143) (1.6091) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gen Mls Inc 0.2953 -1.6712 1.3036 0.7996 -5.1224 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0007 2648.04
(0.0188) (0.1042) (0.0336) (0.5282) (3.5309) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Residential Cap LLC 0.2530 -0.9905 1.3902 0.2867 -0.7308 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 0.0500 -1167.05
(0.0024) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2972) (1.1372) (0.0005) (0.0017) (0.0178) (0.0045)
GMAC LLC 0.4070 -1.2883 2.6925 0.4733 -2.4466 0.0500 0.0309 0.0116 0.0286 367.44
(0.0802) (0.1443) (0.0841) (0.7912) (3.5892) (0.0136) (0.0253) (0.0110) (0.0576)
G A T X Corp 0.1230 -0.7557 1.3086 0.7556 -3.8137 0.0020 0.0013 0.0008 0.0014 2240.52
(0.0163) (0.0725) (0.0326) (0.5282) (2.8844) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
GA PACIFIC LLC 0.1273 -0.6389 1.8959 1.4149 -7.1941 0.0057 0.0027 0.0019 0.0031 1074.29
(0.0358) (0.1564) (0.0870) (1.3602) (6.5438) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009)
The Gap Inc -0.1467 0.6072 1.1275 0.9265 -5.0133 0.0016 0.0011 0.0013 0.0021 2197.22
(0.0359) (0.1666) (0.0734) (1.3808) (7.7597) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Goodrich Corp 0.2703 -1.5237 1.3262 1.1083 -6.7728 0.0008 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 2579.67
(0.0202) (0.1083) (0.0326) (0.5801) (3.8280) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Goodyear Tire& Rubr Co 0.1985 -0.8562 2.0866 1.8121 -7.5002 0.0103 0.0062 0.0029 0.0047 1602.94
(0.0659) (0.2963) (0.0684) (0.7769) (3.5418) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0015)
Halliburton Co 0.1315 -0.8136 1.1373 1.0102 -5.8450 0.0007 0.0005 0.0003 0.0007 2613.37
(0.0081) (0.0483) (0.0293) (0.5481) (3.1487) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
HCA Inc. -0.0295 0.4052 1.8913 1.0638 -6.0129 0.0058 0.0044 0.0031 0.0049 1706.07
(0.0261) (0.1040) (0.0486) (0.8598) (4.4519) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0023)
Home Depot Inc 0.1695 -0.9744 1.1619 0.2619 -1.6744 0.0011 0.0007 0.0006 0.0010 2474.87
(0.0070) (0.0322) (0.0202) (0.3041) (1.8646) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Hess Corp 0.0951 -0.5390 1.0355 0.4459 -2.3946 0.0012 0.0008 0.0007 0.0015 1584.58
(0.0122) (0.0467) (0.0342) (0.6307) (3.1938) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Harrahs Oper Co Inc 0.1985 -0.5309 0.8366 0.1985 -0.7842 0.0500 0.0500 0.0202 0.0500 437.84
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1374) (0.6465) (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0030) (0.0067)
Hartford Finl Svcs Gp Inc 0.1824 -1.1101 1.4502 0.2621 -1.5179 0.0067 0.0019 0.0009 0.0015 2058.31
(0.0215) (0.1037) (0.0224) (0.3218) (1.7471) (0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003)
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Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
Honeywell Intl Inc 0.1983 -1.1526 1.1474 0.6205 -4.0413 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0005 2800.51
(0.0089) (0.0544) (0.0291) (0.4938) (3.1649) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Host Hotels& Resorts Inc 0.4238 -2.0809 2.2317 0.7019 -4.0665 0.0052 0.0027 0.0020 0.0028 1264.08
(0.0452) (0.2071) (0.0528) (0.7638) (3.7685) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Host Hotels& Resorts LP 0.2662 -1.2699 1.9740 1.2003 -6.4937 0.0068 0.0020 0.0024 0.0035 1246.74
(0.0430) (0.1883) (0.0415) (0.8296) (3.8262) (0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Starwood Hotels& Resorts Wwide Inc 0.4296 -2.2311 1.8111 1.6121 -8.3511 0.0029 0.0017 0.0014 0.0023 2034.05
(0.0245) (0.1198) (0.0434) (0.5506) (3.0387) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
K Hovnanian Entpers Inc 0.4692 -1.1960 2.0713 0.4693 -2.3695 0.0208 0.0095 0.0111 0.0218 1000.05
(0.0219) (0.0725) (0.0634) (0.4130) (1.6541) (0.0013) (0.0010) (0.0041) (0.0085)
Hewlett Packard Co 0.2134 -1.2684 1.2784 0.9783 -6.5686 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 2697.80
(0.0170) (0.0879) (0.0262) (0.4652) (3.1173) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Intl Business Machs Corp 0.2430 -1.4018 1.2428 0.5705 -3.9305 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 2775.43
(0.0112) (0.0597) (0.0199) (0.3461) (2.2679) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Intl Paper Co 0.2252 -1.2398 1.5149 0.9198 -5.3366 0.0024 0.0012 0.0009 0.0015 2200.51
(0.0108) (0.0479) (0.0284) (0.4242) (2.4588) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Ingersoll Rand Co 0.2734 -1.5222 1.2212 0.8951 -5.7265 0.0007 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 2587.34
(0.0193) (0.0998) (0.0276) (0.4788) (2.9875) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Iron Mtn Inc -0.0297 0.1895 1.5893 1.8343 -8.2291 0.0034 0.0031 0.0018 0.0021 1567.58
(0.0304) (0.1385) (0.0963) (1.4047) (6.6028) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Johnson Ctls Inc 0.1216 -0.8346 1.4128 0.3615 -2.1790 0.0013 0.0009 0.0005 0.0009 2404.20
(0.0098) (0.0480) (0.0211) (0.4144) (2.1791) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
J C Penney Co Inc 0.2103 -1.2103 1.6244 1.1403 -6.0197 0.0035 0.0018 0.0013 0.0021 2010.69
(0.0221) (0.1160) (0.0349) (0.4744) (2.5843) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Nordstrom Inc 0.2261 -1.2674 1.4000 0.4039 -2.5312 0.0015 0.0009 0.0009 0.0015 2304.83
(0.0111) (0.0415) (0.0276) (0.3366) (2.3058) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
KB Home 0.4105 -2.2546 2.1794 1.2219 -5.7390 0.0096 0.0042 0.0025 0.0040 1712.64
(0.0653) (0.3051) (0.0729) (0.7689) (3.9483) (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Kraft Foods Inc 0.2201 -1.2747 1.3149 0.8576 -5.5090 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005 0.0009 2565.75
(0.0161) (0.0860) (0.0345) (0.5619) (3.6017) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Kerr Mcgee Corp 0.0259 -0.2908 1.1143 1.0679 -6.0046 0.0027 0.0012 0.0006 0.0011 2283.52
(0.0117) (0.0509) (0.0304) (0.5911) (3.2915) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Kinder Morgan Engy Partners L P 0.0464 -0.3380 1.0767 0.6741 -3.6888 0.0016 0.0008 0.0005 0.0009 2401.78
(0.0126) (0.0510) (0.0246) (0.5649) (3.0159) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
The Kroger Co. 0.3601 -1.8829 1.3782 0.8913 -5.3515 0.0013 0.0008 0.0008 0.0014 2371.39
(0.0307) (0.1578) (0.0473) (0.7190) (4.5373) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Kohls Corp 0.1154 -0.8258 1.4212 0.8215 -5.0241 0.0013 0.0007 0.0008 0.0011 2394.60
(0.0133) (0.0627) (0.0394) (0.5936) (3.6162) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Lear Corp -0.2472 0.2960 0.1909 0.0648 -0.0212 0.0500 0.0499 0.0498 0.0491 -5775.63
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0329) (0.0541) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0060) (0.0007)
Lennar Corp 0.1048 -0.5490 1.0672 0.2559 -1.0806 0.0099 0.0040 0.0020 0.0037 1781.28
(0.0247) (0.0831) (0.0235) (0.3565) (1.6275) (0.0023) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0011)
Levi Strauss& Co 0.3546 -1.3011 2.0732 1.1199 -4.1703 0.0121 0.0084 0.0086 0.0126 1384.73
(0.1185) (0.4681) (0.0521) (0.9313) (4.1850) (0.0014) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Liz Claiborne Inc 0.1083 -0.5485 1.1101 0.1255 -0.5585 0.0114 0.0041 0.0030 0.0045 1723.69
(0.0387) (0.1193) (0.0279) (0.3089) (1.4217) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0012)
L 3 Comms Corp 0.0481 -0.3363 1.3256 1.3465 -6.7043 0.0020 0.0015 0.0011 0.0016 2067.38
(0.0176) (0.0938) (0.0825) (1.4281) (7.0238) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Liberty Media LLC 0.2999 -1.4040 1.9154 1.0746 -5.2911 0.0038 0.0026 0.0014 0.0021 1318.46
(0.0456) (0.2173) (0.0825) (1.2050) (5.8394) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Lockheed Martin Corp 0.3061 -1.7449 1.2978 1.1564 -7.7683 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 2744.71
(0.0182) (0.0990) (0.0267) (0.4941) (3.4051) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Lowes Cos Inc 0.2022 -1.3154 1.4413 0.6528 -4.2990 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 0.0008 2579.70
(0.0151) (0.0871) (0.0380) (0.5442) (3.6775) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
LA Pac Corp 0.4924 -2.5747 1.9636 0.8099 -4.2027 0.0109 0.0031 0.0016 0.0023 1846.23
(0.0581) (0.2943) (0.0604) (0.6693) (3.7334) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Ltd Brands Inc 0.3674 -1.8878 1.7397 0.4293 -2.6522 0.0031 0.0017 0.0013 0.0018 2083.17
(0.0238) (0.1044) (0.0280) (0.4219) (2.3803) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Loews Corp 0.0932 -0.6591 1.1756 0.5273 -2.9913 0.0008 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 2625.15
(0.0209) (0.1063) (0.0364) (0.6218) (3.7802) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
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Table 17: Parameters
Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
Southwest Airls Co 0.2696 -1.4491 1.4576 0.5670 -3.2588 0.0017 0.0010 0.0010 0.0019 2244.27
(0.0137) (0.0639) (0.0283) (0.3937) (2.2349) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Level 3 Comms Inc 0.2820 -0.5466 1.1696 0.7162 -1.6624 0.0500 0.0231 0.0097 0.0168 1046.44
(0.0459) (0.1426) (0.0236) (0.4166) (1.1436) (0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0020)
Macy s Inc 0.3467 -1.7179 1.5316 0.3915 -1.9712 0.0040 0.0028 0.0016 0.0021 1007.32
(0.0300) (0.1255) (0.0389) (0.5535) (2.4179) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Macy s Retail Hldgs Inc 0.4681 -2.5348 1.9162 0.6824 -3.5656 0.0037 0.0024 0.0016 0.0025 1007.92
(0.0415) (0.1759) (0.0561) (0.6466) (3.2158) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007)
Marriott Intl Inc 0.0744 -0.5278 1.2556 0.4554 -2.5102 0.0023 0.0010 0.0012 0.0017 2209.41
(0.0133) (0.0488) (0.0326) (0.5233) (2.7668) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Masco Corp 0.1628 -0.8225 1.1794 0.2071 -1.0791 0.0040 0.0021 0.0011 0.0021 2065.05
(0.0214) (0.0782) (0.0229) (0.3389) (1.7111) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0005)
MBIA Ins Corp 0.2481 -0.6600 0.9019 0.2484 -1.2527 0.0500 0.0499 0.0156 0.0486 707.68
(0.0030) (0.0090) (0.0192) (0.0865) (0.5241) (0.0020) (0.0094) (0.0031) (0.0151)
Mediacom LLC 0.0809 -0.2269 1.8526 2.4887 -8.5530 0.0132 0.0064 0.0027 0.0041 1575.52
(0.0507) (0.2253) (0.1129) (1.4816) (5.8086) (0.0018) (0.0012) (0.0004) (0.0005)
McDonalds Corp 0.2463 -1.4447 1.2379 1.0999 -7.4460 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 2713.24
(0.0199) (0.1148) (0.0406) (0.7092) (4.9759) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
McKesson Corp 0.0699 -0.5476 1.2490 1.4056 -8.5987 0.0008 0.0005 0.0005 0.0010 2529.81
(0.0247) (0.1360) (0.0616) (1.1014) (6.8834) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
McClatchy Co 0.4999 -1.7718 1.7300 0.4999 -2.2716 0.0500 0.0500 0.0254 0.0500 163.67
(0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.3572) (1.9847) (0.0022) (0.0075) (0.0057) (0.0076)
M D C Hldgs Inc 0.1658 -0.8841 1.1931 1.1359 -5.4721 0.0032 0.0020 0.0011 0.0021 2094.75
(0.0293) (0.1231) (0.0549) (1.0605) (5.2864) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Massey Engy Co -0.1956 0.8124 1.0782 1.3063 -5.3275 0.0081 0.0043 0.0018 0.0033 1758.50
(0.0263) (0.1068) (0.0465) (1.0555) (4.0977) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0005)
MetLife Inc 0.1268 -0.7840 1.2834 0.2448 -1.4108 0.0054 0.0017 0.0008 0.0012 2141.33
(0.0165) (0.0701) (0.0191) (0.2899) (1.5729) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
MGIC Invt Corp 0.1569 -1.0340 1.0933 0.2702 -1.0242 0.0240 0.0079 0.0042 0.0067 1501.08
(0.0249) (0.0953) (0.0226) (0.3183) (1.3563) (0.0054) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0015)
Mohawk Inds Inc 0.2231 -1.2283 1.5081 0.2427 -1.2161 0.0032 0.0017 0.0011 0.0020 2100.36
(0.0192) (0.0860) (0.0364) (0.4772) (2.4950) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Marsh& Mclennan Cos Inc 0.0818 -0.5567 1.1962 1.4415 -8.1109 0.0011 0.0005 0.0005 0.0011 2442.09
(0.0152) (0.0853) (0.0495) (1.0307) (5.9874) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Altria Gp Inc 0.0512 -0.2618 0.8255 0.7941 -3.8792 0.0021 0.0011 0.0006 0.0012 2302.39
(0.0121) (0.0463) (0.0145) (0.4153) (2.1147) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
MeadWestvaco Corp 0.1426 -0.8596 1.4687 1.4194 -8.0657 0.0015 0.0011 0.0010 0.0019 2236.18
(0.0217) (0.1105) (0.0581) (0.8978) (5.3682) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Maytag Corp -0.2081 0.8041 0.9242 0.6682 -3.3580 0.0019 0.0011 0.0011 0.0021 2178.86
(0.0168) (0.0671) (0.0302) (0.7156) (3.4361) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004)
NALCO Co 0.2111 -1.0010 2.0444 1.8092 -8.6745 0.0065 0.0034 0.0016 0.0025 1742.29
(0.0637) (0.3076) (0.1101) (1.3247) (6.3103) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006)
NOVA Chems Corp 0.4968 -1.3175 2.7398 1.2106 -8.8939 0.0355 0.0222 0.0053 0.0164 1201.95
(0.0640) (0.1458) (0.2308) (1.7818) (12.1569) (0.0269) (0.0661) (0.0021) (0.0349)
Neiman Marcus Gp Inc 0.1197 -0.0707 2.1506 0.4574 -2.8717 0.0090 0.0046 0.0059 0.0101 1513.01
(0.0210) (0.0847) (0.0431) (0.4580) (2.7361) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0017)
Northrop Grumman Corp 0.2225 -1.3243 1.2717 0.8850 -5.6374 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 2682.48
(0.0183) (0.0985) (0.0337) (0.5662) (3.7753) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Natl Rural Utils Coop Fin Corp 0.0632 -0.5066 1.1991 0.6429 -3.6942 0.0027 0.0013 0.0006 0.0011 2291.74
(0.0127) (0.0521) (0.0216) (0.3793) (2.2329) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Norfolk Sthn Corp 0.2416 -1.3569 1.2249 0.9379 -5.9987 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 2637.50
(0.0137) (0.0780) (0.0335) (0.5844) (3.6579) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Newell Rubbermaid Inc 0.1934 -1.0954 1.3458 0.6977 -3.9744 0.0015 0.0010 0.0007 0.0011 2340.10
(0.0184) (0.0873) (0.0286) (0.4294) (2.5564) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
News America Inc 0.2901 -1.5411 1.3359 0.9694 -5.9470 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 2524.31
(0.0154) (0.0781) (0.0233) (0.3638) (2.2261) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
NY Times Co 0.2927 -1.5868 1.6994 0.4388 -2.5104 0.0067 0.0022 0.0014 0.0020 1575.41
(0.0297) (0.1317) (0.0428) (0.5088) (2.9556) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Owens IL Inc 0.4173 -2.0648 2.1319 2.0877 -8.9606 0.0066 0.0029 0.0015 0.0024 1858.20
(0.1012) (0.5089) (0.1352) (1.5372) (7.6506) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003)
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Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
Olin Corp 0.3678 -2.0011 1.6870 1.5918 -8.9922 0.0019 0.0013 0.0012 0.0022 2178.43
(0.0353) (0.1819) (0.0648) (0.9556) (5.4257) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Omnicom Gp Inc 0.1675 -1.0152 1.3307 0.4738 -2.8599 0.0010 0.0007 0.0006 0.0012 2435.90
(0.0107) (0.0516) (0.0240) (0.3526) (2.1040) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Pitney Bowes Inc -0.1094 0.3399 1.1172 0.9171 -5.5117 0.0011 0.0007 0.0007 0.0011 2432.15
(0.0189) (0.0798) (0.0455) (1.0118) (6.0438) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Pride Intl Inc -0.0719 0.2340 1.2057 1.4577 -7.0069 0.0032 0.0020 0.0014 0.0024 2005.66
(0.0254) (0.1068) (0.0538) (1.0015) (4.6927) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Pfizer Inc 0.1114 -0.7989 1.1775 0.3444 -2.3318 0.0006 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 2790.36
(0.0213) (0.1017) (0.0229) (0.4330) (2.7544) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Progress Engy Inc 0.1966 -1.2126 1.3364 1.2126 -7.5575 0.0009 0.0006 0.0003 0.0006 2603.21
(0.0250) (0.1297) (0.0363) (0.6079) (4.0374) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Parker Drilling Co 0.3224 -1.5656 2.0482 1.8599 -8.1276 0.0082 0.0042 0.0020 0.0025 1786.14
(0.0536) (0.2627) (0.1120) (1.3399) (6.1605) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0003)
PMI Gp Inc -0.2105 0.1392 0.6479 0.2288 -0.6541 0.0293 0.0108 0.0072 0.0134 1346.73
(0.0245) (0.0551) (0.0112) (0.2606) (0.7469) (0.0042) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0041)
Polyone Corp 0.4144 -1.1050 2.3538 0.8674 -4.9110 0.0227 0.0084 0.0113 0.0191 1269.24
(0.0282) (0.0678) (0.0623) (0.5374) (2.8253) (0.0030) (0.0013) (0.0030) (0.0096)
Pioneer Nat Res Co 0.1769 -0.9539 1.5782 0.8621 -4.7398 0.0020 0.0015 0.0009 0.0019 2016.61
(0.0194) (0.0922) (0.0347) (0.4958) (2.8360) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Qwest Cap Fdg Inc 0.0739 -0.3112 1.8238 0.9655 -4.5131 0.0067 0.0027 0.0020 0.0028 1813.46
(0.0253) (0.1170) (0.0762) (0.9002) (4.1976) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Ryder Sys Inc 0.1374 -0.9137 1.4254 0.6669 -3.9027 0.0018 0.0011 0.0010 0.0018 2237.64
(0.0174) (0.0782) (0.0349) (0.5912) (3.3892) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Rite Aid Corp 0.2123 -0.3243 1.3077 0.4352 -1.4334 0.0500 0.0271 0.0460 0.0500 779.79
(0.0149) (0.0189) (0.0247) (0.3385) (1.1573) (0.0052) (0.0079) (0.0494) (0.0279)
Reynolds Amern Inc 0.2116 -1.0721 1.4072 0.7353 -3.4604 0.0024 0.0014 0.0010 0.0016 1929.13
(0.0252) (0.1166) (0.0415) (0.7491) (3.7985) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd 0.1432 -0.6960 1.5180 0.7004 -3.2008 0.0093 0.0041 0.0045 0.0078 1622.30
(0.0495) (0.1919) (0.0369) (0.4990) (2.4273) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Radian Gp Inc 0.0628 -0.2070 1.2497 0.1646 -0.7366 0.0500 0.0225 0.0157 0.0301 1018.05
(0.0219) (0.0750) (0.0254) (0.2551) (1.1716) (0.0031) (0.0053) (0.0084) (0.0141)
Realogy Corp 0.4976 -1.2249 1.1408 0.4976 -1.8653 0.0500 0.0500 0.0164 0.0405 339.42
(0.0024) (0.0071) (0.0132) (0.1641) (0.9934) (0.0025) (0.0075) (0.0020) (0.0082)
Rio Tinto Alcan Inc -0.0169 -0.1934 1.1045 0.7376 -4.1049 0.0016 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 1076.80
(0.0114) (0.0485) (0.0473) (0.7242) (3.7679) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Rohm& Haas Co 0.2473 -1.3902 1.3170 0.5822 -3.8235 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0010 2520.54
(0.0123) (0.0649) (0.0263) (0.4651) (2.7958) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
RadioShack Corp 0.0168 -0.2059 1.3015 1.0171 -5.2634 0.0034 0.0020 0.0019 0.0031 1969.03
(0.0109) (0.0440) (0.0264) (0.5846) (2.9815) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0010)
Raytheon Co 0.3992 -2.2821 1.4883 1.1306 -7.4984 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 2687.15
(0.0256) (0.1350) (0.0269) (0.4859) (3.4630) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Sprint Nextel Corp 0.1943 -0.9665 1.4977 0.3168 -1.6850 0.0084 0.0040 0.0017 0.0030 1401.36
(0.0305) (0.1161) (0.0359) (0.3716) (1.7878) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0005) (0.0009)
Sanmina SCI Corp -0.1206 0.5652 1.3291 1.0247 -4.3910 0.0221 0.0109 0.0070 0.0087 1381.18
(0.0575) (0.2313) (0.0295) (0.5643) (2.2416) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0006)
Smithfield Foods Inc 0.1751 -0.8130 2.1335 0.6694 -3.2965 0.0098 0.0053 0.0030 0.0050 1641.13
(0.0599) (0.2712) (0.0874) (0.8638) (4.3377) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0009)
Istar Finl Inc 0.2166 -0.6479 0.9653 0.2166 -0.9076 0.0500 0.0500 0.0155 0.0467 717.91
(0.0019) (0.0070) (0.0109) (0.1104) (0.5927) (0.0033) (0.0080) (0.0021) (0.0152)
SUNGARD DATA Sys INC 0.1702 -0.5949 2.1450 1.4947 -6.8839 0.0084 0.0046 0.0026 0.0039 1283.49
(0.0815) (0.3641) (0.1479) (1.5398) (7.4240) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0002) (0.0004)
SEARS ROEBUCK Accep CORP 0.3476 -1.7200 1.7146 0.5482 -2.8828 0.0133 0.0044 0.0033 0.0053 1650.78
(0.0348) (0.1503) (0.0314) (0.5026) (2.4640) (0.0049) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0025)
Sherwin Williams Co 0.2773 -1.6757 1.4973 1.2509 -8.1373 0.0008 0.0006 0.0005 0.0009 2525.54
(0.0214) (0.1105) (0.0358) (0.6207) (4.0102) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Saks Inc 0.0828 -0.0416 2.1273 0.8764 -4.7556 0.0097 0.0051 0.0052 0.0093 1523.80
(0.0242) (0.0922) (0.0376) (0.5671) (2.6050) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0020)
Sara Lee Corp -0.1343 0.4933 1.1897 1.3388 -7.9543 0.0012 0.0008 0.0009 0.0015 2343.19
(0.0321) (0.1398) (0.0729) (1.3984) (8.6115) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0006)
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Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
SLM Corp 0.1284 -0.7490 1.2649 0.1916 -0.9462 0.0322 0.0076 0.0043 0.0077 1475.99
(0.0204) (0.0831) (0.0174) (0.3618) (1.2721) (0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0016) (0.0025)
Std Pac Corp 0.1208 -0.5563 1.9430 0.7952 -3.5186 0.0125 0.0059 0.0045 0.0076 1473.61
(0.0624) (0.2710) (0.0551) (0.7228) (3.1227) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Simon Ppty Gp L P 0.0669 -0.5445 1.2392 0.4500 -2.4208 0.0022 0.0013 0.0006 0.0012 2255.69
(0.0105) (0.0365) (0.0224) (0.3734) (1.9552) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Staples Inc 0.0894 -0.6702 1.3239 0.8115 -4.6267 0.0014 0.0008 0.0009 0.0013 2338.84
(0.0116) (0.0471) (0.0308) (0.5307) (2.9023) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Sempra Engy 0.2383 -1.3899 1.3339 1.3732 -8.3780 0.0012 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 2512.59
(0.0162) (0.0840) (0.0281) (0.4894) (3.0499) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constellation Brands Inc -0.1108 0.4659 1.2827 1.8668 -8.7239 0.0035 0.0030 0.0016 0.0020 1950.08
(0.0213) (0.0954) (0.0600) (1.1227) (5.5133) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0002)
SUPERVALU INC -0.1260 0.4782 0.9706 0.6522 -2.8029 0.0059 0.0033 0.0018 0.0029 1859.15
(0.0246) (0.0994) (0.0272) (0.6242) (2.8105) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0005)
New Albertson s Inc -0.2762 0.8915 0.5175 0.7723 -2.6187 0.0035 0.0016 0.0014 0.0017 837.56
(0.0432) (0.1381) (0.0295) (1.4004) (4.5162) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0005)
Safeway Inc 0.1057 -0.6732 1.2836 1.3847 -7.8115 0.0015 0.0010 0.0010 0.0017 2289.09
(0.0276) (0.1387) (0.0745) (1.3129) (7.8307) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
AT&T Corp. -0.2486 1.0793 1.0211 0.8983 -5.1989 0.0015 0.0008 0.0007 0.0012 2371.36
(0.0159) (0.0664) (0.0397) (0.7941) (4.4797) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Target Corp 0.1684 -1.0901 1.3370 0.6207 -4.0201 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0009 2575.80
(0.0096) (0.0505) (0.0309) (0.4658) (2.9614) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Tenet Healthcare Corp 0.2926 -1.0457 2.4060 1.9295 -8.8058 0.0135 0.0056 0.0035 0.0052 1576.16
(0.1052) (0.4923) (0.1215) (1.2397) (5.6581) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0015)
Temple Inland Inc 0.2361 -1.3095 1.6023 0.9048 -4.8858 0.0037 0.0022 0.0012 0.0020 2039.74
(0.0169) (0.0796) (0.0307) (0.4298) (2.3877) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0004)
TJX Cos Inc 0.3014 -1.7998 1.5131 0.8681 -5.7841 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0011 2510.15
(0.0185) (0.1042) (0.0381) (0.5705) (3.7577) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Toll Bros Inc 0.4737 -2.4775 1.6492 1.0172 -5.0411 0.0045 0.0025 0.0014 0.0026 1990.60
(0.0390) (0.1852) (0.0516) (0.6934) (3.7234) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0010)
TOYS R US INC 0.5000 -1.3729 2.5115 0.6411 -3.6709 0.0104 0.0050 0.0096 0.0191 1383.98
(0.0262) (0.0857) (0.0609) (0.6824) (3.6968) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0040) (0.0066)
Tribune Co 0.3503 -0.9749 1.1555 0.3503 -1.8321 0.0500 0.0500 0.0145 0.0449 539.15
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.2015) (1.3277) (0.0132) (0.0118) (0.0015) (0.0062)
TRW Automotive Inc 0.4999 -1.9817 2.4820 0.8520 -5.3364 0.0303 0.0121 0.0055 0.0130 1283.07
(0.1176) (0.5437) (0.0858) (0.7455) (4.3598) (0.0079) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0054)
Sabre Hldgs Corp 0.4079 -1.1347 2.3396 0.4592 -3.0521 0.0131 0.0083 0.0105 0.0207 1296.63
(0.0315) (0.1285) (0.0404) (0.4883) (2.7363) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0065) (0.0143)
Tyson Foods Inc 0.1626 -0.8783 1.3756 1.1180 -5.7386 0.0028 0.0016 0.0012 0.0018 2096.25
(0.0150) (0.0693) (0.0363) (0.5826) (3.0866) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Tesoro Corp -0.0666 0.2673 1.5772 0.8453 -4.3252 0.0063 0.0038 0.0014 0.0020 1676.14
(0.0242) (0.1122) (0.0610) (0.8675) (4.5044) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Time Warner Inc 0.2413 -1.3530 1.3813 1.1016 -6.6260 0.0013 0.0007 0.0006 0.0011 2415.82
(0.0217) (0.1082) (0.0333) (0.5290) (3.3561) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
TIME WARNER CABLE INC 0.0855 -0.5836 1.3160 1.5568 -7.7734 0.0023 0.0010 0.0006 0.0011 1167.23
(0.0224) (0.1011) (0.0667) (1.5608) (7.7057) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Historic TW Inc 0.1761 -0.9727 1.3197 0.5961 -3.5277 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 1339.67
(0.0324) (0.1759) (0.0633) (0.7845) (4.9857) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Textron Finl Corp 0.1332 -0.7960 1.2089 0.1565 -0.8393 0.0108 0.0032 0.0010 0.0018 1972.85
(0.0284) (0.1205) (0.0208) (0.2486) (1.2974) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Unvl Health Svcs Inc -0.0873 0.2718 1.1242 0.8430 -4.3988 0.0024 0.0015 0.0010 0.0018 2158.26
(0.0157) (0.0645) (0.0475) (1.0121) (5.1614) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Unisys Corp 0.3751 -1.0304 1.1464 0.3751 -1.5284 0.0500 0.0379 0.0094 0.0296 965.39
(0.0077) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.1989) (0.9410) (0.0160) (0.0221) (0.0005) (0.0025)
UnitedHealth Gp Inc 0.0156 -0.2524 1.1127 0.4260 -2.4167 0.0014 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008 2438.63
(0.0070) (0.0324) (0.0203) (0.4590) (2.4125) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Un Pac Corp 0.2771 -1.5890 1.3466 1.2241 -7.8437 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 2574.73
(0.0182) (0.1047) (0.0386) (0.6664) (4.2131) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Utd Parcel Svc Inc 0.1007 -0.7331 1.1647 0.5520 -3.8209 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 2803.48
(0.0118) (0.0552) (0.0213) (0.4762) (3.0253) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
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Table 20: Parameters
Country κQ κQθQ σQ κP κPθP σ(1) σ(3) σ(7) σ(10) LogLk
Utd Rents North Amer Inc 0.0150 -0.0213 1.7813 1.1297 -4.7314 0.0106 0.0060 0.0032 0.0048 1536.77
(0.0136) (0.0570) (0.1035) (1.3049) (5.3629) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Univision Comms Inc 0.2420 -0.4434 1.6140 0.2433 -1.3102 0.0500 0.0128 0.0445 0.0500 669.25
(0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0588) (0.2600) (1.2033) (0.0140) (0.0021) (0.0223) (0.0138)
Visteon Corp -1.9618 2.3421 2.7983 8.9645 -8.8320 0.0500 0.0499 0.0493 0.0500 -17822.77
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.5387) (0.7112) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0001)
Viacom 0.2311 -1.3051 1.5153 1.1021 -6.5395 0.0019 0.0009 0.0009 0.0017 1486.24
(0.0215) (0.1033) (0.0358) (0.6412) (3.5298) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Valero Energy Corp 0.0657 -0.4105 1.1198 0.4209 -2.2058 0.0027 0.0015 0.0007 0.0012 1714.07
(0.0158) (0.0624) (0.0365) (0.6062) (3.1914) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Vornado Rlty LP 0.1422 -1.0665 1.6062 0.7019 -3.9208 0.0026 0.0013 0.0008 0.0010 2168.98
(0.0165) (0.0769) (0.0317) (0.5161) (2.5154) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Verizon Comms Inc 0.1535 -1.0032 1.4116 0.9594 -6.0241 0.0011 0.0006 0.0006 0.0010 1482.91
(0.0221) (0.1155) (0.0421) (0.8398) (5.2180) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Wendys Intl Inc 0.0341 -0.2761 1.3658 0.5523 -2.9306 0.0037 0.0022 0.0019 0.0031 1934.99
(0.0213) (0.0939) (0.0388) (0.7143) (3.8860) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Wells Fargo& Co 0.1826 -1.1677 1.2527 0.3595 -2.2481 0.0019 0.0010 0.0004 0.0006 2473.73
(0.0157) (0.0749) (0.0198) (0.3108) (1.8631) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Whirlpool Corp 0.2698 -1.5210 1.5747 0.4820 -2.9053 0.0020 0.0013 0.0010 0.0017 2190.07
(0.0130) (0.0694) (0.0351) (0.4796) (3.0132) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Windstream Corp -0.0257 0.0823 1.5175 1.5435 -7.5162 0.0031 0.0025 0.0019 0.0030 1256.88
(0.0298) (0.1382) (0.0904) (1.4559) (7.1688) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009)
WA Mut Inc 0.1040 -0.6225 2.1295 0.1589 -0.5198 0.0185 0.0030 0.0007 0.0016 133.12
(0.0393) (0.1905) (0.0760) (0.6095) (2.4070) (0.0025) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0002)
Wal Mart Stores Inc 0.1823 -1.1401 1.1804 0.3513 -2.2995 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 2790.27
(0.0120) (0.0630) (0.0267) (0.3984) (2.7025) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Weyerhaeuser Co 0.1710 -0.9862 1.4904 0.6254 -3.5485 0.0020 0.0013 0.0010 0.0019 2186.52
(0.0225) (0.1100) (0.0433) (0.5818) (3.4968) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
NRG Energy Inc 0.0038 0.0859 1.8139 1.2872 -6.2735 0.0078 0.0049 0.0017 0.0024 1565.38
(0.0079) (0.0370) (0.0775) (1.0819) (5.2321) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Xerox Corp 0.3028 -1.5989 1.6059 0.7659 -3.8587 0.0023 0.0013 0.0007 0.0014 2190.93
(0.0189) (0.0910) (0.0349) (0.4793) (2.6753) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
XTO Engy Inc 0.1018 -0.6255 1.1107 0.6435 -3.7051 0.0009 0.0004 0.0005 0.0009 2524.18
(0.0075) (0.0381) (0.0305) (0.5305) (2.9453) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
TRW Automotive Inc 0.4999 -1.9817 2.4820 0.8520 -5.3364 0.0303 0.0121 0.0055 0.0130 1283.07
(0.1176) (0.5437) (0.0858) (0.7455) (4.3598) (0.0079) (0.0041) (0.0014) (0.0054)
Sabre Hldgs Corp 0.4079 -1.1347 2.3396 0.4592 -3.0521 0.0131 0.0083 0.0105 0.0207 1296.63
(0.0315) (0.1285) (0.0404) (0.4883) (2.7363) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0065) (0.0143)
Tyson Foods Inc 0.1626 -0.8783 1.3756 1.1180 -5.7386 0.0028 0.0016 0.0012 0.0018 2096.25
(0.0150) (0.0693) (0.0363) (0.5826) (3.0866) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Tesoro Corp -0.0666 0.2673 1.5772 0.8453 -4.3252 0.0063 0.0038 0.0014 0.0020 1676.14
(0.0242) (0.1122) (0.0610) (0.8675) (4.5044) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Time Warner Inc 0.2413 -1.3530 1.3813 1.1016 -6.6260 0.0013 0.0007 0.0006 0.0011 2415.82
(0.0217) (0.1082) (0.0333) (0.5290) (3.3561) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
TIME WARNER CABLE INC 0.0855 -0.5836 1.3160 1.5568 -7.7734 0.0023 0.0010 0.0006 0.0011 1167.23
(0.0224) (0.1011) (0.0667) (1.5608) (7.7057) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Historic TW Inc 0.1761 -0.9727 1.3197 0.5961 -3.5277 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 1339.67
(0.0324) (0.1759) (0.0633) (0.7845) (4.9857) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Textron Finl Corp 0.1332 -0.7960 1.2089 0.1565 -0.8393 0.0108 0.0032 0.0010 0.0018 1972.85
(0.0284) (0.1205) (0.0208) (0.2486) (1.2974) (0.0037) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0004)
Unvl Health Svcs Inc -0.0873 0.2718 1.1242 0.8430 -4.3988 0.0024 0.0015 0.0010 0.0018 2158.26
(0.0157) (0.0645) (0.0475) (1.0121) (5.1614) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Unisys Corp 0.3751 -1.0304 1.1464 0.3751 -1.5284 0.0500 0.0379 0.0094 0.0296 965.39
(0.0077) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.1989) (0.9410) (0.0160) (0.0221) (0.0005) (0.0025)
UnitedHealth Gp Inc 0.0156 -0.2524 1.1127 0.4260 -2.4167 0.0014 0.0009 0.0004 0.0008 2438.63
(0.0070) (0.0324) (0.0203) (0.4590) (2.4125) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Un Pac Corp 0.2771 -1.5890 1.3466 1.2241 -7.8437 0.0007 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008 2574.73
(0.0182) (0.1047) (0.0386) (0.6664) (4.2131) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Utd Parcel Svc Inc 0.1007 -0.7331 1.1647 0.5520 -3.8209 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0006 2803.48
(0.0118) (0.0552) (0.0213) (0.4762) (3.0253) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
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Chapter 3
Market-Wide Liquidity in Credit Default Swap Spreads
Abstract
This paper analyzes the importance of market-wide illiquidity of the CDS, equity, and corporate bond
markets on changes of CDS spreads of credit quality portfolios for five alternative maturities. Illiquidity
CDS betas across credit quality portfolios and maturities are positive and statistically significant. Our
evidence is robust to alternative market-wide measures of illiquidity from different financial markets, and
other macroeconomic control measures. Low credit rating CDS spreads tend to be highly sensitive to
aggregate illiquidity shocks relative to high credit quality CDS spreads. There is also evidence of flight-
to-liquidity during stress periods, at least at short horizons.
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1 Introduction
It is generally accepted that credit default swap spreads (CDS spreads) can be decomposed into the expected
loss, a default risk premium, a liquidity risk premium related to the impact of trades on the spread and the
adverse selection effect associated with the asymmetric information between the CDS sellers and buyers, and
the correlation-induced components.1 However, initial papers on CDS spreads have considered the spreads
as a pure measure of creditworthiness of a company. The existence of a potentially important liquidity
component is originally suggested by the evidence reported by Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), and
Berndt, Duglas, Duffie, Ferguson, and Schranz (2008). Indeed, Blanco et al. (2005) report average CDS
spreads larger than the underlying corporate bond yield spreads for most of the entities on their sample, and
Berndt et al. (2008) find that, on average, a significant component of the spreads cannot be explained by
default risk measured by the Moody’s KMV’s expected default frequencies.
These papers motivate a relatively large literature about the importance of the liquidity component on
the CDS spreads.2 The empirical evidence clearly supports the presence of a liquidity component of CDS
spreads independently of credit quality, maturity and type of underlying. This is the case despite the large
variety of econometric methodologies and theoretical models employed in the estimation. For example, Chen
et al. (2005), Chen et al. (2010), and Buhler and Trapp (2009) employ the intensity framework for pricing
CDS spreads proposed by Duffie and Singleton (2003), and Pan and Singleton (2008), where liquidity enters
the picture as a further spread, or intensity, over and above the risk neutral arrival rate of a credit event
component. On the other hand, Bongaerts et al. (2011) propose an equilibrium derivative pricing model with
liquidity effects in which the zero net-supply feature of the derivative market generates very different liquidity
effects than the liquidity pricing model of Acharya and Pedersen (2005). They find that only compensation for
expected liquidity is significant with higher expected liquidity being associated with higher expected returns
for the protection sellers. As pointed out by Brigo et al. (2010) this finding is contrary to Chen et al. (2005),
and Chen et al. (2010) that found protection buyers to obtain the liquidity premium. In any case, not only
these theoretically-based papers, but also other empirical-based literature mentioned above concludes that
CDS spreads cannot be assumed to be pure measures of credit risk. CDS liquidity seems to be significantly
priced in CDS spreads.
However, most papers analyze the importance of liquidity at the individual level.3 This is surprising
1See Buhler and Trapp (2009), Jarrow (2011), and Bongaerts, Jong, and Driessen (2011), among others.
2See Chen, Cheng, and Wu (2005), Tang and Yan (2008), Chen, Fabozzi, and Sverdlove (2010), Buhler and Trapp (2009), Brigo,
Predescu, and Capponi (2010), Pires, Perreira, and Martins (2010), Bongaerts et al. (2011), and Coro, Dufour, and Varotto (2012).
3An important exception is the paper by Coro et al. (2012) who employ European CDS data from GFI Group and Bloomberg that
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given the available evidence from the corporate and sovereign bond markets. Xing, Zhang, and Zhou (2007)
document a strong commonality in individual bond liquidity changes after controlling for both bond specific
determinants, such as price and volatility, and macroeconomic state variables. They find that the covariance
of a bond’s liquidity with respect to market liquidity shocks is a significant risk factor in determining the
yield spread. More recently, Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010) report that during stress periods, liquidity
risk is a significant factor in affecting corporate bond prices, especially of low-rated bonds, and Panyanukul
(2009) finds that liquidity risk is a priced factor in explaining sovereign bond returns. As in the previous
paper, this is especially the case during the period 2007 to 2009. This research suggests a strong conditional
component of market-wide liquidity effects in both corporate and sovereign bond markets.
This paper contributes to the literature by analyzing market-wide liquidity in the CDS market. We study
thoroughly the impact of illiquidity on CDS spreads on an aggregate level. We first show that, for a given
maturity and credit rating, there is a strong commonality in the liquidity of CDS contracts. Then, we show
that market-wide illiquidity is a powerful determinant of CDS spreads. There is a consistently positive and
significant relation between CDS spreads and market-wide illiquidity changes across all maturities and credit
qualities. Moreover, this relation is stronger during stress periods. Finally, there is a monotonic relationship
between sensitivity to market-wide changes of liquidity and credit ratings, being this sensitivity stronger for
high yield underlyings. Indeed, aggregate illiquidity risk seems to be a more important factor than credit risk
in the CDSmarket. This conclusion is also supported by a significant flight-to-liquidity given the time-varying
nature of liquidity risk embedded in CDS spreads. This is particularly important at the shortest maturities.
Crisis episodes reflect short-term flight-to-liquidity but not flight-to-credit quality.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data employed in the analysis
and the methodology for constructing CDS portfolios. Section 3 presents the relation between CDS spread
changes and market-wide variables for portfolios sorted by maturity and credit quality. Section 4 performs
the flight-to-liquidity and flight-to-quality analysis, and Section 5 concludes with summary and final remarks.
2 Data, Credit-quality-sorted Portfolios, and Aggregate Variables
We obtain data on CDS spreads from Markit Group Ltd. We consider corporate (non-sovereign) CDS names
incorporated in North America, which are or have been part of the CDX North America index. We further
restrict our sample to CDS contracts, which are (i) denominated in US dollars (ii) are written on senior
covers the period from January 1, 2006 to July 31, 2009.
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unsecured debt of companies, and (iii) incorporate the modified restructuring clause as a credit event. These
are the typical terms that a CDS contract trades on in North America. In our analysis, we consider the time
period from January 2004 to April 2011. Additionally, for each CDS name we use the spreads with 1-, 3-, 5-,
7-, and 10 year maturities. Finally, our analysis deals with monthly CDS spreads. In particular, we construct
monthly CDS spreads for a given name and maturity by taking the last non-missing daily CDS spread for
each month. The above criteria leave us with an overall sample of 284 CDS names, which amount to 21,623
issuer-month observations.
Table 1 provides the distribution of CDS names in our sample by sector and rating group. The reported
rating is the resulting average of Moody’s and S&P ratings that are adjusted to the seniority of the instrument
and are rounded not to include the plus and minus levels. Market uses 10-sector ICB classification and
adds one additional category for Government. Those sectors are Financial, Oil & Gas, Basic Materials,
Industrial, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Health Care, Telecommunications, Utilities, Technology
and Government. Nearly 52% of the CDS contracts in our database are written on the debt of investment
grade companies, whereas the share of CDS contracts written on the debt of high-yield companies is 48%.
There are 4 industries represented individually by more than 10% of the total number of contracts. These are
CDS contracts written on the debt of companies from the Consumer Services, Financial, Consumer Goods,
and Industrial sectors. These four sectors cover around 65% of our sample.
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 display the time series of aggregate monthly CDS spreads by maturity. This series is calculated
by taking the cross-sectional average of individual CDS spreads for each month and maturity. We observe
that CDS spreads of all maturities are relatively stable before mid 2007. Afterwards, there is a sharp increase
in CDS spreads up to the beginning of 2009. The drastic increase of mid 2007 is associated with the burst
of the housing bubble in the US around August 2007, and the associated losses on subprime mortgage asset
backed securities, collateralized debt obligation bonds, and CDS on the asset backed holdings. When these
financial securities lost value due to the housing market crash, financial institutions using these products did
not have enough capital to respond to the enormous losses realized. Specifically, the upward sloping trend
of CDS spread time series is followed by a series of credit events, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
the bailout of AIG group and the federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September 2008.4 The
4See Jarrow (2011) for an overall discussion on the CDS market and the website of Federal Reserve of St. Louis for a detailed
timeline of the credit events associated with the subprime financial crisis (http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline).
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slope of the term structure of CDS spreads is mostly positive, so that the spreads of short maturity horizons
tend to be lower than the spreads of longer horizons. However, Figure 1 also shows that from mid 2008 till
mid 2009 the CDS spreads with short-term maturity are higher than CDS spreads with long-term maturity.
The inversion of the slope of the term structure during stress periods has also been documented by Pan and
Singleton (2008) for some emerging countries during periods of financial or political crisis. It is important to
point out that the inversion of the slope is perfectly monotonic.5
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
2.1 Credit-quality-sorted Portfolios of CDS spreads
To assess the impact of market-wide illiquidity on CDS spreads, we construct credit-quality-sorted portfolios.
In all subsequent sections we perform our regression analysis based on the CDS spreads of these credit-
quality-sorted portfolios.
For a given maturity (1-, 3-, 5-, 7-, and 10 year horizons), we classify all CDS spreads according to the
credit rating of the underlying asset. To have enough observations in each portfolio, we form 4 credit-quality-
sorted portfolios of CDS spreads: AAA to A-, BBB+ to BBB-, BB+ to BB-, and B+ to D. We equally weight
CDS spreads in each portfolio. To construct these four portfolios, first we obtain data on corporate credit
ratings of the CDS names in our database. More specifically, we download this data from Thomson Reuters
3000 Xtra. Then, for each CDS name we can have data on credit rating assigned by S&P, Fitch or Moody’s.
In addition, we have detailed data on credit ratings for different categories of a debt of a particular company,
such as long-term issuer rating, short-term issuer rating, issuer outlook, rating on debt in local currency, etc.
When constructing our portfolios, we employ only the long-term issuer rating assigned by S&P, Fitch and
Moody’s. We have therefore to obtain a monthly time series of composite credit ratings for each CDS using
three agencies. In order to construct this series, we take the previously assigned credit rating by a particular
agency and apply it to all months up to the next month the agency issues a new rating. For instance, the
long-term issuer rating assigned by S&P to Cox Communications Inc. was BBB for August 2008, and BBB-
in December 2008. Hence, we take the BBB to be the issuer credit rating assigned by S&P for all four months
5Schneider, Sogner, and Veza (2009) point out that the one-year CDS spread exhibits time-varying behavior higher-maturity
spreads do not share. They presume that investment funds primarily use the 1-year CDS spreads to express their views on the
creditworthiness of CDS names. Hence, they argue the economic driver behind the unique pattern in 1-year spreads is a supply-and-
demand premium induced by such large traders. It should be pointed out however that the pattern shown in Figure 1 is the complete
and monotonic inversion of the slope of the term structure. This implies that this phenomenon is not uniquely related to the shortest
maturity CDS spreads.
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from August 2008 to November 2008. We construct the composite rating measure by taking the average of at
most three ratings on long-term issuers assigned by the three credit rating agencies to a CDS name for a given
month. To calculate the average rating of a CDS name, we transform the long-term issuer ratings from the
letter scale to numerical, by taking the letter rating designation of S&P as a common base ( AAA = 1, AA+
= 2, . . . , D = 22). As Moody’s uses a different scale than S&P and Fitch, beforehand we translate the rating
tier of Moody’s to the scale equivalent to S&P’s by equating the categories as Aaa = AAA, Baa1 = BBB+,
etc. Finally, we obtain the composite rating assigned to a CDS name for a given month by transforming the
averaged numerical rating (rounded to the nearest integer) to the letter scale used by S&P. This procedure
leaves us with 4 equally-weighted portfolios of CDS spreads for a given maturity.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of these portfolios. Portfolio CDS spreads increase on average
as the portfolio maturity increases. This holds for all CDS portfolios. This is consistent with a (average)
positive slope of the term structure of CDS spreads. Simultaneously, holding the maturity constant, the
portfolio CDS spreads increase as the credit quality of the corresponding CDS portfolio deteriorates. The
same observations hold for the median of portfolio CDS spreads. On the other hand, the standard deviation of
portfolio CDS spreads grows as the maturity of the corresponding CDS portfolio decreases. In other words,
for a given credit-quality-sorted portfolio of CDS, spreads with short-term maturity are more volatile than
CDS spreads with long-term maturity. And, for a given maturity, the volatility of the spreads increases with
the deterioration of credit quality.
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2 plots the time series of portfolio CDS spreads with 5 year maturity for alternative credit ratings.
The dynamics of the spreads across different rating categories reinforce our previous observation that the
portfolio CDS spreads are higher as the credit quality of the corresponding portfolio declines. We also
observe that the portfolio CDS spreads increase substantially after the start of the financial crisis of August
2007, and this is especially true for lowest rating portfolio.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
2.2 Aggregate illiquidity Measures
We employ two aggregate measures of illiquidity for the CDS market, which are based on the absolute bid-
ask spreads of CDS names and on the gamma measures of illiquidity of Roll (1984), and Bao, Pan, and
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Wang (2011). We estimate the aggregate bid-ask spread measure of illiquidity for the CDS market by taking
the cross-sectional average of absolute bid-ask spreads of CDS names per month. We use absolute (rather
than relative) bid-ask spreads as they are already a proportional measure and, therefore, they do not need
to be scaled by the average of CDS bid and ask quotes.6 As in the case of CDS spreads, we construct the
monthly absolute bid-ask spread of a CDS name by taking the last non-missing daily absolute bid-ask spread
for each month. Additionally, we obtain the aggregate bid-ask spread measures of illiquidity for maturities of
one, three, five, seven, and ten years. Data on CDS bid-ask spreads are taken from CMA Datastream and is
available from January 1, 2004 till September 30, 2010.
In the spirit of Bao et al. (2011), we also calculate the individual measure of gamma illiquidity for a CDS
name i with T year maturity as,
γi(T ) = cov
￿
rcdsit (T ),r
cdsi
t+1(T )
￿
(1)
where rcdsit (T ) is the CDS return of name i with T year maturity.7 We calculate this measure for each CDS
contract and maturity on monthly basis. In doing so, we impose the restriction that at least 10 observations
of rcdsit (T ) are available for each CDS name within each month.8 To calculate daily CDS returns, we follow
Berndt and Obreja (2010). In particular, the CDS return is given by,
rCDSt (T ) =−∆CDSt(T )×At(T ) (2)
where
At(T ) =
1
4
4T
∑
s=1
δ (t,s/4)q(t,s/4)
and ∆CDSt(T ) is the daily change in CDS spreads with T year maturity, δ (t,s) denotes the risk neutral
discount factor for day t and time period s, and q(t,s) is the risk neutral survival probability of the CDS name
over the future time period s. To calculate the risk neutral discount factors, we bootstrap the risk free interest
rates from the US LIBOR interest rate term structure with 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month maturities augmented by
6See Pires et al. (2010) for a formal argument.
7The formula for gamma illiquidity for bonds in Bao et al. (2011) is defined as the negative of the covariance between consecutive
bond price changes. As discussed by Roll (1984) in the context of stock returns, the reason for the negative sign is due to the fact
that bond price returns exhibit negative serial correlation. However, CDS returns by construction approximate yield changes of the
underlying bond. As pointed out by Blanco et al. (2005), among others, the CDS spread should be approximately equal to the bond
yield minus the risk free rate. As it is well known, bond yield changes and bond returns are inversely related.
8We remove the CDS returns that fall outside the 5th and 95th percentile range of their distribution for each day and maturity.
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the term structure of IRS swap spreads with 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-, 7-, and 10-year maturities. To calculate the risk
neutral survival probabilities we use the approximation derived by Berndt and Obreja (2010):
q(t,s,λ ) = e−λ (t−s) (3)
where
λ = 4log
￿
1+
CDSt(T )
4(1−R)
￿
Finally, to estimate the aggregate gamma measure of illiquidity for the CDS market, we take the cross-
sectional mean of individual gamma measures of illiquidity of CDS names for each month and maturity.
To control for the illiquidity of other market, and the potential spillovers from bond and stock markets to
the CDS market, we also employ the aggregate illiquidity measures for the stock and bond markets suggested
by Amihud (2002). We calculate the individual Amihud ratio for each stock trading in the US market as,9
ILLIQit =
1
Dit
Dit
∑
d=1
|Ritd |
V itd
(4)
whereDit is the number of days for which data is available for stock i in month t, Ritd is the return on stock i on
day d in month t, and V itd is the trading volume (in US dollars) for stock i on day d in month t. We obtain the
aggregate Amihud ratio for the US stock market by taking the cross-sectional average of individual Amihud
ratios for each month. Finally, we estimate the aggregate measure of illiquidity (ILS) for the US stock market
by taking the AR(2) residuals of the regression of the aggregate ratio on its first two lags as suggested by
Acharya and Pedersen (2005). The aggregate measure of illiquidity for the bond market (ILB) is constructed
in a similar way but using data from TRACE.10
2.3 Other Aggregate (Control) Variables
In addition to aggregate illiquidity measures, we consider series of additional aggregate potential determinants
of CDS spreads. Corporate CDS spreads might include a premium for bearing risk associated with the state
of the economy. To the extent that macroeconomic conditions affect the risk preferences of participants in
9We use data from CRSP and only data on stock returns and trading volume from the NYSE.
10We employ the Amihud aggregate measure calculated by Monkerud, Nieto, and Rodriguez (2012). The actual procedure is
described in their paper. It is the average aggregate illiquidity ratio using corporate bonds from the components of the S&P100 index.
We thank Belén Nieto for kindly providing us this measure.
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the CDS market, we would expect to find economic and statistically significant relationships between CDS
spreads and aggregate variables. To capture the state of the economy or, even more importantly, to predict
future real activity, we should employ state variables with proved predicting capacity of future output growth.
The term spread, measured as the difference between the interest rates on long and short maturity gov-
ernment debt, is probably the most common financial leading indicator of real activity. Among many others,
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Stock and Watson (2003), and Ang, Piazzesi,
and Wei (2006) show the significant predictive content of the spread for production growth, including its
capacity to forecast a recession indicator in probit regressions. Additionally, there is a growing body of lit-
erature exploring the transmission of credit conditions into the real economy. Among recent papers, Mueller
(2009) and Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) show the forecasting power of the term structure of credit
spreads for future output growth. These authors argue that there is a pure credit component orthogonal to
macroeconomic conditions that accounts for a large part of the predicting capacity of credit spreads. We
approximate the slope of the US term structure of interest rates by the difference between 10-year constant
maturity Treasury bond yields and the 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields (TERM). Moreover, to
capture the credit conditions, we use the difference between Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yield indices (DEF).
These two measures, reflecting the unexpected changes in the term structure of interest rates and in default
risk, have also been used by Acharya et al. (2010) as relevant time series determinants of the corporate bond
yields, and by Gebhardt, Hvidkjaer, and Swaminathan (2005) in their cross-sectional analysis of corporate
bond returns.
There has been considerable recent attention to financial uncertainty as a predictor of real activity. An
increasingly popular measure of the risk premium potentially embedded in financial uncertainty is given by
the variance risk premium (VRP) as discussed by Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), Longstaff, Pan,
Pedersen, and Singleton (2011) and Nieto, Novales, and Rubio (2011). It is well known that the difference
between the realized volatility during a particular month and the risk neutral counterpart represented by
VIX gives the (annualized) monthly volatility risk premium proxy. The realized variance is estimated as
the (annualized) squared daily returns for a given month of the S&P500 index. The variance risk premium
is reported to be negative on average.11 It may be noted that the difference between the realized variance
and (the square of) VIX can be understood as the payoff of a variance swap contract. The average negative
payoff of the contract suggests that investors are willing to accept negative returns for purchasing realized
variance. Equivalently, investors who are sellers of variance and are providing insurance to the market, require
11See Carr and Wu (2009)
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substantial positive returns. This may be rational since the correlation between volatility shocks and market
returns is known to be strongly negative and investors want protection against stock market crashes.
Finally, the aggregate risk preferences of market participants are proxy by the time-varying relative risk
aversion (RA) measure under habit preferences based on the consumption surplus ratio of Campbell and
Cochrane (1999). It is estimated as,
RAt =
γ
St
(5)
where St is the surplus consumption ratio given by St =(Ct−Xt)/Ct ,Ct is the monthly seasonally adjusted real
per capita consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services, Xt is the level of habit approximated
by an autoregressive process consistent with a low volatile enough interest rate, and γ is utility curvature.12
2.4 Descriptive Statistics of Aggregate Variables
Table 3 provides the summary statistics of the aggregate illiquidity measures and the macroeconomic control
variables. In Panels A and B we further break down the summary statistics of the aggregate illiquidity
measures for the CDS market given by the aggregate absolute bid-ask spread and aggregate gamma of CDS
spreads and returns respectively by portfolio rating and maturity. From Panel A we observe that, for a given
credit rating, the shorter maturities are always more illiquid than longer maturities. This is especially the case
for the shortest maturity portfolios which are relatively highly illiquid contracts. The 5-year CDS contracts
are the most liquid with the only exception of the high yield portfolios in which the 5-, 7-, and 10-year
maturities have approximately the same illiquidity level. Therefore, the (average) slope of the term structure
of bid-ask illiquidity for CDS spreads presents an asymmetric U-shaped pattern. At the same time, the
standard deviation of portfolio illiquidity decreases almost everywhere as maturity increases. On the other
hand, for a given maturity, portfolio illiquidity increases as the credit quality of the portfolio drops. This
holds for portfolio CDS spreads for all maturities in terms of both mean and median, and it also holds for
the standard deviation of illiquidity. Moreover, holding maturity constant, the increase in portfolio illiquidity
is considerable when moving from the investment grade to the high-yield category of CDS portfolios. For
12We obtain nominal consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services from the Table 2.8.5 of the National Institute
of Pension Administrators (NIPA). Population data are from NIPA’s Table 2.6 and the price deflator is computed using prices from
NIPA’s Table 2.8.4 with the year 2000 as its basis. All this information is used to construct monthly seasonally adjusted real per
capita consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services. The autoregressive parameter of the habit process is estimated
using the price-dividend ratio obtained from the original series on Robert Shiller’s website. The actual procedure to estimate the
surplus consumption ratio follows the methodology described by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) with γ = 2 . This utility curvature
generates a stochastic discount factor with a mean value close to the inverse of the risk free rate during the sample period.
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instance, the average of the most liquid 5-year bid-ask spread of AAA/A- and BBB+/BBB- portfolios are
around 6 and 7 basis points, whereas the average 5-year bid-ask spread of BB+/B- and B+/D are around 17
and 43 basis points respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 depicts the time series of aggregate bid-ask spreads by maturity. We observe that the lower the
maturity, the higher the illiquidity of the CDS contracts. This is particularly the case during stress periods,
with the known exception of the 5-year contract which is overall the most liquid contract. As expected, the
illiquidity of the CDS market increases substantially after the start of the financial crisis and it reaches its
peak at the end of 2008 around the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
In the case of the gamma measure of illiquidity, displayed in Panel B of Table 3, portfolio CDS bid-
ask spreads increase across both maturity and credit quality almost everywhere. Although the increasing
monotonic illiquidity relation throughout credit ratings is maintained for all maturities, the opposite result
is observed with respect to maturity for a given credit quality. Figure 4 plots the time series pattern of the
gamma measure of illiquidity.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Panel C of Table 3 also reports descriptive statistics for aggregate illiquidity for alternative horizons
without distinguishing across credit quality both for bid-ask spreads and the gamma measure, market-wide
illiquidity of the stock and corporate bond markets, time-varying risk aversion, the variance risk premium,
the slope of the term structure and default risk. As before, aggregate illiquidity measured by the absolute bid-
ask spread shows that short-term maturity contracts are highly illiquid, the average variance risk premium
is negative, and the slope and default state variables are, as expected, positive on average during our sample
period. Figure 5 and 6 depict the time series of aggregate Amihud ratio and aggregate Amihud illiquidity,
the AR(2) residuals, for the US stock and bond markets respectively. The behavior of these two series is
very close over time. It suggests spillovers of market-wide illiquidity from the stock to the bond market
and vice versa. Figures 7 display the aggregate time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences. Risk
aversion tends to increase during stress periods but, of course, it is striking the enormous increase of risk
aversion during the current economic and financial crisis. It reaches unknown levels of risk aversion which
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should strongly impact discount rates and financial prices. Figure 8 represents the annualized volatility risk
premium. As expected, the volatility under the risk neutral measure tends to be higher than the volatility under
the objective probability measure except in periods of great distress in which realized volatility is extremely
high.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 displays the correlation matrix among the aggregate illiquidity and other control variables. Panel
A contains the correlations for the whole sample period from January 2004 to April 2011, whereas Panels
B and C present the correlations for the expansion (January 2004 to June 2007) and recession (July 2007 to
April 2011) sub-periods respectively. From Panel A we observe that there is a high level of correlation among
bid-ask spreads of CDS contracts for different maturities. More specifically, all the pairwise correlation
coefficients between any two series of bid-ask spreads with different maturities are higher than 90%. This
already suggests that there might be a high commonality in bid-ask spreads of different maturities. The
pattern of high correlation holds also for gamma illiquidity measures of CDS spreads. The correlation among
aggregate bid-ask spreads and gamma illiquidity across different maturities is higher than 70%.
The aggregate illiquidity measure for the US equity market has a relatively high (above 0.30 and less
than 0.65) correlation with the aggregate illiquidity measures of CDS spreads. However, despite the 0.37
correlation between ILS and ILB, the illiquidity measures for the fixed income market has a much lower, and
even negative, correlation with the CDS market illiquidity. It should be recalled that ILB is calculated only
with corporate bonds from companies of the S&P100 index. The association of macroeconomic variables is
higher with aggregate bid-ask spreads than with the gamma measure of illiquidity. We also observe moderate
and positive correlation coefficients between alternative aggregate illiquidity variables of the CDS market and
both, the variance risk premium and changes in default risk. It is interesting to note the negative correlation
between the variance risk premium and aggregate risk aversion. When risk aversion increases, the expected
variance under the risk neutral measure becomes higher relative to realized variance generating a negative
association between these two variables.
Looking now at Panels B and C of Table 4, it turns out that the correlation among illiquidity and macroe-
conomic variables increase from the expansion to recession sub-periods nearly in all pairwise scenarios. This
is especially evident for the correlations among the aggregate illiquidity measures of the CDS market.
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
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3 Effects of Market-Wide Illiquidity on CDS Spreads
3.1 Illiquidity Commonality
As already mentioned before, the results of Table 3 suggest that there is a high level of liquidity commonality
among aggregate bid-ask spreads of CDS contracts of different maturities. To examine the degree of com-
monality of CDS illiquidity spreads in terms of the overall aggregate bid-ask spreads, we run the following
ordinary least squares (OLS) autocorrelation-robust standard error regressions:
∆PILBASyt = a+b∆ILBASt + εt (6)
where ∆PILBASyt is the change of the bid-ask spread of credit-quality-sorted portfolio p at month t with
either 1-, 3-, 5-, 7-, or 10- year maturity, and ∆ILBASt is the maturity independent aggregate bid-ask spread
of the CDS market. Before constructing the aggregate measure of bid-ask spread illiquidity of the market,
individual bid-ask spreads of a CDS name are averaged across maturity. Table 5 contains the empirical results.
It shows that there is a strong commonality across all portfolios and maturities. Most of the slope coefficients
are positive and statistically significant. However, it is striking the strong illiquidity commonality, both in
terms of regression coefficients and R-squared statistics, for high-yield underlings with ratings from BB+ to
D. More importantly, this is especially the case for the higher default risk portfolio with ratings from B+
to D. Aggregate illiquidity seems to have an enormous impact on the CDS market segment of the lowest
credit-quality-sorted portfolios.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
3.2 Market-wide Illiquidity and CDS spreads
We next investigate the relationship between changes in CDS spreads and market-wide illiquidity. For a given
maturity, and for each portfolio p of a particular credit quality, we run the following OLS autocorrelation-
robust standard error regressions:
∆CDSpt = βp0+βpilbas∆ILBASyt +βpilsILSt (7)
+ βpraRAt +βpvrpVRPt +βpterm∆TERMt +βpde f∆DEFt + ept
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where ∆CDSpt is the change of the monthly CDS spread of portfolio p, ∆ILBASyt is the change of the
aggregate (equally weighted) absolute bid-ask spread for a given maturity, and the other variables have pre-
viously been defined.
Table 6 contains the regression results where each panel corresponds to a given horizon of 1-, 3-, 5-,
7-, and 10- year maturities. We show the empirical results for the full period, and also for two sub-periods
that we relate to expansion and distress scenarios respectively. The key result of this section is the positive
relationship between changes in portfolio CDS spreads and changes in the aggregate bid-ask spread measure
of illiquidity of the CDS market. The regression coefficients, which we interpret as illiquidity CDS betas, are
estimated with precision across credit ratings, maturities, and alternative sample periods. More specifically,
nearly for all specifications of portfolio CDS maturity and rating groups, the illiquidity betas are positive
and statistically significant for standard confidence levels. Moreover, as one would expect, the magnitude of
the coefficients tends to be larger for high yield underlings. Therefore, low credit rating CDS spreads tend
to be highly sensitive to aggregate illiquidity shocks relative to high credit quality CDS spreads. This is a
robust and economically important result. It suggests that changes of CDS spreads are not only determined
by changes in the credit quality of the underlying corporate bond. In other words, CDS spreads do not only
reflect expected default and the associated default risk premium, but also expected market-wide illiquidity
and the related illiquidity risk premium. A consequence of this result is that, at least for corporate CDS
contracts, the well known one-factor intensity model for pricing CDS spreads of Pan and Singleton (2008) is
likely to be badly specified.
In terms of sub-periods, for the 3-, 7-, and 10- year maturities, CDS spreads of low credit quality portfolios
tend to have higher illiquidity betas during the distress period than during the expansion years. These high-
yield distressed illiquidity betas are estimated with high precision. For the 1-, and 5- year maturities their
sensitivities to illiquidity shocks seem to be equally relevant during both expansion and recession sub-periods.
Overall, higher market-wide illiquidity tends to be accompanied by high CDS spreads both before and after
June 2007 regardless of CDS maturity and credit rating.
The aggregate measure of Amihud illiquidity of the US equity market tends to be a significant factor
mainly for AAA to A- rated CDS portfolios. The regression coefficients are always positive and they are
estimated with precision. This is the case regardless of the portfolio maturity or the sample period of the
analysis. Therefore, possible spillovers effects of market-wide illiquidity equity shocks seem to be relevant
especially for highly rated underlings. However, it turns out that for all maturities, except for the shortest 1-
year horizon, equity market-wide illiquidity seems to be also significant during the expansion sub-period. In
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other words, during non-recession moments of time equity illiquidity affects CDS spreads but this is not the
case for distress periods where the aggregate illiquidity of the CDS market plays a more significant role.
The uncertainty embedded in financial assets, and proxy by the volatility risk premium, is also mainly
related to AAA to A- CDS portfolios. The regression coefficients of these CDS portfolios are negatively
and significantly related to VRP. Once again, as in the case of illiquidity spillover effects, it seems that
equity volatility shocks only impact CDS spreads of highly rated underlings. However, there is an important
difference with the previous result. Equity illiquidity spillovers tend to be relevant during the expansion
sub-period, whereas equity volatility spillover shocks from the stock market to the CDS market of high
credit quality portfolios are exclusively due to the recession sub-period. It is interesting to note the negative
relationship between VRP and CDS spreads. It should be recalled that the VRP is estimated as the difference
between the ex-post realized volatility and VIX. This is just the payoff of the future contract on realized
variance. This means that when realized volatility is not as high as expected, traders on the CDS market
interpret the lower observed volatility as good news for the economy, and CDS spreads become lower.
Time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences does not seem to be a consistently price factor in
the CDS spread market. Most of the regression coefficients are estimated with very low precision, and the
signs of the coefficients change from positive to negative depending upon the sub-period and maturities of
the analysis. The only consistently priced CDS spread correspond to the B+ to D portfolio from January
2004 to June 2007. The coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero. As shown in Figure 7,
increasing changes in RA start well before the beginning of the financial crisis. It may easily be the case that
this pattern of increasing uncertainty is the source of the positive regression coefficient between CDS spreads
of low credit quality underlings and time-varying risk aversion.
In general, inverted zero-coupon curves tend to anticipate recessions, while upward-sloping curves tend
to forecast expansions. This suggests that increases in TERM should be negatively related to changes in CDS
spreads. This state variable does not seem to be a consistently important factor in the CDS market. The
regression coefficients tend to be negative but they are estimated with very low precision. The only exception
is the behaviour of BBB+ to BBB- credit quality portfolios which show a relatively well estimated coefficient
especially at long horizons. It may be that this segment is dominated by an industry particularly sensitive to
interest rate risks.
Finally, changes in DEF are one of the key factors that consistently explain changes in CDS spreads. DEF
reflects aggregate default risk and, therefore, we expect a positive sign for the regression coefficients. This
is systematically the case, although they are not always significantly different from zero. It turns out that,
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when estimated with precision, the low credit quality portfolios tend to have a stronger positive relationship
between default risk and CDS spreads than other better credit rating assets. However, the most consistently
default risk priced portfolio corresponds to the best credit ranking underlings. The AAA to A- CDS portfolio
always presents a positive and significant regression coefficient which becomes lower the longer the maturity
of the contract. This is a relevant finding that reflects how high quality corporate bonds react to aggregate
default risk of the US economy. Moreover, default risk is priced especially during the boom sub-period.
There are very few significant regression coefficients during the stress sub-period. This indicates that default
risk impacts the CDS market mainly when there is a potential change in expectations. During the recession
sub-period DEF seems to affect only high quality CDS portfolios. The situation may be so deteriorated that
all potential aggregate default risk is already discounted in CDS spreads.
Overall, our selected market-wide variables explain a higher percentage of the variability of the AAA
to A- CDS portfolio than the variability of the rest of portfolios. This finding becomes stronger the longer
the maturity of the CDS portfolio. On average, the R-squared statistics for this high quality portfolio is
approximately 0.57 for the full period across all five maturities. The expansion sub-period presents an average
R-squared statistics across portfolios and maturities of 0.52, whereas the average statistic during the recession
sub-period is 0.43. However, this lower explanatory power is not due to the AAA to A- CDS portfolio. Indeed,
the highest R-squared coefficient across all regressions is 0.65 which corresponds to the better rating portfolio
and the 10- year maturity contract. The model seems to price reasonably well CDS spreads but it is also true
that the model has a larger average explanatory power during expansions, and it seems to fit better the high
quality contracts relative to other CDS spreads.13
To conclude, market-wide illiquidity in the CDSmarket, financial uncertainty represented by the volatility
risk premium, and default risk are the aggregate variables that are systematically related to changes in CDS
spreads. Additionally, spillover illiquidity effects from the equity market are consistently associated with the
AAA to A- CDS portfolio.
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
13Alternative specifications with either levels or changes of RA and VRP, and with or without RA or TERM do not seem to affect
the overall conclusions.
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4 Flight-to-liquidity, flight-to-quality and CDS spreads
The result of the previous section show that, especially in distress macroeconomic scenarios, a negative
market-wide illiquidity shock in the CDS market raises the sensitivity of CDS spreads to those shocks. This
effect is stronger in junk underlings than in high quality corporate bonds. This result suggest that investors
may substitute less liquid corporate bonds for highly liquid bonds which should consequently raise the CDS
spread associated to those bad quality bonds. Therefore, we may have a flight-to- liquidity phenomenon
reflected even in the CDS market and not only on the corporate bond market. At the same time, and for
similar reasons, we may have a possible distinct flight-to-quality episode. The section investigates whether
the CDS market reflect either a flight-to-liquidity or flight-to-quality or both.
We study how the difference between the CDS spread of the B+ to D and the spread of the AAA to A-
portfolio is explained by default and illiquidity market-wide risks in expansion and in moments of financial
distress. Hence, we first form an additional CDS portfolio as the difference of the spreads between out two
extreme portfolios. Secondly, we perform OLS autocorrelation-robust standard error regressions of the form,
∆CDSLHpt = βp0+βpilbas∆ILBASyt +βpilsILSt
+ βpraRAt +βpvrpVRPt +βpterm∆TERMt +βpde f∆DEFt
+ βpdilbas∆ILBASyt ×Dt +βpdilsILSt ×Dt
+ βpdraRAt ×Dt +βpdvrpVRPt ×Dt +βpdterm∆TERMt ×Dt +βpdde f∆DEFt ×Dt + ept (8)
where ∆CDSLHpt is now the difference between the CDS spreads of the junk portfolio given by the B+ to
D ratings (L) and the CDS portfolio spreads associated with the AAA to A- underlings (H), and is a dummy
variable taking the value of 1 during the financial crisis (second sub-period) and 0 otherwise. For each
maturity, we run these regressions with and without the illiquidity aggregate variables, both from the CDS
and equity markets, to check the differences between the cross-product terms of the illiquidity variables and
the recession dummy. If the sign of the regression coefficient associated with the cross-product is negative
and significant, once we include market-wide illiquidity, we may conclude that that there is flight-to-liquidity
during stress times in the CDS market. We then pursue the same procedure to analyze the potential flight-to-
quality in this market. We first run regression (8) omitting the default variable, and then we add it to check
the sign and significance of the cross-product coefficient.
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Table 7 contains the results regarding flight-to-liquidity. Each column corresponds to a given maturity
where we report the results first without liquidity variables and then adding these variables and the cross-
product terms. The first column reports the results for the shortest horizon. Both ILS and market-wide
illiquidity in the CDS market present positive and significant results. However, the regression coefficient
of ∆ILBAS1y is estimated with much more precision than the coefficient of ILS. Additionally, there is a
significant and negative coefficient of the cross-product term ∆ILBAS1y×Dt which suggests a short-term
flight to liquidity in this market given the inversion of the slope of the term structure of CDS spreads during
the stress sub-period for the 1- year horizon. For the rest of maturities, our results do not seem to present
incremental differences on the impact of market-wide illiquidity variables. The flight-to-liquidity finding is
exclusively a short-term phenomenon. It is important to point out the very large increase experimented by the
explanatory of the model when we include market-wide illiquidity variables. Although the highest R-squared
statistic is obtained for the model with illiquidity variables during the crisis sub-period, it should be noted that
the percentage increase of the R-squared once we incorporate the illiquidity variables is higher the longer the
maturity of the CDS contract. These regression results therefore show the enormous importance of aggregate
illiquidity shocks to explain the differential CDS spreads between bad quality CDS portfolios relative to
highly rated portfolios. Overall, the spread differential significantly increase when there is an adverse shocks
to market-wide illiquidity in the stock market independently of the maturity of the CDS contract. However,
this effect is only significant for the aggregate illiquidity of the CDS market for maturities with 1- and 5- year
contracts.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
Table 8 shows the same results where we now omit the default risk variables rather than the illiquidity
variables. It turns out that default risk seems to be much less important for explaining changes in the differ-
ential CDS spreads than illiquidity risk. The R-squared statistics are practically the same independently of
adding default risk into the regression or not. Moreover, this result holds for all maturities. We do not find
any significant evidence of flight-to-credit quality in the CDS market during the stress sub-period. We al-
ready discussed in Section 2 that we also consider an alternative measure of aggregate illiquidity on the CDS
market given by the covariance between adjacent returns or the gamma measure of illiquidity. Moreover, we
also employ an aggregate measure of illiquidity in the corporate bond market using the Amihud ratio for the
corporate bonds of the components of the S&P100 index estimated with TRACE. The overall results with
these alternative measures are the same as the empirical evidence reported in Tables 6, 7 and 8. Market-wide
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illiquidity is an important determinant of changes of corporate CDS spreads. The detailed evidence is con-
tained in Appendices A, B, C and D for the bid-ask spread and ILB, the gamma illiquidity measure and ILS,
the gamma illiquidity measure and ILB, and the flight-to-liquidity/flight-to-quality evidence respectively.
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
5 Conclusions
The recent financial crisis has raised some concerns about the liquidity of CDS contracts. At this point, it
is generally accepted that CDS spreads cannot be understood as a pure measure of creditworthiness of a
company. CDS spreads can be explained by factors related not only to the credit risk of a company, but also
to liquidity related components. Although, there are several papers analyzing the relationship between CDS
spreads and illiquidity proxies, there is no work that has focused on the effects of aggregate illiquidity from
the CDS, equity, and corporate bond markets on CDS spreads.
In this paper we find a strong commonality in the illiquidity of CDS portfolios. This suggests that mea-
sures of market-wide illiquidity may explain changes on CDS spreads. Indeed, this turns out to be the case.
There is a positive and significant relationship between changes in CDS spreads and changes in aggregate
bid-ask spread for a given maturity of the CDS contract. Illiquidity CDS betas across credit quality portfolios
and maturities are positive and statistically significant. Our evidence is a strong and robust to alternative
market-wide measures of illiquidity from other markets, and other macroeconomic control measures. More-
over, as one would expect, the magnitude of the coefficients tends to be larger for high yield underlings.
Therefore, low credit rating CDS spreads tend to be highly sensitive to aggregate illiquidity shocks relative to
high credit quality CDS spreads. This is particularly the case during the recession sub-period. There is also
evidence of flight-to-liquidity during stress periods, at least at short horizons.
Overall, our empirical evidence suggests that changes of CDS spreads are not only determined by changes
in the credit quality of the underlying corporate bond. In other words, CDS spreads do not only reflect
expected default and the associated default risk premium, but also expected market-wide illiquidity and the
related illiquidity risk premium. A consequence of this result is that the well known one-factor intensity model
of Pan and Singleton (2008) is likely to be badly specified when used for pricing corporate CDS contracts.
In future research, we plan to extend the one-factor pricing intensity model by adding an illiquidity factor.
The fact that illiquidity CDS betas are positive and significant suggests a high and economically relevant
illiquidity risk premium in the CDS market.
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Table 1: CDS names by Sector and Rating
AA A BBB BB B CCC Total
Basic Materials 1 7 6 2 16
Consumer Goods 1 13 12 1 6 42
Consumer Services 1 6 29 14 2 2 72
Financials 3 11 9 8 4 8 43
Health Care 1 6 2 3 2 14
Industrials 1 5 16 6 4 32
Oil & Gas 4 6 8 1 19
Technology 6 5 3 4 18
Telecommunications 7 2 4 1 14
Utilities 1 5 3 3 2 14
Total 6 48 94 67 5 19 284
This table shows the distribution of CDS names in our database by rating and
ICB Industry category. The rating is the average of the Moody’s and S&P rat-
ings that are adjusted to the seniority of the instrument and are rounded not to
include the plus and minus levels.
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Table 2: Portfolio CDS Spreads
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
mean med sd mean med sd mean med sd mean med sd
1y 51.52 20.99 75.55 64.41 39.79 72.29 185.91 120.71 202.24 526.80 293.18 688.73
3y 59.61 36.91 67.28 84.45 60.79 69.05 249.60 189.71 175.46 642.15 445.50 597.18
5y 69.53 47.75 62.77 104.25 80.22 63.59 297.62 240.15 159.56 696.43 519.11 522.80
7y 73.61 56.10 56.59 111.91 92.00 56.23 308.67 255.50 141.38 690.32 545.11 463.65
10y 78.94 64.14 51.25 120.68 104.87 49.80 318.76 284.56 128.64 680.67 558.40 405.81
This table reports summary statistics for equally-weighted CDS spreads of credit-quality-sorted portfolios with different maturities.
Before constructing portfolio CDS spreads, 1 and 99 percentiles of CDS spreads were removed from the cross-sectional distribution of
CDS spreads for each month and maturity. The frequency of portfolio CDS spreads is monthly. The sample period spans from January
2004 to March 2011.
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Table 3: Liquidity Proxies and Macro Variables
Panel A: Portfolio Bid-Ask Spreads
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
mean med sd mean med sd mean med sd mean med sd
1y 11.36 7.01 9.65 13.97 10.39 9.60 32.09 20.91 30.62 80.38 43.52 99.50
3y 8.43 6.18 5.27 10.48 8.37 4.89 23.33 18.85 16.49 55.42 31.66 68.77
5y 6.17 5.24 3.68 7.28 6.30 3.38 17.13 14.27 12.71 43.19 26.48 60.54
7y 7.07 5.91 3.19 8.74 7.78 2.77 18.66 16.06 11.65 43.17 26.50 61.18
10y 7.13 5.98 2.86 8.93 8.19 2.39 18.34 16.63 10.59 42.12 27.27 57.52
Panel B: Portfolio Gamma Illiquidity
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
mean med sd mean med sd mean med sd mean med sd
1y 0.01 -0.00 0.11 0.02 -0.00 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.40
3y 0.21 0.00 0.83 0.25 0.00 0.77 0.60 0.03 1.30 1.14 0.04 2.59
5y 0.50 0.02 1.47 0.71 0.05 1.84 1.43 0.20 2.55 2.20 0.29 4.44
7y 0.73 0.02 2.21 1.02 0.06 2.65 1.97 0.18 3.74 3.15 0.38 5.40
10y 0.89 0.01 3.18 1.38 0.07 4.12 2.63 0.28 5.34 3.51 0.46 6.52
Panel C: Aggregate Iliquidity Proxies and Macro Variables
mean sd min 5% med 95% max Obs.
ILBAS1y 30.20 33.32 7.86 8.63 14.83 106.41 184.66 81
ILBAS3y 20.85 19.81 6.94 8.14 12.07 54.21 143.56 81
ILBAS5y 15.27 16.08 4.83 5.88 9.18 39.62 121.12 81
ILBAS7y 16.32 15.42 6.54 7.57 10.68 36.19 120.43 81
ILBAS10y 16.07 14.21 6.93 7.69 11.04 32.77 113.23 81
ILCOV1y 0.03 0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.00 0.13 1.05 87
ILCOV3y 0.38 1.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 1.78 7.60 87
ILCOV5y 0.93 2.02 -0.05 -0.00 0.07 4.89 14.26 87
ILCOV7y 1.33 2.85 -0.22 -0.16 0.07 6.55 19.85 87
ILCOV10y 1.71 4.13 -0.80 -0.38 0.07 6.33 31.33 87
ILS -0.03 0.46 -1.92 -0.46 -0.04 0.49 2.52 84
ILB 0.00 0.09 -0.40 -0.11 -0.00 0.19 0.30 72
RA 51.13 38.11 23.74 24.26 28.58 130.24 139.00 84
VRP -3.69 4.54 -12.65 -11.20 -3.60 3.41 16.65 88
TERM 1.82 1.37 -0.61 -0.32 2.14 3.52 3.78 88
DEF 1.18 0.62 0.60 0.71 0.94 2.93 3.43 88
This table reports the summary statistics for our illiquidity measures and macroeconomic variables. Panel A and B provide the summary
statistics for Bid-ask spread and Gamma measure of illiquidity of the CDS market in terms of maturity and credit quality, respectively.
Credit-quality-sorted bid-ask spreads and gamma measures are calculated in the same way as the portfolio CDS spreads. Panel C
provides the summary statistics for the aggregate measures and macroeconomic variables. ILS and ILB are the aggregate measures
of illiquidity for US stock and bond markets, respectively. RA is the time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences based on the
consumption surplus ratio. VRP is the variance risk premium, TERM is the term spread of interest rate curve, and DEF is the default
spread of Moody’s. The frequency of all measures is monthly. The data for most of the measures are from January 2004 to April 2011.
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Table 5: Portfolio Bid-ask spread versus Aggregate bid-ask spread illiquidity
Dep Var: ∆ PILBAS1y
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
Cons 0.02 0.03 −0.07 −0.44
(0.05) (0.09) (−0.08) (−0.29)
∆ ILBAS 0.18∗∗∗ 0.10 1.22∗∗∗ 4.90∗∗∗
(3.21) (1.60) (9.50) (55.55)
N 80 80 80 80
adj. R2 0.289 0.141 0.849 0.941
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dep Var: ∆ PILBAS3y
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
Cons 0.04 0.06 0.00 −0.56
(0.19) (0.32) (0.01) (−0.51)
∆ ILBAS 0.08∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗
(2.31) (2.14) (12.53) (23.48)
N 80 80 80 80
adj. R2 0.169 0.210 0.897 0.972
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dep Var: ∆ PILBAS5y
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
Cons 0.01 0.01 −0.13 −0.70
(0.06) (0.07) (−0.37) (−0.54)
∆ ILBAS 0.05∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 4.07∗∗∗
(1.75) (2.04) (14.15) (20.99)
N 80 80 80 80
adj. R2 0.116 0.156 0.872 0.963
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dep Var: ∆ PILBAS7y
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
Cons 0.05 0.05 0.00 −0.49
(0.33) (0.43) (0.00) (−0.33)
∆ ILBAS 0.04 0.05∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 4.04∗∗∗
(1.64) (2.33) (15.86) (18.42)
N 80 80 80 80
adj. R2 0.098 0.156 0.909 0.963
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
Dep Var: ∆ PILBAS10y
AAA to A- BBB+ to BBB- BB+ to BB- B+ to D
Cons 0.06 0.08 0.01 −0.53
(0.44) (0.61) (0.05) (−0.36)
∆ ILBAS 0.04 0.04∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 3.79∗∗∗
(1.57) (2.27) (16.85) (17.20)
N 80 80 80 80
adj. R2 0.077 0.109 0.909 0.960
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in 1- , 3-, 5-, 7-, 10 - year portfolio Bid-ask spread (equally weighted) as a dependant
variable (constructed in the same way as credit quality sorted CDS spreads). t-statistics are calculated based on standard errors corrected for
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. N denotes the number of observations used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2
statistics. ∆ILBAS denotes changes in aggregate CDS Bid-ask spread (aggregated by maturity). “Maturity-independent" bid-ask spread series
for each CDS name are constructed by averaging monthly bid-ask spreads over all maturities. ILBAS is constructed by averaging the cross
sectional “maturity-independent" bid-ask spreads for each month. Before the aggregation 1st and 99th percentiles of absolute bid-ask spreads
(maturity-independent) were dropped from the cross sectional distribution of absolute bid-ask spreads for each month.
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Table 7: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Bid-Ask Illiquidity and Amihud Stock Illiquidity.
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in extreme-portfolio CDS spread with different maturities as a dependant variable.
Extreme-portfolio CDS spreads are calculated as the difference between CDS spreads of AAA to A- and B to D CDS portfolios. t-statistics are
calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the number of observations
used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS(M)y denotes changes in aggregate CDS Bid-ask spread with
M year maturity (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV (M)y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with M year maturity. ILS and ILB denotes the aggregate Amihud measures of illiquidity for the US stock and bond markets, respectively. RA
denotes the time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences based on the consumption surplus ratio. VRP denotes the level of variance risk
premium. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields
and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between
Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 33.97 44.04 46.44 70.08 47.61 79.52 37.41 71.36 19.75 54.73
(0.55) (0.54) (0.94) (1.01) (1.07) (1.30) (0.86) (1.24) (0.49) (1.10)
RA −0.85 −1.60 −1.00 −2.08 −0.97 −2.61 −0.36 −2.06 0.45 −1.24
(−0.36) (−0.50) (−0.51) (−0.76) (−0.55) (−1.08) (−0.21) (−0.90) (0.28) (−0.63)
RA×Dt 1.61 1.27 1.22 1.47 0.85 1.75 0.31 1.19 −0.27 0.60
(0.73) (0.48) (0.71) (0.64) (0.57) (0.90) (0.22) (0.66) (−0.21) (0.38)
VRP 7.16∗∗ 1.72 9.02∗∗∗ 5.42∗ 8.32∗∗ 3.54 9.68∗∗∗ 4.90 11.11∗∗∗ 6.60∗
(2.13) (0.96) (2.99) (1.94) (2.60) (1.25) (3.03) (1.58) (3.06) (1.89)
VRP×Dt 16.48 4.23 7.07 0.15 1.07 −1.46 −1.35 −4.65 −2.13 −5.38
(0.89) (0.41) (0.51) (0.02) (0.09) (−0.21) (−0.12) (−0.68) (−0.21) (−0.90)
∆ TERM −0.47 1.21 10.34 13.36 7.90 6.30 19.79 27.76∗ −11.95 −6.12
(−0.02) (0.05) (0.44) (0.48) (0.39) (0.26) (1.12) (1.93) (−0.37) (−0.16)
∆ TERM×Dt 80.76 −4.71 40.58 −38.61 19.69 −75.91 5.43 −100.43 69.16 −37.13
(0.54) (−0.04) (0.36) (−0.42) (0.20) (−1.02) (0.06) (−1.44) (0.68) (−0.55)
∆ DEF 153.50 29.60 225.60∗∗ 190.14∗ 174.04 63.83 182.80 96.82 236.75∗∗ 151.39
(1.35) (0.37) (2.16) (1.95) (1.62) (0.77) (1.59) (1.01) (2.02) (1.28)
∆ DEF×Dt 17.54 111.50 −56.81 −97.57 15.54 9.24 −8.88 −14.03 −96.65 −125.08
(0.08) (0.90) (−0.30) (−0.60) (0.09) (0.06) (−0.05) (−0.10) (−0.59) (−0.84)
ILS 70.44∗∗ 133.68∗∗∗ 76.10∗ 95.76∗∗∗ 109.35∗∗∗
(2.47) (4.64) (1.84) (3.24) (3.64)
ILS×Dt −217.03∗ −161.68∗ −91.19 −111.99 −104.52
(−1.88) (−1.76) (−0.98) (−1.29) (−1.45)
∆ ILBAS1y 30.55∗∗∗
(6.10)
∆ ILBAS1y×Dt −17.82∗∗∗
(−2.99)
∆ ILBAS3y 0.30
(0.05)
∆ ILBAS3y×Dt 9.01
(1.36)
∆ ILBAS5y 19.28∗∗∗
(3.35)
∆ ILBAS5y×Dt −9.67
(−1.49)
∆ ILBAS7y 17.36
(1.64)
∆ ILBAS7y×Dt −7.89
(−0.72)
∆ ILBAS10y 12.24
(1.42)
∆ ILBAS10y×Dt −2.81
(−0.31)
N 83 80 83 80 83 80 83 80 83 80
adj. R2 0.109 0.428 0.103 0.323 0.043 0.252 0.026 0.260 0.047 0.334
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table 8: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Bid-ask Spread Illiquidity and Amihud Stock Illiquidity
(Without DEF).
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in portfolio CDS spread (equally weighted) with different maturities as a dependant
variable. t-statistics are calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the
number of observations used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS1y denotes changes in aggregate
CDS Bid-ask spread (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV1y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with 1 year maturity. ILS denotes the AR(2) residual of stationarized aggregate Amihud measure for the US stock market. ILB is the AR(2)
residual of the aggregate Amihud measure for the US corporate bond market. RA denotes the risk aversion in levels for the gamma parameter
equal to 2. VRP denotes the level of variance risk premium, which is calculated as the difference between the monthly realized volatility of the
S& P500 index return (annualized) and the VIX index for the corresponding month. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines
as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes
changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 54.85 44.04 77.38 70.08 85.28 79.52 77.77 71.36 56.97 54.73
(0.71) (0.54) (1.21) (1.01) (1.49) (1.30) (1.44) (1.24) (1.26) (1.10)
∆ ILBAS1y 31.02∗∗∗ 30.55∗∗∗
(6.42) (6.10)
∆ ILBAS1y×Dt −18.43∗∗∗ −17.82∗∗∗
(−3.18) (−2.99)
∆ ILBAS3y 1.64 0.30
(0.26) (0.05)
∆ ILBAS3y×Dt 7.63 9.01
(1.11) (1.36)
∆ ILBAS5y 20.45∗∗∗ 19.28∗∗∗
(3.75) (3.35)
∆ ILBAS5y×Dt −10.82∗ −9.67
(−1.74) (−1.49)
∆ ILBAS7y 18.95∗∗ 17.36
(2.02) (1.64)
∆ ILBAS7y×Dt −9.50 −7.89
(−0.97) (−0.72)
∆ ILBAS10y 15.23∗∗ 12.24
(2.12) (1.42)
∆ ILBAS10y×Dt −5.81 −2.81
(−0.76) (−0.31)
ILS 70.10∗∗ 70.44∗∗ 134.35∗∗∗ 133.68∗∗∗ 75.31∗ 76.10∗ 94.77∗∗∗ 95.76∗∗∗ 107.62∗∗∗ 109.35∗∗∗
(2.52) (2.47) (4.58) (4.64) (1.87) (1.84) (3.21) (3.24) (3.82) (3.64)
ILS×Dt −178.91 −217.03∗ −138.79 −161.68∗ −72.35 −91.19 −90.07 −111.99 −96.16 −104.52
(−1.65) (−1.88) (−1.58) (−1.76) (−0.83) (−0.98) (−1.09) (−1.29) (−1.38) (−1.45)
RA −2.02 −1.60 −2.38 −2.08 −2.85 −2.61 −2.32 −2.06 −1.36 −1.24
(−0.66) (−0.50) (−0.95) (−0.76) (−1.26) (−1.08) (−1.09) (−0.90) (−0.75) (−0.63)
RA×Dt 1.67 1.27 1.75 1.47 1.97 1.75 1.43 1.19 0.71 0.60
(0.66) (0.48) (0.83) (0.64) (1.07) (0.90) (0.83) (0.66) (0.49) (0.38)
VRP 1.73 1.72 5.25∗∗ 5.42∗ 3.46 3.54 4.81 4.90 6.37∗ 6.60∗
(0.99) (0.96) (2.12) (1.94) (1.29) (1.25) (1.65) (1.58) (1.97) (1.89)
VRP×Dt 6.26 4.23 1.60 0.15 −0.40 −1.46 −3.43 −4.65 −4.80 −5.38
(0.60) (0.41) (0.20) (0.02) (−0.05) (−0.21) (−0.48) (−0.68) (−0.78) (−0.90)
∆ TERM 1.07 1.21 10.83 13.36 5.02 6.30 26.52∗ 27.76∗ −8.33 −6.12
(0.05) (0.05) (0.34) (0.48) (0.20) (0.26) (1.72) (1.93) (−0.21) (−0.16)
∆ TERM×Dt −19.85 −4.71 −46.39 −38.61 −83.07 −75.91 −108.39 −100.43 −37.93 −37.13
(−0.18) (−0.04) (−0.49) (−0.42) (−1.11) (−1.02) (−1.56) (−1.44) (−0.53) (−0.55)
∆ DEF 29.60 190.14∗ 63.83 96.82 151.39
(0.37) (1.95) (0.77) (1.01) (1.28)
∆ DEF×Dt 111.50 −97.57 9.24 −14.03 −125.08
(0.90) (−0.60) (0.06) (−0.10) (−0.84)
N 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
adj. R2 0.440 0.428 0.339 0.323 0.271 0.252 0.278 0.260 0.352 0.334
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Figure 1: Time series of sample mean CDS spreads.
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This graphs plots the monthly time series of CDS spreads by maturity. The time series of monthly CDS spreads
for each maturity is constructed by taking the cross-sectional average of CDS spreads for each month and
maturity. The time period of our sample spans from January 2004 to April 2011.
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Figure 2: Time series of CDS spreads of credit quality sorted portfolios (equally weighted).
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This graphs depicts the time series of CDS spreads of credit quality sorted portfolios. The 1st and 99th per-
centiles of CDS spreads were removed from the cross-sectional distribution of CDS spreads for each month
before the calculation of the equally weighted portfolio CDS spreads. The time period of our sample spans
from January 2004 to April 2011.
124
Figure 3: Time series of aggregate absolute CDS Bid-Ask Spread
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This graphs depicts the time series of aggregate Bid-ask spreads by maturity. The time series of aggregate
Bid-ask spreads are obtained by taking the cross-sectional average of individual bid-ask spreads of CDS names
in our database for each month and maturity. Before the aggregation the 1st and 99th percentiles of individual
bid-ask spreads were removed from their cross sectional distribution for each month and maturity. The time
period of our sample spans from January 2004 to September 2010.
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Figure 4: Time series of aggregate measure of Gamma Illiquidity for CDS spreads
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This graphs depicts the time series of aggregate measure of gamma illiquidity for CDS spreads. The aggregation
is done by taking the cross sectional mean of individual gamma measures of illiquidity of all CDS name for a
given month and maturity. Before calculating gamma measure of illiquidity for each CDS name and maturity,
5th and 95th percentiles of CDS returns were removed from the cross-sectional distribution of CDS returns for
each month and maturity.
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Figure 5: Time series of aggregate measure of Amihud ratio
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This graphs depicts the time series of the aggregate ratio of Amihud. The aggregation is done by taking the
cross sectional mean of individual Amihud ratios for each month. When calculating the individual Amihud ratio
for a month of a given stock, the stock returns that fall outside the 1st and 99th percentile of the cross-sectional
distribution of stock return per trading volume were removed. The time period of the aggregate Amihud ratio
goes from January 2000 to December 2011.
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Figure 6: Time series of aggregate measure of Amihud illiquidity (AR(2) residuals)
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This graphs depicts the aggregate measure of illiquidity of Amihud. We calculate this measure by first taking
the AR(2) residuals when regressing aggregate Amihud ratio on its first two lags. The time periods spans from
March 2000 to December 2011.
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Figure 7: Time series of Risk Aversion
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This graphs plots the time series of the time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences based on the con-
sumption surplus ratio. The time period spans from February 1959 to December 2010.
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Figure 8: Time series of Variance Risk Premium
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This graphs depicts the time series of variance risk premium (VRP). We calculate the VRP by taking the
difference between the monthly and realized volatility of the returns of the S&P 500 index (annualized volatility)
and the end-of-month value of the VIX index for the corresponding month. The time series spans from January
2000 to January 2012.
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A The Aggregate Bid-Ask Spread Illiquidity, the Market-Wide Illiquidity of
the Corporate Bond Market, and CDS Spreads
The results contained in Panels A to E of Table A1 show that, when we employ ILB instead of ILS, we
find very similar results for all maturities in terms of the relationship between changes of CDS spreads and
the behavior of market-wide illiquidity of the CDS market, VRP, and DEF. In fact, the R-squared statistics
present similar magnitudes across CDS portfolios and maturities. The relationship between spreads and ILB
shows a positive and significant coefficient for the shortest maturities both for the full period and the recession
sub-period. As in Table 6 this result only holds for the AAA to A- CDS portfolio. However, the significant
spillover effects from the aggregate illiquidity of the equity market to the CDS market reported in Table 6 for
the expansion sub-period does not seem to hold for the aggregate illiquidity of the corporate bond market.
If anything, for the 5-year maturity, we observe a negative relationship between the illiquidity of corporate
bonds and the high quality CDS portfolio spreads. This weaker result of ILB relative to ILS may be explained
by the fact that our measure of market-wide illiquidity of corporate bonds only incorporates the 100 largest
US companies.
[INSERT TABLE A1 ABOUT HERE]
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B The Aggregate Gamma Illiquidity Measure, the Market-Wide Illiquidity
of the Equity Market, and CDS Spreads
Panels A to E of Table B1 summarizes the regression results with changes in portfolio CDS spreads as the
dependent variable, where the aggregate illiquidity measure of the CDS and US stock markets are ILCOV
and ILS respectively. Overall, the aggregate gamma measure of illiquidity of the CDS market shows weaker
results than the bid-ask spread measure. The positive and significant relationship between changes in CDS
spreads and changes in aggregate illiquidity only holds for the BB+ to BB- rated portfolio. There is also a
weak positive relationship with the junk CDS portfolio spreads during the expansion sub-period as long as
we employ 5-, 7-, and 10- year maturities. The R-squared statistics are systematically lower when we use
ILCOV rather than ILBAS reflecting the lower explanatory power of the gamma measure.
[INSERT TABLE B1 ABOUT HERE]
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C The Aggregate Gamma Illiquidity Measure, the Market-Wide Illiquidity
of the Corporate Bond Market, and CDS Spreads
Panels A to E of Table C1 present the empirical results using the gamma measure and the market-wide
illiquidity of the corporate bond market instead the illiquidity of the equity market. As before, the gamma
measure shows lower explanatory power than the bid-ask spread measure even when we use illiquidity from
corporate bonds. However, the positive effects reported between CDS spreads of high quality bonds and ILB
does not hold anymore. On the contrary, we now find a negative and significant relationship between changes
of CDS spreads of junk portfolios and ILB. When there is an increase of aggregate illiquidity in the bond
market of large companies, the CDS spread on junk bonds diminishes.
[INSERT TABLE C1 ABOUT HERE]
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D Flight-to-Liquidity/Flight-to Quality under AlternativeMeasures ofMarket-
Wide Illiquidity
Tables D1 to D3 show the results using the difference between CDS spreads of junk portfolios and CDS
spreads of the AAA to A- portfolio. This is the analysis of flight-to-liquidity during the recession sub-period
using alternative measures of aggregate illiquidity for both the CDS market and the corporate bond market.
[INSERT TABLE D1 to D3 ABOUT HERE]
Tables D4 to D6 show similar evidence about flight-to-quality in the stress sub-period. As before, we find
a significant flight-to-liquidity but it seems even stronger when we use the aggregate bond illiquidity measure
instead of the equity illiquidity. This is also true when we employ the gamma measure of illiquidity. Finally,
as in Section 4, we do not find any support of flight-to-quality except for weak evidence at the shortest horizon
when we employ the gamma measure and aggregate illiquidity from the bond market.
[INSERT TABLE D4 to D6 ABOUT HERE]
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Table D1: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Bid-Ask Illiquidity and Amihud Bond Illiquidity.
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in extreme-portfolio CDS spread with different maturities as a dependant variable.
Extreme-portfolio CDS spreads are calculated as the difference between CDS spreads of AAA to A- and B to D CDS portfolios. t-statistics are
calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the number of observations
used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS(M)y denotes changes in aggregate CDS Bid-ask spread with
M year maturity (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV (M)y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with M year maturity. ILS and ILB denotes the aggregate Amihud measures of illiquidity for the US stock and bond markets, respectively. RA
denotes the time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences based on the consumption surplus ratio. VRP denotes the level of variance risk
premium. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields
and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between
Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 33.97 120.62 46.44 143.90∗ 47.61 145.41∗ 37.41 133.94∗ 19.75 103.46
(0.55) (1.31) (0.94) (1.82) (1.07) (1.97) (0.86) (1.85) (0.49) (1.67)
RA −0.85 −4.56 −1.00 −5.05 −0.97 −5.21∗ −0.36 −4.53 0.45 −3.15
(−0.36) (−1.26) (−0.51) (−1.63) (−0.55) (−1.79) (−0.21) (−1.58) (0.28) (−1.28)
RA×Dt 1.61 3.11 1.22 3.17 0.85 3.14∗ 0.31 2.46 −0.27 1.66
(0.73) (1.34) (0.71) (1.49) (0.57) (1.71) (0.22) (1.39) (−0.21) (1.07)
VRP 7.16∗∗ 3.08∗ 9.02∗∗∗ 6.74∗∗ 8.32∗∗ 4.90∗∗ 9.68∗∗∗ 6.14∗∗ 11.11∗∗∗ 8.29∗∗
(2.13) (1.78) (2.99) (2.28) (2.60) (2.07) (3.03) (2.09) (3.06) (2.61)
VRP×Dt 16.48 3.46 7.07 −0.89 1.07 −3.37 −1.35 −7.01 −2.13 −6.79
(0.89) (0.21) (0.51) (−0.08) (0.09) (−0.34) (−0.12) (−0.72) (−0.21) (−0.87)
∆ TERM −0.47 −0.72 10.34 16.44 7.90 8.65 19.79 25.54 −11.95 −8.72
(−0.02) (−0.03) (0.44) (0.60) (0.39) (0.30) (1.12) (1.37) (−0.37) (−0.24)
∆ TERM×Dt 80.76 −49.09 40.58 −49.13 19.69 −76.57 5.43 −96.47 69.16 −28.46
(0.54) (−0.40) (0.36) (−0.55) (0.20) (−1.11) (0.06) (−1.65) (0.68) (−0.49)
∆ DEF 153.50 19.92 225.60∗∗ 185.01 174.04 44.41 182.80 79.94 236.75∗∗ 132.49
(1.35) (0.23) (2.16) (1.55) (1.62) (0.44) (1.59) (0.79) (2.02) (1.06)
∆ DEF×Dt 17.54 73.29 −56.81 −6.39 15.54 109.93 −8.88 72.34 −96.65 −19.73
(0.08) (0.47) (−0.30) (−0.04) (0.09) (0.90) (−0.05) (0.61) (−0.59) (−0.14)
ILB 126.20 180.41 −61.51 194.43 158.31
(1.01) (0.74) (−0.35) (0.83) (0.75)
ILB×Dt −738.36 −788.97 −424.72 −618.52 −587.86
(−1.20) (−1.58) (−0.99) (−1.35) (−1.57)
∆ ILBAS1y 35.65∗∗∗
(6.60)
∆ ILBAS1y×Dt −25.69∗∗∗
(−4.46)
∆ ILBAS3y 9.14
(1.54)
∆ ILBAS3y×Dt −1.29
(−0.20)
∆ ILBAS5y 25.77∗∗∗
(5.28)
∆ ILBAS5y×Dt −17.31∗∗∗
(−3.21)
∆ ILBAS7y 26.91∗∗∗
(2.91)
∆ ILBAS7y×Dt −18.43∗
(−1.93)
∆ ILBAS10y 20.96∗∗∗
(2.84)
∆ ILBAS10y×Dt −12.44
(−1.62)
N 83 71 83 71 83 71 83 71 83 71
adj. R2 0.109 0.418 0.103 0.346 0.043 0.266 0.026 0.271 0.047 0.354
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table D2: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Gamma Illiquidity and Amihud Stock Illiquidity.
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in extreme-portfolio CDS spread with different maturities as a dependant variable.
Extreme-portfolio CDS spreads are calculated as the difference between CDS spreads of AAA to A- and B to D CDS portfolios. t-statistics are
calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the number of observations
used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS(M)y denotes changes in aggregate CDS Bid-ask spread with
M year maturity (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV (M)y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with M year maturity. ILS and ILB denotes the aggregate Amihud measures of illiquidity for the US stock and bond markets, respectively. RA
denotes the time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences based on the consumption surplus ratio. VRP denotes the level of variance risk
premium. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields
and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between
Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 33.97 43.58 46.44 52.92 47.61 55.40 37.41 43.95 19.75 31.13
(0.55) (0.68) (0.94) (0.98) (1.07) (1.12) (0.86) (0.95) (0.49) (0.74)
RA −0.85 −1.50 −1.00 −1.50 −0.97 −1.66 −0.36 −0.99 0.45 −0.34
(−0.36) (−0.60) (−0.51) (−0.71) (−0.55) (−0.85) (−0.21) (−0.54) (0.28) (−0.21)
RA×Dt 1.61 2.09 1.22 1.64 0.85 1.28 0.31 0.80 −0.27 0.14
(0.73) (0.97) (0.71) (0.95) (0.57) (0.84) (0.22) (0.55) (−0.21) (0.11)
VRP 7.16∗∗ 2.92 9.02∗∗∗ 4.80∗ 8.32∗∗ 3.58 9.68∗∗∗ 4.65 11.11∗∗∗ 6.31∗
(2.13) (1.09) (2.99) (1.89) (2.60) (1.10) (3.03) (1.36) (3.06) (1.69)
VRP×Dt 16.48 18.58 7.07 10.33 1.07 2.19 −1.35 1.86 −2.13 −2.43
(0.89) (1.01) (0.51) (0.70) (0.09) (0.19) (−0.12) (0.16) (−0.21) (−0.26)
∆ TERM −0.47 −3.66 10.34 11.93 7.90 5.75 19.79 20.26 −11.95 −10.42
(−0.02) (−0.13) (0.44) (0.43) (0.39) (0.27) (1.12) (1.36) (−0.37) (−0.29)
∆ TERM×Dt 80.76 36.53 40.58 9.47 19.69 0.15 5.43 −20.94 69.16 38.98
(0.54) (0.35) (0.36) (0.10) (0.20) (0.00) (0.06) (−0.20) (0.68) (0.39)
∆ DEF 153.50 104.87 225.60∗∗ 173.32∗ 174.04 100.70 182.80 113.74 236.75∗∗ 168.38∗
(1.35) (1.06) (2.16) (1.78) (1.62) (1.11) (1.59) (1.31) (2.02) (1.83)
∆ DEF×Dt 17.54 −119.26 −56.81 −135.45 15.54 −9.43 −8.88 −69.65 −96.65 −138.31
(0.08) (−0.34) (−0.30) (−0.56) (0.09) (−0.05) (−0.05) (−0.36) (−0.59) (−0.84)
ILS 125.65∗∗∗ 126.31∗∗∗ 95.20∗∗∗ 116.21∗∗∗ 115.81∗∗∗
(3.47) (4.23) (2.92) (3.39) (3.72)
ILS×Dt 12.14 −33.96 −17.35 −20.61 −28.78
(0.06) (−0.29) (−0.17) (−0.18) (−0.32)
∆ ILCOV1y 3172.98∗
(1.70)
∆ ILCOV1y×Dt −3208.83∗
(−1.70)
∆ ILCOV3y 104.31
(1.53)
∆ ILCOV3y×Dt −111.23
(−1.28)
∆ ILCOV5y 59.18∗
(1.97)
∆ ILCOV5y×Dt −57.10
(−1.59)
∆ ILCOV7y 33.86∗∗∗
(2.94)
∆ ILCOV7y×Dt −35.76∗
(−1.73)
∆ ILCOV10y 22.53∗∗∗
(2.89)
∆ ILCOV10y×Dt −19.48∗
(−1.68)
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
adj. R2 0.109 0.082 0.103 0.075 0.043 0.011 0.026 0.000 0.047 0.048
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table D3: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Gamma Illiquidity and Amihud Bond Illiquidity.
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in extreme-portfolio CDS spread with different maturities as a dependant variable.
Extreme-portfolio CDS spreads are calculated as the difference between CDS spreads of AAA to A- and B to D CDS portfolios. t-statistics are
calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the number of observations
used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS(M)y denotes changes in aggregate CDS Bid-ask spread with
M year maturity (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV (M)y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with M year maturity. ILS and ILB denotes the aggregate Amihud measures of illiquidity for the US stock and bond markets, respectively. RA
denotes the time-varying risk aversion under habit preferences based on the consumption surplus ratio. VRP denotes the level of variance risk
premium. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields
and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between
Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 33.97 113.80 46.44 106.14∗ 47.61 107.39∗∗ 37.41 86.19 19.75 69.72
(0.55) (1.42) (0.94) (1.69) (1.07) (2.06) (0.86) (1.65) (0.49) (1.52)
RA −0.85 −4.09 −1.00 −3.51 −0.97 −3.72∗ −0.36 −2.62 0.45 −1.82
(−0.36) (−1.32) (−0.51) (−1.47) (−0.55) (−1.83) (−0.21) (−1.29) (0.28) (−1.02)
RA×Dt 1.61 4.24∗ 1.22 3.48∗ 0.85 2.90∗ 0.31 2.22 −0.27 1.36
(0.73) (1.81) (0.71) (1.78) (0.57) (1.70) (0.22) (1.34) (−0.21) (0.98)
VRP 7.16∗∗ 6.32∗∗ 9.02∗∗∗ 7.50∗∗∗ 8.32∗∗ 5.12 9.68∗∗∗ 6.88∗ 11.11∗∗∗ 8.60∗∗
(2.13) (2.30) (2.99) (2.71) (2.60) (1.53) (3.03) (1.86) (3.06) (2.22)
VRP×Dt 16.48 21.98 7.07 16.60 1.07 6.37 −1.35 6.40 −2.13 0.48
(0.89) (1.39) (0.51) (1.08) (0.09) (0.51) (−0.12) (0.50) (−0.21) (0.05)
∆ TERM −0.47 −9.33 10.34 8.08 7.90 2.66 19.79 17.38 −11.95 −12.68
(−0.02) (−0.30) (0.44) (0.29) (0.39) (0.10) (1.12) (0.90) (−0.37) (−0.35)
∆ TERM×Dt 80.76 −4.28 40.58 −17.96 19.69 −9.76 5.43 −23.33 69.16 39.41
(0.54) (−0.04) (0.36) (−0.21) (0.20) (−0.13) (0.06) (−0.28) (0.68) (0.50)
∆ DEF 153.50 128.83 225.60∗∗ 179.94 174.04 92.94 182.80 117.24 236.75∗∗ 171.90
(1.35) (1.06) (2.16) (1.50) (1.62) (0.77) (1.59) (1.00) (2.02) (1.40)
∆ DEF×Dt 17.54 393.05∗∗ −56.81 215.92 15.54 301.04∗ −8.88 265.71 −96.65 160.14
(0.08) (2.04) (−0.30) (1.10) (0.09) (1.82) (−0.05) (1.42) (−0.59) (0.96)
ILB 225.67 122.12 63.64 72.64 61.33
(1.42) (0.52) (0.28) (0.37) (0.28)
ILB×Dt −1973.55∗∗∗ −1419.82∗∗ −1088.28∗ −1128.21∗ −983.08∗
(−3.61) (−2.36) (−1.75) (−1.86) (−1.92)
∆ ILCOV1y 2821.86
(1.35)
∆ ILCOV1y×Dt −2833.45
(−1.36)
∆ ILCOV3y 188.43∗∗
(2.48)
∆ ILCOV3y×Dt −207.22∗∗
(−2.21)
∆ ILCOV5y 88.19∗∗
(2.52)
∆ ILCOV5y×Dt −90.77∗∗
(−2.20)
∆ ILCOV7y 49.90∗∗∗
(3.22)
∆ ILCOV7y×Dt −56.33∗∗
(−2.24)
∆ ILCOV10y 33.68∗∗∗
(3.19)
∆ ILCOV10y×Dt −32.71∗∗
(−2.22)
N 83 71 83 71 83 71 83 71 83 71
adj. R2 0.109 0.226 0.103 0.195 0.043 0.079 0.026 0.078 0.047 0.118
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table D4: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Bid-ask Spread Illiquidity and Amihud Bond Illiquidity
(Without DEF).
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in portfolio CDS spread (equally weighted) with different maturities as a dependant
variable. t-statistics are calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the
number of observations used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS1y denotes changes in aggregate
CDS Bid-ask spread (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV1y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with 1 year maturity. ILS denotes the AR(2) residual of stationarized aggregate Amihud measure for the US stock market. ILB is the AR(2)
residual of the aggregate Amihud measure for the US corporate bond market. RA denotes the risk aversion in levels for the gamma parameter
equal to 2. VRP denotes the level of variance risk premium, which is calculated as the difference between the monthly realized volatility of the
S& P500 index return (annualized) and the VIX index for the corresponding month. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines
as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes
changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 122.59 120.62 150.11∗ 143.90∗ 151.28∗∗ 145.41∗ 139.91∗ 133.94∗ 108.14∗ 103.46
(1.36) (1.31) (1.90) (1.82) (2.10) (1.97) (1.98) (1.85) (1.78) (1.67)
∆ ILBAS1y 35.94∗∗∗ 35.65∗∗∗
(7.41) (6.60)
∆ ILBAS1y×Dt −25.59∗∗∗ −25.69∗∗∗
(−4.87) (−4.46)
∆ ILBAS3y 10.49∗ 9.14
(1.85) (1.54)
∆ ILBAS3y×Dt −2.03 −1.29
(−0.33) (−0.20)
∆ ILBAS5y 26.60∗∗∗ 25.77∗∗∗
(5.69) (5.28)
∆ ILBAS5y×Dt −17.50∗∗∗ −17.31∗∗∗
(−3.35) (−3.21)
∆ ILBAS7y 28.14∗∗∗ 26.91∗∗∗
(3.56) (2.91)
∆ ILBAS7y×Dt −19.08∗∗ −18.43∗
(−2.30) (−1.93)
∆ ILBAS10y 23.47∗∗∗ 20.96∗∗∗
(3.71) (2.84)
∆ ILBAS10y×Dt −14.48∗∗ −12.44
(−2.17) (−1.62)
ILB 124.63 126.20 183.46 180.41 −67.97 −61.51 195.82 194.43 160.67 158.31
(1.01) (1.01) (0.68) (0.74) (−0.37) (−0.35) (0.82) (0.83) (0.72) (0.75)
ILB×Dt −622.22 −738.36 −597.24 −788.97 −254.64 −424.72 −457.45 −618.52 −469.13 −587.86
(−1.16) (−1.20) (−1.22) (−1.58) (−0.61) (−0.99) (−1.03) (−1.35) (−1.27) (−1.57)
RA −4.64 −4.56 −5.31∗ −5.05 −5.45∗ −5.21∗ −4.78∗ −4.53 −3.36 −3.15
(−1.31) (−1.26) (−1.71) (−1.63) (−1.91) (−1.79) (−1.71) (−1.58) (−1.40) (−1.28)
RA×Dt 3.18 3.11 3.43∗ 3.17 3.38∗ 3.14∗ 2.71 2.46 1.87 1.66
(1.43) (1.34) (1.69) (1.49) (1.95) (1.71) (1.61) (1.39) (1.25) (1.07)
VRP 3.07∗ 3.08∗ 6.57∗∗ 6.74∗∗ 4.83∗∗ 4.90∗∗ 6.06∗∗ 6.14∗∗ 8.06∗∗∗ 8.29∗∗
(1.78) (1.78) (2.31) (2.28) (2.13) (2.07) (2.15) (2.09) (2.68) (2.61)
VRP×Dt 4.60 3.46 2.42 −0.89 −0.48 −3.37 −4.13 −7.01 −4.50 −6.79
(0.29) (0.21) (0.21) (−0.08) (−0.05) (−0.34) (−0.40) (−0.72) (−0.57) (−0.87)
∆ TERM −0.99 −0.72 13.88 16.44 8.07 8.65 24.49 25.54 −10.62 −8.72
(−0.04) (−0.03) (0.44) (0.60) (0.29) (0.30) (1.25) (1.37) (−0.27) (−0.24)
∆ TERM×Dt −45.12 −49.09 −38.68 −49.13 −71.47 −76.57 −90.62 −96.47 −23.25 −28.46
(−0.39) (−0.40) (−0.45) (−0.55) (−1.11) (−1.11) (−1.61) (−1.65) (−0.39) (−0.49)
∆ DEF 19.92 185.01 44.41 79.94 132.49
(0.23) (1.55) (0.44) (0.79) (1.06)
∆ DEF×Dt 73.29 −6.39 109.93 72.34 −19.73
(0.47) (−0.04) (0.90) (0.61) (−0.14)
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
adj. R2 0.436 0.418 0.357 0.346 0.282 0.266 0.286 0.271 0.368 0.354
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table D5: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Gamma Illiquidity and Amihud Stock Illiquidity (Without
DEF).
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in portfolio CDS spread (equally weighted) with different maturities as a dependant
variable. t-statistics are calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the
number of observations used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS1y denotes changes in aggregate
CDS Bid-ask spread (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV1y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with 1 year maturity. ILS denotes the AR(2) residual of stationarized aggregate Amihud measure for the US stock market. ILB is the AR(2)
residual of the aggregate Amihud measure for the US corporate bond market. RA denotes the risk aversion in levels for the gamma parameter
equal to 2. VRP denotes the level of variance risk premium, which is calculated as the difference between the monthly realized volatility of the
S& P500 index return (annualized) and the VIX index for the corresponding month. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines
as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes
changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 43.08 43.58 54.87 52.92 59.55 55.40 46.01 43.95 32.67 31.13
(0.72) (0.68) (1.04) (0.98) (1.24) (1.12) (1.01) (0.95) (0.81) (0.74)
∆ ILCOV1y 3338.44∗ 3172.98∗
(1.77) (1.70)
∆ ILCOV1y×Dt −3373.12∗ −3208.83∗
(−1.77) (−1.70)
∆ ILCOV3y 134.06 104.31
(1.65) (1.53)
∆ ILCOV3y×Dt −141.48 −111.23
(−1.46) (−1.28)
∆ ILCOV5y 68.72∗∗ 59.18∗
(2.20) (1.97)
∆ ILCOV5y×Dt −67.26∗ −57.10
(−1.84) (−1.59)
∆ ILCOV7y 38.67∗∗∗ 33.86∗∗∗
(2.98) (2.94)
∆ ILCOV7y×Dt −40.84∗ −35.76∗
(−1.95) (−1.73)
∆ ILCOV10y 27.05∗∗∗ 22.53∗∗∗
(2.66) (2.89)
∆ ILCOV10y×Dt −24.12∗ −19.48∗
(−1.83) (−1.68)
ILS 127.99∗∗∗ 125.65∗∗∗ 127.85∗∗∗ 126.31∗∗∗ 94.79∗∗∗ 95.20∗∗∗ 116.81∗∗∗ 116.21∗∗∗ 116.75∗∗∗ 115.81∗∗∗
(3.66) (3.47) (4.46) (4.23) (3.05) (2.92) (3.42) (3.39) (3.74) (3.72)
ILS×Dt 5.87 12.14 −26.26 −33.96 5.45 −17.35 −10.02 −20.61 −22.16 −28.78
(0.04) (0.06) (−0.25) (−0.29) (0.06) (−0.17) (−0.11) (−0.18) (−0.28) (−0.32)
RA −1.48 −1.50 −1.59 −1.50 −1.86 −1.66 −1.09 −0.99 −0.43 −0.34
(−0.63) (−0.60) (−0.77) (−0.71) (−0.98) (−0.85) (−0.61) (−0.54) (−0.27) (−0.21)
RA×Dt 2.07 2.09 1.74 1.64 1.53 1.28 0.92 0.80 0.24 0.14
(1.07) (0.97) (1.11) (0.95) (1.07) (0.84) (0.66) (0.55) (0.20) (0.11)
VRP 2.90 2.92 4.67∗ 4.80∗ 3.33 3.58 4.46 4.65 6.09∗ 6.31∗
(1.17) (1.09) (1.95) (1.89) (1.07) (1.10) (1.38) (1.36) (1.75) (1.69)
VRP×Dt 18.36 18.58 11.10 10.33 4.03 2.19 2.79 1.86 −1.72 −2.43
(1.04) (1.01) (0.84) (0.70) (0.37) (0.19) (0.25) (0.16) (−0.19) (−0.26)
∆ TERM −6.17 −3.66 8.30 11.93 3.31 5.75 17.82 20.26 −13.93 −10.42
(−0.20) (−0.13) (0.26) (0.43) (0.14) (0.27) (1.10) (1.36) (−0.35) (−0.29)
∆ TERM×Dt 40.56 36.53 9.72 9.47 −5.03 0.15 −22.07 −20.94 40.06 38.98
(0.32) (0.35) (0.09) (0.10) (−0.05) (0.00) (−0.20) (−0.20) (0.38) (0.39)
∆ DEF 104.87 173.32∗ 100.70 113.74 168.38∗
(1.06) (1.78) (1.11) (1.31) (1.83)
∆ DEF×Dt −119.26 −135.45 −9.43 −69.65 −138.31
(−0.34) (−0.56) (−0.05) (−0.36) (−0.84)
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83
adj. R2 0.107 0.082 0.100 0.075 0.035 0.011 0.027 0.000 0.072 0.048
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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Table D6: Extreme Portfolio CDS Spreads, CDS Gamma Illiquidity and Amihud Bond Illiquidity (Without
DEF).
This table reports monthly regressions with changes in portfolio CDS spread (equally weighted) with different maturities as a dependant
variable. t-statistics are calculated based on standard errors corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Newey-West). N denotes the
number of observations used in the regression analysis. adj. R2 denotes the adjusted R2 statistics. ∆ILBAS1y denotes changes in aggregate
CDS Bid-ask spread (in annual basis points). ∆ILCOV1y denotes changes in aggregate monthly gamma measure of illiquidity for CDS spreads
with 1 year maturity. ILS denotes the AR(2) residual of stationarized aggregate Amihud measure for the US stock market. ILB is the AR(2)
residual of the aggregate Amihud measure for the US corporate bond market. RA denotes the risk aversion in levels for the gamma parameter
equal to 2. VRP denotes the level of variance risk premium, which is calculated as the difference between the monthly realized volatility of the
S& P500 index return (annualized) and the VIX index for the corresponding month. ∆TERM denotes changes in term spread, which is defines
as the difference between 10-year constant maturity Treasury bond yields and 3-month constant maturity Treasury bill yields. ∆DEF denotes
changes in default spread, which is defines as the differences between Moody’s Aaa and Baa bond yields.
1y 3y 5y 7y 10y
without with without with without with without with without with
Cons 125.93 113.80 114.63 106.14∗ 116.18∗ 107.39∗∗ 96.17 86.19 78.43 69.72
(1.40) (1.42) (1.52) (1.69) (1.88) (2.06) (1.57) (1.65) (1.51) (1.52)
∆ ILCOV1y 3018.05 2821.86
(1.46) (1.35)
∆ ILCOV1y×Dt −3031.59 −2833.45
(−1.47) (−1.36)
∆ ILCOV3y 220.63∗∗ 188.43∗∗
(2.40) (2.48)
∆ ILCOV3y×Dt −241.26∗∗ −207.22∗∗
(−2.28) (−2.21)
∆ ILCOV5y 96.92∗∗∗ 88.19∗∗
(2.80) (2.52)
∆ ILCOV5y×Dt −100.00∗∗ −90.77∗∗
(−2.47) (−2.20)
∆ ILCOV7y 55.06∗∗∗ 49.90∗∗∗
(3.57) (3.22)
∆ ILCOV7y×Dt −61.07∗∗ −56.33∗∗
(−2.47) (−2.24)
∆ ILCOV10y 38.50∗∗∗ 33.68∗∗∗
(3.22) (3.19)
∆ ILCOV10y×Dt −37.32∗∗ −32.71∗∗
(−2.40) (−2.22)
ILB 219.78 225.67 114.94 122.12 57.01 63.64 63.23 72.64 49.30 61.33
(1.22) (1.42) (0.44) (0.52) (0.23) (0.28) (0.30) (0.37) (0.20) (0.28)
ILB×Dt −1486.84∗∗∗ −1973.55∗∗∗ −1057.65∗ −1419.82∗∗ −725.21 −1088.28∗ −758.84 −1128.21∗ −660.19 −983.08∗
(−2.92) (−3.61) (−1.80) (−2.36) (−1.21) (−1.75) (−1.35) (−1.86) (−1.37) (−1.92)
RA −4.56 −4.09 −3.86 −3.51 −4.10∗ −3.72∗ −3.03 −2.62 −2.19 −1.82
(−1.31) (−1.32) (−1.34) (−1.47) (−1.72) (−1.83) (−1.29) (−1.29) (−1.09) (−1.02)
RA×Dt 5.05∗∗ 4.24∗ 4.13∗∗ 3.48∗ 3.56∗∗ 2.90∗ 2.84∗ 2.22 1.92 1.36
(2.29) (1.81) (2.10) (1.78) (2.12) (1.70) (1.72) (1.34) (1.39) (0.98)
VRP 6.42∗∗ 6.32∗∗ 7.43∗∗∗ 7.50∗∗∗ 4.91 5.12 6.73∗ 6.88∗ 8.43∗∗ 8.60∗∗
(2.52) (2.30) (2.79) (2.71) (1.52) (1.53) (1.88) (1.86) (2.26) (2.22)
VRP×Dt 35.24∗∗ 21.98 27.30∗ 16.60 16.91 6.37 15.94 6.40 8.86 0.48
(2.10) (1.39) (1.77) (1.08) (1.25) (0.51) (1.16) (0.50) (0.91) (0.05)
∆ TERM −11.72 −9.33 4.80 8.08 0.84 2.66 15.50 17.38 −15.56 −12.68
(−0.36) (−0.30) (0.15) (0.29) (0.03) (0.10) (0.76) (0.90) (−0.39) (−0.35)
∆ TERM×Dt 33.21 −4.28 10.73 −17.96 18.48 −9.76 4.79 −23.33 64.93 39.41
(0.28) (−0.04) (0.11) (−0.21) (0.21) (−0.13) (0.05) (−0.28) (0.70) (0.50)
∆ DEF 128.83 179.94 92.94 117.24 171.90
(1.06) (1.50) (0.77) (1.00) (1.40)
∆ DEF×Dt 393.05∗∗ 215.92 301.04∗ 265.71 160.14
(2.04) (1.10) (1.82) (1.42) (0.96)
N 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71
adj. R2 0.193 0.226 0.167 0.195 0.045 0.079 0.043 0.078 0.084 0.118
t statistics in parentheses∗ p< 0.1, ∗∗ p< 0.05, ∗∗∗ p< 0.01
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